Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://www.info.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]next
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.info.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9857d"-alert(1)-"1634c822576 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /?9857d"-alert(1)-"1634c822576=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head> <title>Info.com - Search the Web</title> <meta name=keywords content="Info,information,Search,Searches,Searching,Searchers,Advanced search,Search Help,Search guide,Search tips,Search t ...[SNIP]... <!-- var pqry="qcat%3DWeb%26itpage%3D?9857d"-alert(1)-"1634c822576=1";var rqry="iREGQry";var sqry="iSale";var dt=window.document,nr=navigator,ina=nr.appName,sr="0&0",px=0,sv=10,je=0; var inav=nr.appVersion,iie=inav.indexOf('MSIE '),intp=(ina.indexOf('Netscape')> ...[SNIP]...
1.2. http://www.info.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Firm
Host:
http://www.info.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c4beb'><a>13945db1d18 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Request
GET /?c4beb'><a>13945db1d18=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 436a5%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253ed23057a9ce0 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 436a5<script>alert(1)</script>d23057a9ce0 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /washington%20dc%20law%20firms436a5%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253ed23057a9ce0 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>Info.com - washington dc law firms436a5%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ed23057a9ce0 - www.Info.com</title><l ...[SNIP]... <a href="http://Info.com/searchw?qkw=washington+dc+law+firms+436a5%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3Ed23057a9ce0&r_cop=spell" style="text-decoration:underline">washington dc law firms 436a5<script>alert(1)</script>d23057a9ce0</a> ...[SNIP]...
2. Cookie scoped to parent domainpreviousnext There are 2 instances of this issue:
A cookie's domain attribute determines which domains can access the cookie. Browsers will automatically submit the cookie in requests to in-scope domains, and those domains will also be able to access the cookie via JavaScript. If a cookie is scoped to a parent domain, then that cookie will be accessible by the parent domain and also by any other subdomains of the parent domain. If the cookie contains sensitive data (such as a session token) then this data may be accessible by less trusted or less secure applications residing at those domains, leading to a security compromise.
Issue remediation
By default, cookies are scoped to the issuing domain and all subdomains. If you remove the explicit domain attribute from your Set-cookie directive, then the cookie will have this default scope, which is safe and appropriate in most situations. If you particularly need a cookie to be accessible by a parent domain, then you should thoroughly review the security of the applications residing on that domain and its subdomains, and confirm that you are willing to trust the people and systems which support those applications.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /washington%20dc%20law HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>Info.com - washington dc law - www.Info.com</title><link rel="shortcut icon" href="http://gfx.info.com/common/imag ...[SNIP]...
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /washington%20dc%20law%20firms HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>Info.com - washington dc law firms - www.Info.com</title><link rel="shortcut icon" href="http://gfx.info.com/commo ...[SNIP]...
3. Cross-domain script includepreviousnext There are 3 instances of this issue:
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
GET /washington%20dc%20law HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
GET /washington%20dc%20law%20firms HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:
Z=YOYLQIS74.205.26.219CKMLO; path=/
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /washington%20dc%20law HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>Info.com - washington dc law - www.Info.com</title><link rel="shortcut icon" href="http://gfx.info.com/common/imag ...[SNIP]...
The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /washington%20dc%20law%20firms HTTP/1.1 Host: www.info.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>Info.com - washington dc law firms - www.Info.com</title><link rel="shortcut icon" href="http://gfx.info.com/commo ...[SNIP]...
Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Apr 17 09:28:56 CDT 2011.