XSS, SQL Injection, medstatsystems.com, CWE-79, CAPEC-86

Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defence and monitor the traffic passing through switches.

Issue remediation

The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.

1.1. http://www.medstatsystems.com/ next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field:

password

Request

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:01:57 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 6341

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
Medstat Sy
...[SNIP]...
<td style="vertical-align: top;">
<form action="members/index.cfm" method="post" name="loginform">
<table class="border">
...[SNIP]...
<td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">
<input type="password" size="20" name="password" />
</td>
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.medstatsystems.com/aboutUs.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/aboutUs.aspx

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field:

password

Request

GET /aboutUs.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/contactUs.aspx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:10:41 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 13072

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
Medstat Sy
...[SNIP]...
<td style="vertical-align: top;">
<form action="members/index.cfm" method="post" name="loginform">
<table class="border">
...[SNIP]...
<td style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">
<input type="password" size="20" name="password" />
</td>
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://www.medstatsystems.com/contactUs.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/contactUs.aspx

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field:

password

Request

GET /contactUs.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

1.4. http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/members/index.cfm

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field:

password

Request

POST /members/index.cfm HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://www.medstatsystems.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Content-Length: 16

login=&password=

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:14 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET


                       <HTML>
<HEAD>
   <TITLE>Medstat Systems, Inc.</TITLE>
   <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="Medstat, Systems" >
   <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Medstat Systems, Inc." >
   <META NAME="titl
...[SNIP]...
</B>

<form action="index.cfm" method="post" name="loginform">
<TABLE CELLPADDING="5" CELLSPACING="1" BORDER="0">
...[SNIP]...
<TD><INPUT TYPE="password" SIZE="25" NAME="password"></TD>
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-site scripting (reflected) previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/getPassword2.cfm [Referer HTTP header]
/getPassword2.cfm [User-Agent HTTP header]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

2.1. http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword2.cfm [Referer HTTP header] previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/getPassword2.cfm

Issue detail

The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 2c303<script>alert(1)</script>e25a722a066edc8e1 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Request

GET /getPassword2.cfm?email= HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=2c303<script>alert(1)</script>e25a722a066edc8e1
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://www.medstatsystems.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:54 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET

</TD></TD></TD></TH></TH></TH></TR></TR></TR></TABLE></TABLE></TABLE></A></ABBREV></ACRONYM></ADDRESS></APPLET></AU></B></BANNER></BIG></BLINK></BLOCKQUOTE></BQ></CAPTION></CENTER></CITE></CODE></
...[SNIP]...
<BR>HTTP Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=2c303<script>alert(1)</script>e25a722a066edc8e1<BR>
...[SNIP]...

2.2. http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword2.cfm [User-Agent HTTP header] previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/getPassword2.cfm

Issue detail

The value of the User-Agent HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 12d41<script>alert(1)</script>fd591b5cb5c204c52 was submitted in the User-Agent HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Request

GET /getPassword2.cfm?email= HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword1.cfm
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://www.medstatsystems.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.1612d41<script>alert(1)</script>fd591b5cb5c204c52
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:49 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET

</TD></TD></TD></TH></TH></TH></TR></TR></TR></TABLE></TABLE></TABLE></A></ABBREV></ACRONYM></ADDRESS></APPLET></AU></B></BANNER></BIG></BLINK></BLOCKQUOTE></BQ></CAPTION></CENTER></CITE></CODE></
...[SNIP]...
<BR>Browser: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.1612d41<script>alert(1)</script>fd591b5cb5c204c52<BR>
...[SNIP]...

3. Password field with autocomplete enabled previous next
There are 4 instances of this issue:

/
/aboutUs.aspx
/contactUs.aspx
/members/index.cfm

Issue background

Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.

The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.

Issue remediation

To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).

3.1. http://www.medstatsystems.com/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

password

Request

Response

3.2. http://www.medstatsystems.com/aboutUs.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/aboutUs.aspx

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

password

Request

Response

3.3. http://www.medstatsystems.com/contactUs.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/contactUs.aspx

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

password

Request

Response

3.4. http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/members/index.cfm

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:

http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm

The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

password

Request

Response

4. Referer-dependent response previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/getPassword2.cfm

Issue description

The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.

Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:

Referer-based access controls, where the application assumes that if you have arrived from one privileged location then you are authorised to access another privileged location. These controls can be trivially defeated by supplying an accepted Referer header in requests for the vulnerable function.
Attempts to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks by verifying that requests to perform privileged actions originated from within the application itself and not from some external location. Such defences are not robust - methods have existed through which an attacker can forge or mask the Referer header contained within a target user's requests, by leveraging client-side technologies such as Flash and other techniques.
Delivery of Referer-tailored content, such as welcome messages to visitors from specific domains, search-engine optimisation (SEO) techniques, and other ways of tailoring the user's experience. Such behaviours often have no security impact; however, unsafe processing of the Referer header may introduce vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. If parts of the document (such as META keywords) are updated based on search engine queries contained in the Referer header, then the application may be vulnerable to persistent code injection attacks, in which search terms are manipulated to cause malicious content to appear in responses served to other application users.

Issue remediation

The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defences against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.

If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defences against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.

Request 1

POST /getPassword2.cfm HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword1.cfm
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://www.medstatsystems.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Content-Length: 6

email=

Response 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:25 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET

</TD></TD></TD></TH></TH></TH></TR></TR></TR></TABLE></TABLE></TABLE></A></ABBREV></ACRONYM></ADDRESS></APPLET></AU></B></BANNER></BIG></BLINK></BLOCKQUOTE></BQ></CAPTION></CENTER></CITE></CODE></
...[SNIP]...
<BR>Remote Address: 173.193.214.243<BR>HTTP Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword1.cfm<P></TD></TR></TABLE><P><HR>
</BODY></HTML>

Request 2

POST /getPassword2.cfm HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://www.medstatsystems.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Content-Length: 6

email=

Response 2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:32 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET

</TD></TD></TD></TH></TH></TH></TR></TR></TR></TABLE></TABLE></TABLE></A></ABBREV></ACRONYM></ADDRESS></APPLET></AU></B></BANNER></BIG></BLINK></BLOCKQUOTE></BQ></CAPTION></CENTER></CITE></CODE></
...[SNIP]...
<BR>Remote Address: 173.193.214.243<P></TD></TR></TABLE><P><HR>
</BODY></HTML>

5. Email addresses disclosed previous next
There are 5 instances of this issue:

/
/aboutUs.aspx
/contactUs.aspx
/getPassword1.cfm
/members/index.cfm

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

5.1. http://www.medstatsystems.com/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:01:57 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 6341

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
Medstat Sy
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com </li>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">
rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

5.2. http://www.medstatsystems.com/aboutUs.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/aboutUs.aspx

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:10:41 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 13072

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
Medstat Sy
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">
rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

5.3. http://www.medstatsystems.com/contactUs.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/contactUs.aspx

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

dshay@medstatsystems.com
ejauert@medstatsystems.com
jhammond@medstatsystems.com
raldrich@medstatsystems.com
rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com
sbohm@medstatsystems.com
tbohm@medstatsystems.com
tbyrnes@medstatsystems.com

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:10:32 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 9049

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
Medstat Sy
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:sbohm@medstatsystems.com">sbohm@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:raldrich@medstatsystems.com">raldrich@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:ejauert@medstatsystems.com">ejauert@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:dshay@medstatsystems.com">dshay@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:jhammond@medstatsystems.com">jhammond@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:tbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">tbyrnes@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:tbohm@medstatsystems.com">tbohm@medstatsystems.com
</td>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">
rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

5.4. http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword1.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/getPassword1.cfm

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com

Request

GET /getPassword1.cfm HTTP/1.1
Host: www.medstatsystems.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.151 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:22 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET


<HTML>
<HEAD>
   <TITLE>Medstat Systems, Inc.</TITLE>
   <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="Medstat, Systems, Courier, Transportation, Delivery" >
   <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Medstat Systems, I
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com">rbyrnes@medstatsystems.com</A>
...[SNIP]...

5.5. http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/members/index.cfm

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

medstat@medstatsystems.com

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:14 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET


                       <HTML>
<HEAD>
   <TITLE>Medstat Systems, Inc.</TITLE>
   <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="Medstat, Systems" >
   <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Medstat Systems, Inc." >
   <META NAME="titl
...[SNIP]...
<A HREF="mailto:medstat@medstatsystems.com">medstat@medstatsystems.com</A>
...[SNIP]...

6. Content type is not specified previous
There are 3 instances of this issue:

/getPassword1.cfm
/getPassword2.cfm
/members/index.cfm

Issue description

If a web response does not specify a content type, then the browser will usually analyse the response and attempt to determine the MIME type of its content. This can have unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the absence of a content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

6.1. http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword1.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/getPassword1.cfm

Request

Response

6.2. http://www.medstatsystems.com/getPassword2.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/getPassword2.cfm

Request

Response

6.3. http://www.medstatsystems.com/members/index.cfm previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.medstatsystems.com
Path:	/members/index.cfm

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 15:02:14 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
MicrosoftOfficeWebServer: 5.0_Pub
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET


                       <HTML>
<HEAD>
   <TITLE>Medstat Systems, Inc.</TITLE>
   <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="Medstat, Systems" >
   <META NAME="description" CONTENT="Medstat Systems, Inc." >
   <META NAME="titl
...[SNIP]...
<META NAME="author" CONTENT="Medstat" >
   <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1" >
   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../MedstatStyle.css" />
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Mar 24 10:12:39 CDT 2011.