XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, paperg.com

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Jun 13 08:09:46 CDT 2011.

Public Domain Vulnerability Information, Security Articles, Vulnerability Reports, GHDB, DORK Search

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

2. Cross-domain Referer leakage

3. HTML does not specify charset

4. Content type incorrectly stated

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected) next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.paperg.com
Path:	/jsfb/embed.php

Issue detail

The value of the bid request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 98743%3balert(1)//c7d5874a27e was submitted in the bid parameter. This input was echoed as 98743;alert(1)//c7d5874a27e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

Request

GET /jsfb/embed.php?pid=16509&bid=395898743%3balert(1)//c7d5874a27e HTTP/1.1
Host: www.paperg.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://thesouthern.com/sports/basketball/article_c9733ff4-3bb8-56f0-83a0-e42a06ed2d38.html
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.77 Safari/534.24
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utma=27786045.1704528150.1305557138.1305557138.1305557138.1; __utmz=27786045.1305557138.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmz=1.1305557272.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=1.1027440590.1305557272.1305557272.1305557272.1

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2011 11:02:27 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3-7+squeeze1
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
P3P: CP="CAO PSA OUR"
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 45319
Connection: Keep-alive
Via: 1.1 AN-0016020122637050

var IMAGE_ROOT = 'http://www.paperg.com/beta/';
var flyerboard_root = 'http://www.paperg.com/jsfb/';
var remote_ip = '173.193.214.243';
var view = '';
var edit = '0';
var EMBED_URL395898743;alert(1)//c7d5874a27e = 'http://www.paperg.com/jsfb/embed.php?pid=16509&bid=395898743%3balert(1)//c7d5874a27e';
// links stylesheets in head
function pg_linkss(filename)
{
var head = document.getElementsByTagName('head'
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-domain Referer leakage previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.paperg.com
Path:	/jsfb/embed.php

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://www.paperg.com/jsfb/embed.php?pid=16509&bid=3958

The response contains the following link to another domain:

http://www.thesouthern.com/app/flyerboard/flyerboard.php?pid=16509&bid=3958&cid=0

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

Request

GET /jsfb/embed.php?pid=16509&bid=3958 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.paperg.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://thesouthern.com/sports/basketball/article_c9733ff4-3bb8-56f0-83a0-e42a06ed2d38.html
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/11.0.696.77 Safari/534.24
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: __utma=27786045.1704528150.1305557138.1305557138.1305557138.1; __utmz=27786045.1305557138.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmz=1.1305557272.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=1.1027440590.1305557272.1305557272.1305557272.1

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2011 11:01:20 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3-7+squeeze1
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
P3P: CP="CAO PSA OUR"
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 46774
Connection: Keep-alive
Via: 1.1 AN-0016020122637050

var IMAGE_ROOT = 'http://www.paperg.com/beta/';
var flyerboard_root = 'http://www.paperg.com/jsfb/';
var remote_ip = '173.193.214.243';
var view = '';
var edit = '0';
var EMBED_URL3958 = 'http://www.
...[SNIP]...
<div class="options-fb-wrap"><a href="http://www.thesouthern.com/app/flyerboard/flyerboard.php?pid=16509&bid=3958&cid=0" title="View All" target="_blank"><span>
...[SNIP]...

3. HTML does not specify charset previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.paperg.com
Path:	/jsfb/embed.php

Issue description

If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.

In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.

Request

Response

4. Content type incorrectly stated previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://www.paperg.com
Path:	/jsfb/embed.php

Issue detail

The response contains the following Content-type statement:

Content-Type: text/html

The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain script.

Issue background

If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

Response

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Jun 13 08:09:46 CDT 2011.