Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the uuid request parameter is copied into the name of an HTML tag attribute. The payload 64455%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%209c94ce34389 was submitted in the uuid parameter. This input was echoed as 64455 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 9c94ce34389 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 438122100300000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 17:23:32 GMT Content-Length: 7074
1.2. http://www.microsoft.com/canada/fr/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/windowspluswindowslive.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 5e56e%3balert(1)//7c1a3e885b9 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 5e56e;alert(1)//7c1a3e885b9 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 438303430900000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:58:05 GMT Content-Length: 84724
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
1.3. http://www.microsoft.com/canada/fr/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/windowspluswindowslive.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript rest-of-line comment. The payload bbc29%0ad68ec9660e0 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as bbc29 d68ec9660e0 in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to terminate the JavaScript string into which our data is being copied. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 279398330800000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:58:06 GMT Content-Length: 84662
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the ocid request parameter is copied into a JavaScript rest-of-line comment. The payload 3b762%0a524848a8e6b was submitted in the ocid parameter. This input was echoed as 3b762 524848a8e6b in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to terminate the JavaScript string into which our data is being copied. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 79184830800000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:57:49 GMT Content-Length: 84641
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the ocid request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 36543%3balert(1)//8106b1ed291 was submitted in the ocid parameter. This input was echoed as 36543;alert(1)//8106b1ed291 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791533031000000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:57:48 GMT Content-Length: 84703
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the ocid request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b30d2"%3balert(1)//8a95c30fa44 was submitted in the ocid parameter. This input was echoed as b30d2";alert(1)//8a95c30fa44 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791645230600000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:57:46 GMT Content-Length: 84548
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the tab request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 933a9"%3balert(1)//1d5e1bd35c7 was submitted in the tab parameter. This input was echoed as 933a9";alert(1)//1d5e1bd35c7 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791706430300000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:57:32 GMT Content-Length: 81673
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of the tab request parameter is copied into a JavaScript rest-of-line comment. The payload 8f765%0aalert(1)//d21fede2cb7 was submitted in the tab parameter. This input was echoed as 8f765 alert(1)//d21fede2cb7 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 279676130400000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:57:34 GMT Content-Length: 81668
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.
Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:
Referer-based access controls, where the application assumes that if you have arrived from one privileged location then you are authorised to access another privileged location. These controls can be trivially defeated by supplying an accepted Referer header in requests for the vulnerable function.
Attempts to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks by verifying that requests to perform privileged actions originated from within the application itself and not from some external location. Such defences are not robust - methods have existed through which an attacker can forge or mask the Referer header contained within a target user's requests, by leveraging client-side technologies such as Flash and other techniques.
Delivery of Referer-tailored content, such as welcome messages to visitors from specific domains, search-engine optimisation (SEO) techniques, and other ways of tailoring the user's experience. Such behaviours often have no security impact; however, unsafe processing of the Referer header may introduce vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. If parts of the document (such as META keywords) are updated based on search engine queries contained in the Referer header, then the application may be vulnerable to persistent code injection attacks, in which search terms are manipulated to cause malicious content to appear in responses served to other application users.
Issue remediation
The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defences against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.
If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defences against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: public Content-Length: 20794 Content-Type: application/x-javascript Expires: Fri, 03 Aug 2012 09:55:54 GMT Last-Modified: Sat, 23 Jul 2011 01:53:11 GMT Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 14.0.0.5136 VTag: 791453330900000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:38:52 GMT
function WebForm_PostBackOptions(eventTarget, eventArgument, validation, validationGroup, actionUrl, trackFocus, clientSubmit) { this.eventTarget = eventTarget; this.eventArgument = eventArgument; this.validation = validation; this.validationGroup = validationGroup; this.actionUrl = actionUrl; this.trackFocus = trackFocus; this.clientSubmit = clientSubmit; } function WebForm_DoPostBackWithOptions(options) { var validationResult = true; if (options.validation) { if (typeof(Page_ClientValidate) == 'function') { validationResult = Page_ClientValidate(options.validationGroup); } } if (validationResult) { if ((typeof(options.actionUrl) != "undefined") && (options.actionUrl != null) && (options.actionUrl.length > 0)) { theForm.action = options.actionUrl; } if (options.trackFocus) { var lastFocus = theForm.elements["__LASTFOCUS"]; if ((typeof(lastFocus) != "undefined") && (lastFocus != null)) { if (typeof(document.activeElement) == "undefined") { lastFocus.value = options.eventTarget; } else { var active = document.activeElement; if ((typeof(active) != "undefined") && (act ...[SNIP]...
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Location: http://www.microsoft.com/library/errorpages/smarterror.aspx?aspxerrorpath=http%3a%2f%2fwww.microsoft.com%2fWebResource.axd%3fd%3dbAElw4ObhUDwStCGAnIZE7WvteQ_RwuUsifXquxeQII2OvOdM7hvK2-Vz2f0UUB6KeuNdf7DMvAzWGtpBKcMocsS8gQ1%26t%3d634469395109273111 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 438183530300000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:39:31 GMT Content-Length: 397
<html><head><title>Object moved</title></head><body> <h2>Object moved to <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/library/errorpages/smarterror.aspx?aspxerrorpath=http%3a%2f%2fwww.microsoft.com%2fWebResource.axd%3fd%3dbAElw4ObhUDwStCGAnIZE7WvteQ_RwuUsifXquxeQII2OvOdM7hvK2-Vz2f0UUB6KeuNdf7DMvAzWGtpBKcMocsS8gQ1%26t%3d634469395109273111">here</a>.</h2> </body></html> <head><title>
</title></head>
3. Cross-domain Referer leakagepreviousnext There are 2 instances of this issue:
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Expires: -1 Last-Modified: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:38:24 GMT Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791279330400000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:38:24 GMT Content-Length: 17591
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791706430300000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:56:06 GMT Content-Length: 84544
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html dir="ltr">
<head><meta name="keywords" /><meta name="description ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="https://signup.live.com/signup.aspx?mkt=fr-ca&rollrs=12&lic=1" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Get a Windows Live ID','TN','event2');
				">Cr..er un identifiant Windows Live ID</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://home.live.com/" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Access Your Online Services','TN','event2');
				">Acc..der aux services en ligne</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://download.live.com/writer" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Writer','MN','event3');
				">Writer</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://download.live.com/toolbar" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Toolbar','MN','event3');
				">Toolbar</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://download.live.com/familysafety" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Contr..le parental','MN','event3');
				">Contr..le parental</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://download.live.com/moviemaker" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Movie Maker','MN','event3');
				">Movie Maker</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://mobile.live.com" onmousedown="javascript:" onmouseup="javascript:" onclick="javascript:TrackExitLink(this,'Mobile','MN','event3');
				">Mobile</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://download.live.com/?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:hero:getWL" target="new">T..l..charger Windows Live</a> ...[SNIP]... </a> simplifie l...importation de vos photos dans la <a href="http://download.live.com/photogallery?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:tab3:photogallery" target="new">Galerie de photos Windows Live</a> ...[SNIP]... <p> Vous pouvez retoucher automatiquement vos photos avec la <a href="http://download.live.com/photogallery?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:tab3:photogallery" target="new">Galerie de photos Windows Live</a> ...[SNIP]... <p> Ensuite, en seulement quelques clics, vous pouvez publier vos photos pr..f..r..es sur Facebook, Flickr, <a href="http://photos.live.com?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:tab3:photos" target="new">Windows Live Photos</a> ...[SNIP]... <p> Quand vos amis vous demandent des nouvelles de votre voyage par messagerie instantan..e, pensez .. faire glisser vos photos dans la fen..tre de conversation <a href="http://download.live.com/messenger?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:tab3:messenger" target="new">Windows Live Messenger</a> ...[SNIP]... <p class="generic_getstarted_links"><a href="http://www.download.live.com?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:tab3:essentials" target="new">T..l..charger Windows Live</a> ...[SNIP]... <td class="win7learnmore_link"><a href="http://download.live.com/photogallery?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:rightnav:photos" target="new">Photos</a> ...[SNIP]... <td class="win7learnmore_link"><a href="http://download.live.com/moviemaker?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:rightnav:movies" target="new">Films</a> ...[SNIP]... <td class="win7learnmore_link"><a href="http://hotmail.live.com?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:rightnav:email" target="new">Messagerie ..lectronique</a> ...[SNIP]... <td class="win7learnmore_link"><a href="http://download.live.com/messenger?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:rightnav:IM" target="new">Messagerie instantan..e</a> ...[SNIP]... <td class="win7learnmore_link"><a href="http://mobile.live.com?ocid=PID27252::T:WIN7WLv2:ON:WL:fr-ca:rightnav:mobile" target="new">Mobile</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://tou.live.com/en-us/default.aspx">L..gal</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="https://support.live.com/eform.aspx">Aide</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://feedback.live.com/">Commentaires</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://download.live.com/systemrequirements">Configuration requise</a> ...[SNIP]... <noscript> <a href="http://www.omniture.com" title="Web Analytics"> <img src="http://mswllmwave3intlcom.112.2O7.net/b/ss/mswllmwave3intlcom/1/H.17--NS/0" height="1" width="1" border="0" alt="" /> </a> ...[SNIP]... <noscript> <img border="0" name="DCSIMG" width="1" height="1" alt="" src="http://m.webtrends.com/dcsjwb9vb00000c932fd0rjc7_5p3t/njs.gif?dcsuri=/nojavascript&WT.js=No" /> </noscript> ...[SNIP]...
4. Cross-domain script includepreviousnext There are 3 instances of this issue:
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Expires: -1 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 79154831000000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:38:02 GMT Content-Length: 22925
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" > <html> <head> <title></title> <meta name="GENERATOR" Content="Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 7.1"> <meta name="CODE_LANGUAGE" ...[SNIP]... <center><script type="text/javascript" src="http://Ads1.msn.com/library/dap.js"></script> ...[SNIP]...
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Expires: -1 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 279984532100000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 23:39:05 GMT Content-Length: 39836
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Expires: -1 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791655531500000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 23:00:59 GMT Content-Length: 52154
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: max-age=900 Content-Type: application/x-javascript Last-Modified: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 08:50:36 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "a8cd280f67eca1:0" Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 VTag: 279398330800000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:56:15 GMT Content-Length: 18389
/* SiteCatalyst code version: H.17. Copyright 1997-2008 Omniture, Inc. More info available at http://www.omniture.com */
var s_account = "mswllmtoolkit3com" var s = s_gi(s_account) /*********** ...[SNIP]... av()+q+(qs?qs:s." + "rq(^C)),0,id,ta);qs`e;`Wm('t')`5s.p_r)s.p_r(`R`X`e}^7(qs);^z`p(@i;`l@i`L^9,`G$71',vb`R@G=^D=s.`N`i=s.`N^M=`F@0^y=s.ppu=^p=^pv1=^pv2=^pv3`e`5$x)`F@0@G=`F@0eo=`F@0`N`i=`F@0`N^M`e`5!id@Ls.tc#Ctc=1;s.f" + "lush`a()}`2$m`Atl`0o,t,n,vo`1;s.@G=@wo`R`N^M=t;s.`N`i=n;s.t(@i}`5pg){`F@0co`0o){`K@J\"_\",1,#B`2@wo)`Awd@0gs`0$S{`K@J$p1,#B`2s.t()`Awd@0dc`0$S{`K@J$p#B`2s.t()}}@3=(`F`J`Y`8`4@us@d0`Rd=^ ...[SNIP]...
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Expires: -1 Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 VTag: 791655531500000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 23:00:59 GMT Content-Length: 52154
If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.
In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: max-age=900 Content-Type: text/html Last-Modified: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 16:29:48 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "06637b272cdc81:0" Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 VTag: 43861730900000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 18:41:21 GMT Content-Length: 437
...<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" >
<head> <title>ErrorSearch ...[SNIP]...
7. Content type incorrectly statedprevious There are 2 instances of this issue:
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: max-age=900 Content-Type: application/x-javascript Last-Modified: Sun, 06 Jun 2010 00:23:57 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "3389648de5cb1:0" Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 VTag: 438837200800000000 P3P: CP="ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo OUR SAMo CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI" X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 17:22:39 GMT Content-Length: 59014