Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload fe525"-alert(1)-"d116a885fd5 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /account.php HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=fe525"-alert(1)-"d116a885fd5 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=44260ee8414729770d83d5959fc035fe; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=A; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ANBC%253AChuck%253AChuck%2520Nerd%2520Herd%2520Cap%253ADetail%7C1297442193625%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_sq%3Ddelagentnbc%252Cdelagentglobalrollup%253D%252526pid%25253DNBC%25252520Universal%25252520Store%2525253ANBC%2525253AChuck%2525253AChuck%25252520Nerd%25252520Herd%25252520Cap%2525253ADetail%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttps%2525253A//secure.nbcuniversalstore.com/account.php%252526ot%25253DA%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2011 16:06:35 GMT Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 50951
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head>
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 65b49"-alert(1)-"80cb2e617c6 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /cart.php HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=65b49"-alert(1)-"80cb2e617c6 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=fc28e281c7fbf4148b5a2f888766a471; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=B; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; DACART=qKmgk5qRnaWskJc%253D; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ANBC%253AChuck%253AChuck%2520Nerd%2520Herd%2520Cap%253ADetail%7C1297440951058%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_sq%3Ddelagentnbc%252Cdelagentglobalrollup%253D%252526pid%25253DNBC%25252520Universal%25252520Store%2525253ANBC%2525253AChuck%2525253AChuck%25252520Nerd%25252520Herd%25252520Cap%2525253ADetail%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttps%2525253A//secure.nbcuniversalstore.com/cart.php%252526ot%25253DA%3B
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 78d24"-alert(1)-"76ee5a3b656a7dfb0 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
/************* DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! **************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code) //--> ...[SNIP]...
2. Password field submitted using GET methodpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://secure.nbcuniversalstore.com
Path:
/checkout.php
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted using the GET method:
https://secure.nbcuniversalstore.com/checkout.php
The form contains the following password field:
password
Issue background
The application uses the GET method to submit passwords, which are transmitted within the query string of the requested URL. Sensitive information within URLs may be logged in various locations, including the user's browser, the web server, and any forward or reverse proxy servers between the two endpoints. URLs may also be displayed on-screen, bookmarked or emailed around by users. They may be disclosed to third parties via the Referer header when any off-site links are followed. Placing passords into the URL increases the risk that they will be captured by an attacker.
Issue remediation
All forms submitting passwords should use the POST method. To achieve this, you should specify the method attribute of the FORM tag as method="POST". It may also be necessary to modify the corresponding server-side form handler to ensure that submitted passwords are properly retrieved from the message body, rather than the URL.
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
If the secure flag is set on a cookie, then browsers will not submit the cookie in any requests that use an unencrypted HTTP connection, thereby preventing the cookie from being trivially intercepted by an attacker monitoring network traffic. If the secure flag is not set, then the cookie will be transmitted in clear-text if the user visits any HTTP URLs within the cookie's scope. An attacker may be able to induce this event by feeding a user suitable links, either directly or via another web site. Even if the domain which issued the cookie does not host any content that is accessed over HTTP, an attacker may be able to use links of the form http://example.com:443/ to perform the same attack.
Issue remediation
The secure flag should be set on all cookies that are used for transmitting sensitive data when accessing content over HTTPS. If cookies are used to transmit session tokens, then areas of the application that are accessed over HTTPS should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /cart.php HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.nbcuniversalstore.com/detail.php?p=60458&v=nbc_chuck&ecid=PRF-TV2-101833&pa=PRF-TV2-101833 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=fc28e281c7fbf4148b5a2f888766a471; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=B; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; DACART=qKmgk5qRnaWskJc%253D; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ANBC%253AChuck%253AChuck%2520Nerd%2520Herd%2520Cap%253ADetail%7C1297440951058%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_sq%3Ddelagentnbc%252Cdelagentglobalrollup%253D%252526pid%25253DNBC%25252520Universal%25252520Store%2525253ANBC%2525253AChuck%2525253AChuck%25252520Nerd%25252520Herd%25252520Cap%2525253ADetail%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttps%2525253A//secure.nbcuniversalstore.com/cart.php%252526ot%25253DA%3B
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
A cookie's domain attribute determines which domains can access the cookie. Browsers will automatically submit the cookie in requests to in-scope domains, and those domains will also be able to access the cookie via JavaScript. If a cookie is scoped to a parent domain, then that cookie will be accessible by the parent domain and also by any other subdomains of the parent domain. If the cookie contains sensitive data (such as a session token) then this data may be accessible by less trusted or less secure applications residing at those domains, leading to a security compromise.
Issue remediation
By default, cookies are scoped to the issuing domain and all subdomains. If you remove the explicit domain attribute from your Set-cookie directive, then the cookie will have this default scope, which is safe and appropriate in most situations. If you particularly need a cookie to be accessible by a parent domain, then you should thoroughly review the security of the applications residing on that domain and its subdomains, and confirm that you are willing to trust the people and systems which support those applications.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /cart.php HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.nbcuniversalstore.com/detail.php?p=60458&v=nbc_chuck&ecid=PRF-TV2-101833&pa=PRF-TV2-101833 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=fc28e281c7fbf4148b5a2f888766a471; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=B; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; DACART=qKmgk5qRnaWskJc%253D; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ANBC%253AChuck%253AChuck%2520Nerd%2520Herd%2520Cap%253ADetail%7C1297440951058%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_sq%3Ddelagentnbc%252Cdelagentglobalrollup%253D%252526pid%25253DNBC%25252520Universal%25252520Store%2525253ANBC%2525253AChuck%2525253AChuck%25252520Nerd%25252520Herd%25252520Cap%2525253ADetail%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttps%2525253A//secure.nbcuniversalstore.com/cart.php%252526ot%25253DA%3B
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Request
GET /cart.php HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.nbcuniversalstore.com/detail.php?p=60458&v=nbc_chuck&ecid=PRF-TV2-101833&pa=PRF-TV2-101833 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=fc28e281c7fbf4148b5a2f888766a471; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=B; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; DACART=qKmgk5qRnaWskJc%253D; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ANBC%253AChuck%253AChuck%2520Nerd%2520Herd%2520Cap%253ADetail%7C1297440951058%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_sq%3Ddelagentnbc%252Cdelagentglobalrollup%253D%252526pid%25253DNBC%25252520Universal%25252520Store%2525253ANBC%2525253AChuck%2525253AChuck%25252520Nerd%25252520Herd%25252520Cap%2525253ADetail%252526pidt%25253D1%252526oid%25253Dhttps%2525253A//secure.nbcuniversalstore.com/cart.php%252526ot%25253DA%3B
The cookie does not appear to contain a session token, which may reduce the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
/* SiteCatalyst code version: H.17. Copyright 1997-2008 Omniture, Inc. More info available at http://www.omniture.com */ /************************ ADDITIONAL FEATURES ************************ Plu ...[SNIP]... .hav()+q+(qs?qs:s." +"rq(^C)),0,id,ta);qs`e;`Wm('t')`5s.p_r)s.p_r(`R`X`e}^7(qs);^z`p(@i;`l@i`L^9,`G$71',vb`R@G=^D=s.`N`i=s.`N^M=`F@0^y=s.ppu=^p=^pv1=^pv2=^pv3`e`5$x)`F@0@G=`F@0eo=`F@0`N`i=`F@0`N^M`e`5!id@Ls.tc#Ctc=1;s.f" +"lush`a()}`2$m`Atl`0o,t,n,vo`1;s.@G=@wo`R`N^M=t;s.`N`i=n;s.t(@i}`5pg){`F@0co`0o){`K@J\"_\",1,#B`2@wo)`Awd@0gs`0$S{`K@J$p1,#B`2s.t()`Awd@0dc`0$S{`K@J$p#B`2s.t()}}@3=(`F`J`Y`8`4@us@d0`Rd=^L; ...[SNIP]...
typeface.js, version 0.14 | typefacejs.neocracy.org
Copyright (c) 2008 - 2009, David Chester davidchester@gmx.net
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, includ ...[SNIP]...
Unless directed otherwise, browsers may store a local cached copy of content received from web servers. Some browsers, including Internet Explorer, cache content accessed via HTTPS. If sensitive information in application responses is stored in the local cache, then this may be retrieved by other users who have access to the same computer at a future time.
Issue remediation
The application should return caching directives instructing browsers not to store local copies of any sensitive data. Often, this can be achieved by configuring the web server to prevent caching for relevant paths within the web root. Alternatively, most web development platforms allow you to control the server's caching directives from within individual scripts. Ideally, the web server should return the following HTTP headers in all responses containing sensitive content:
Cache-control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Request
GET /nbcuniversalstore/layout/favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=fc28e281c7fbf4148b5a2f888766a471; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=B; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; DACART=qKmgk5qRnaWskJc%253D; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ACart%253AShopping%2520Cart%7C1297440968677%3B; s_sess=%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Last-Modified: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 20:13:44 GMT ETag: "1a8819d-37e-4949042d06e00" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 894 Content-Type: text/plain Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2011 15:45:50 GMT Connection: keep-alive
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/plain
The response states that it contains plain text. However, it actually appears to contain unrecognised content.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
Request
GET /nbcuniversalstore/layout/favicon.ico HTTP/1.1 Host: secure.nbcuniversalstore.com Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.94 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: SESSID=fc28e281c7fbf4148b5a2f888766a471; DASHORTNAME=nbcuniversalstore; DAABTEST=B; DAPART=PRF-TV2-101833; DACART=qKmgk5qRnaWskJc%253D; s_pers=%20gpv_pageName%3DNBC%2520Universal%2520Store%253ACart%253AShopping%2520Cart%7C1297440968677%3B; s_sess=%20s_campaign%3DPRF-TV2-101833%3B%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Last-Modified: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 20:13:44 GMT ETag: "1a8819d-37e-4949042d06e00" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 894 Content-Type: text/plain Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2011 15:45:50 GMT Connection: keep-alive