XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, DORK, GHDB, speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Apr 28 13:38:29 CDT 2011.

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

2. Email addresses disclosed

2.1. http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/CFIDE/scripts/cfform.js

2.2. http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_home.cfm

2.3. http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm


1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Path:   /speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3426f"><script>alert(1)</script>7fe943cb71c was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

Request

GET /speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm?3426f"><script>alert(1)</script>7fe943cb71c=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_home.cfm
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=446209786; CFTOKEN=36742584; s_cc=true; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 18:33:37 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


                           
...[SNIP]...
<form name="sb_request" action="/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm?3426f"><script>alert(1)</script>7fe943cb71c=1" method="post" onsubmit="return _CF_checksb_request(this)">
...[SNIP]...
2. Email addresses disclosed  previous
There are 3 instances of this issue:

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

2.1. http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/CFIDE/scripts/cfform.js  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Path:   /CFIDE/scripts/cfform.js

Issue detail

The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /CFIDE/scripts/cfform.js HTTP/1.1
Host: speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=446209786; CFTOKEN=36742584; s_cc=true; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 21329
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Content-Location: http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/CFIDE/scripts/cfform.js
Last-Modified: Fri, 09 Sep 2005 21:01:08 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "042769981b5c51:4b6"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 18:27:50 GMT

/*
* Copyright (c) 1995-2005 Macromedia, Inc. All rights reserved.
*/
// ColdFusion JavaScript functions for cfform client-side validation
var _CF_error_messages = new Array();
var _CF_error_fi
...[SNIP]...
-9]{4}$/, required);
}

/**
* validate that the value is formatted as an email address correctly
*
* this regex matches the majoriity of all email address.
* example matches.
* Matches: [rick.jones@unit.army.mil], [john_doe@foobar.com], [foo99@foo.co.uk]
* Non-Matches: [find_the_mistake.@foo.org], [.prefix.@some.net]
*
* _CF_checkURL mailto uses this same email regex - keep in sync.
*/
function _CF_checkEmail(object_value, required)
{
   //trim whitespace before we validate
object_value = object_value
...[SNIP]...
m/index.cfm/userid/1/name/mike+nimer - trick used by cf developers so search engines can parse their sites (search engines ignore query strings)
* ftp://www.mm.com/
* ftp://uname:pass@www.mm.com/
* mailto:email@address.com
* news:rec.gardening
* news:rec.gardening
* http://a/
*            file://ftp.yoyodyne.com/pub/files/foobar.txt
* Non-Matches: www.yahoo.com
* http:www.mm.co
...[SNIP]...
2.2. http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_home.cfm  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Path:   /speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_home.cfm

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_home.cfm HTTP/1.1
Host: speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 18:30:03 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


                           
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:info@simonspeakers.com?subject=Simon and Schuster Speakers Bureau" title="Contact Us">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:info@simonspeakers.com?subject=Simon and Schuster Speakers Bureau">
...[SNIP]...
2.3. http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Path:   /speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_requestForm.cfm HTTP/1.1
Host: speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://speakersbureau.simonandschuster.biz/speakersbureau/speaker_bureau_home.cfm
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.205 Safari/534.16
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: CFID=446209786; CFTOKEN=36742584; s_cc=true; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 18:33:35 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


                           
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:info@simonspeakers.com?subject=Simon and Schuster Speakers Bureau" title="Contact Us">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:info@simonspeakers.com?subject=Simon and Schuster Speakers Bureau">
...[SNIP]...
Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Apr 28 13:38:29 CDT 2011.