Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d5b9c"-alert(1)-"b05d62e2351 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /online-scanner HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=d5b9c"-alert(1)-"b05d62e2351
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 79440"-alert(1)-"b598b50e2ed was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /online-scanner/help HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=79440"-alert(1)-"b598b50e2ed
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 745d9"-alert(1)-"b96c10ee407 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /online-scanner/run HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=745d9"-alert(1)-"b96c10ee407 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.1.10.1303044897; s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 98e22"-alert(1)-"2096f355350 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /purchase HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=98e22"-alert(1)-"2096f355350
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a252f"-alert(1)-"980a35ca14f was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=a252f"-alert(1)-"980a35ca14f
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6c103"-alert(1)-"ae091e76540 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/ HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=6c103"-alert(1)-"ae091e76540
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 72d6a"-alert(1)-"5798006d14 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/activate HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=72d6a"-alert(1)-"5798006d14
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 171a7"-alert(1)-"728ddbe3c42 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/business/products HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=171a7"-alert(1)-"728ddbe3c42
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a378a"-alert(1)-"cc718e60cd8 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/company HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.1.10.1303044897; s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=a378a"-alert(1)-"cc718e60cd8
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 183b2"-alert(1)-"80f4e4b2bd was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/company/contact HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=183b2"-alert(1)-"80f4e4b2bd
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b04f0"-alert(1)-"e90e470ffad was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/company/fun-stuff HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=b04f0"-alert(1)-"e90e470ffad
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 180f9"-alert(1)-"a6eaf5719f2 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/company/legal-notices HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=180f9"-alert(1)-"a6eaf5719f2
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e97d8"-alert(1)-"fbe9f8cd23c was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/company/privacy-policy HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=e97d8"-alert(1)-"fbe9f8cd23c
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 4d532"-alert(1)-"511703cb891 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/download HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=4d532"-alert(1)-"511703cb891
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f8efc"-alert(1)-"85ec92afe8 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/download/free-trial HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=f8efc"-alert(1)-"85ec92afe8
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 4915b"-alert(1)-"48ff9162e36 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/download/free-trial/nod32-antivirus HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=4915b"-alert(1)-"48ff9162e36
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 99a9d"-alert(1)-"f4bb3c9f35 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/download/free-trial/smart-security HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=99a9d"-alert(1)-"f4bb3c9f35
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3de70"-alert(1)-"aff7b074c41 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/home HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=3de70"-alert(1)-"aff7b074c41
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3eb46"-alert(1)-"bea4f5a8167 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/home/compare-eset-to-competition HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=3eb46"-alert(1)-"bea4f5a8167
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 45768"-alert(1)-"5ab3639d88d was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/home/nod32-antivirus HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=45768"-alert(1)-"5ab3639d88d
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload fdaa1"-alert(1)-"a109434bb74 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/home/smart-security HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=fdaa1"-alert(1)-"a109434bb74
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload fa10d"-alert(1)-"394143401d1 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/online-scanner HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=fa10d"-alert(1)-"394143401d1
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 87b2c"-alert(1)-"4bfc395c0f4 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/online-scanner/run HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=87b2c"-alert(1)-"4bfc395c0f4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.1.10.1303044897; s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c4c89"-alert(1)-"905792298ce was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/partners HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c4c89"-alert(1)-"905792298ce
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9f790"-alert(1)-"2951c1a0ee7 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/partners/worldwide-partners HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=9f790"-alert(1)-"2951c1a0ee7
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 9d7e3"-alert(1)-"3cfb654df82 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/press-center HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=9d7e3"-alert(1)-"3cfb654df82
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 91bf9"-alert(1)-"12531d7b5ed was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/renew HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=91bf9"-alert(1)-"12531d7b5ed
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c9f54"-alert(1)-"0b6f004dd10 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/rss HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c9f54"-alert(1)-"0b6f004dd10
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 936d3"-alert(1)-"a91f278d403 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/sitemap HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=936d3"-alert(1)-"a91f278d403
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5491d"-alert(1)-"4a921ceb826 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /us/store HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=5491d"-alert(1)-"4a921ceb826
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:
PHPSESSID=cactk8q566m5g6gpieoat7p2l0; path=/
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
Request
GET /us/online-scanner HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"><html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> <head> <title>F ...[SNIP]...
3. Password field with autocomplete enabledpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.eset.com
Path:
/us/partners
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL:
https://secure.eset.com/us/partners
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
password
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
Request
GET /us/partners HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.2.10.1303044897; mbox=check#true#1303045213|session#1303045152447-372951#1303047013|PC#1303045152447-372951.17#1304254757;
The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.
Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:
Referer-based access controls, where the application assumes that if you have arrived from one privileged location then you are authorised to access another privileged location. These controls can be trivially defeated by supplying an accepted Referer header in requests for the vulnerable function.
Attempts to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks by verifying that requests to perform privileged actions originated from within the application itself and not from some external location. Such defences are not robust - methods have existed through which an attacker can forge or mask the Referer header contained within a target user's requests, by leveraging client-side technologies such as Flash and other techniques.
Delivery of Referer-tailored content, such as welcome messages to visitors from specific domains, search-engine optimisation (SEO) techniques, and other ways of tailoring the user's experience. Such behaviours often have no security impact; however, unsafe processing of the Referer header may introduce vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. If parts of the document (such as META keywords) are updated based on search engine queries contained in the Referer header, then the application may be vulnerable to persistent code injection attacks, in which search terms are manipulated to cause malicious content to appear in responses served to other application users.
Issue remediation
The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defences against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.
If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defences against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.
Request 1
GET /us/online-scanner/run HTTP/1.1 Host: www.eset.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.eset.com/us/online-scanner User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=berki2oh2eh89hcmnibdtt6du1; __utmz=1.1303044897.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=1.379079516.1303044897.1303044897.1303044897.1; __utmc=1; __utmb=1.1.10.1303044897; s_pers=%20s_visit%3D1%7C1303046697136%3B%20gpv_pageName%3Dus/online-scanner%7C1303046697139%3B%20s_nr%3D1303044897141-New%7C1334580897141%3B%20s_vnum%3D1334580897143%2526vn%253D1%7C1334580897143%3B%20s_invisit%3Dtrue%7C1303046697143%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
The POSTing of data between domains does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. You should review the contents of the information that is being transmitted between domains, and determine whether the originating application should be trusting the receiving domain with this information.
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
// Copyright Eloqua Corporation. var elqWDt = new Date(20020101); var elqDt = new Date(); var elqMs = elqDt.getMilliseconds(); var elqTzo = elqWDt.getTimezoneOffset(); var elqRef2 = ''; if (type ...[SNIP]...
var Observer=new Class({Implements:[Options,Events],options:{periodical:false,delay:1000},initialize:function(c,a,b){this.element=$(c)||$$(c);this.addEvent("onFired",a);this.setOptions(b);this.bound=t ...[SNIP]...
/* SiteCatalyst code version: H.21. Copyright 1996-2010 Adobe, Inc. All Rights Reserved More info available at http://www.omniture.com */ /************************ ADDITIONAL FEATURES *********** ...[SNIP]...