Report generated by Unforgivable Vulnerabilities, DORK Search, Exploit Research at Thu Jan 13 09:08:06 CST 2011.

DORK CWE-79 XSS Report

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

2. Flash cross-domain policy

3. TRACE method is enabled

4. Robots.txt file


1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://siteanalytics.compete.com
Path:   /revresda.com

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 48b8b"><img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>6ad0fda629e was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 48b8b"><img src=a onerror=alert(1)>6ad0fda629e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

Request

GET /revresda.com48b8b"><img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>6ad0fda629e HTTP/1.1
Host: siteanalytics.compete.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:45:58 GMT
Server: Apache
Vary: Cookie
Content-Length: 19256
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en">
<head>
...[SNIP]...
<span title="revresda.com48b8b"><img src=a onerror=alert(1)>6ad0fda629e">
...[SNIP]...
2. Flash cross-domain policy  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://siteanalytics.compete.com
Path:   /crossdomain.xml

Issue detail

The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which allows access from specific subdomains.

Allowing access from specific domains means that web sites on those domains can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust the specific domains allowed by the policy.

Issue background

The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.

Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access.

Issue remediation

You should review the domains which are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.

Request

GET /crossdomain.xml HTTP/1.0
Host: siteanalytics.compete.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:43 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Fri, 03 Dec 2010 16:53:34 GMT
ETag: "b898b-110-60febf80"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 272
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/xml

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM "http://www.macromedia.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd">
<cross-domain-policy>
<allow-access-from domain="media.compete.com" />
<allow-access-from domain="stg.media.compete.com" />
...[SNIP]...
3. TRACE method is enabled  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://siteanalytics.compete.com
Path:   /

Issue description

The TRACE method is designed for diagnostic purposes. If enabled, the web server will respond to requests which use the TRACE method by echoing in its response the exact request which was received.

Although this behaviour is apparently harmless in itself, it can sometimes be leveraged to support attacks against other application users. If an attacker can find a way of causing a user to make a TRACE request, and can retrieve the response to that request, then the attacker will be able to capture any sensitive data which is included in the request by the user's browser, for example session cookies or credentials for platform-level authentication. This may exacerbate the impact of other vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting.

Issue remediation

The TRACE method should be disabled on the web server.

Request

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: siteanalytics.compete.com
Cookie: 8cf04a6532970250

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:34 GMT
Server: Apache
Vary: Host
Connection: close
Content-Type: message/http

TRACE / HTTP/1.0
Host: siteanalytics.compete.com
Cookie: 8cf04a6532970250

4. Robots.txt file  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://siteanalytics.compete.com
Path:   /revresda.com

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: siteanalytics.compete.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 01:43:47 GMT
Server: Apache
Vary: Host
Last-Modified: Fri, 07 Jan 2011 22:32:13 GMT
ETag: "34877-c6-308c3540"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 198
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

User-Agent: *
Disallow: /s/load_tags/
Disallow: /s/async/
Disallow: /metrics/async/
Disallow: /uv/
Disallow: /m/profiles/site/

Sitemap: http://siteanalytics.compete.com/sitemap_index.xml

Report generated by Unforgivable Vulnerabilities, DORK Search, Exploit Research at Thu Jan 13 09:08:06 CST 2011.