Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the class_evenrow request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c2996"><script>alert(1)</script>dc978e944ad was submitted in the class_evenrow parameter. This input was echoed as c2996\"><script>alert(1)</script>dc978e944ad in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the class_oddrow request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c1bb4"><script>alert(1)</script>f512881cb18 was submitted in the class_oddrow parameter. This input was echoed as c1bb4\"><script>alert(1)</script>f512881cb18 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the s request parameter is copied into a JavaScript expression which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 998ea%3balert(1)//2f06f50c960 was submitted in the s parameter. This input was echoed as 998ea;alert(1)//2f06f50c960 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET /common/js/aggregate.js?s=main|thePlatform/util|thePlatform/swfobject|tv_listing998ea%3balert(1)//2f06f50c960&menz=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.necn.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5db8d585898b23752022541cd48c0bd8
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:58 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:58 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 91199
function bigShowHide(inputString,direction){ var pairs = inputString.split(","); var directions = direction.split(","); for (var i=0; i<pairs.length; i++){ if(directions[i]){ direction = direc ...[SNIP]... </b>: include(/export/home/common/js/tv_listing998ea;alert(1)//2f06f50c960.js) [<a href='function.include'> ...[SNIP]...
The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:
http://www.necn.com/
The form contains the following password field:
login_password
Issue background
Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defense and monitor the traffic passing through switches.
Issue remediation
The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=2a02820e026de694b113032169f8e7dd; path=/ Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 98185
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:fb="http://www.facebook.com/2008/fbml"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <table width='100%' cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 border=0 bgcolor=''> <form enctype="multipart/form-data" action="/" Name= "" ID = "" method="post"> <tr> ...[SNIP]... <td>pass:<input type=password name='login_password' class='-1'></td> ...[SNIP]...
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=2a02820e026de694b113032169f8e7dd; path=/ Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 98185
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:fb="http://www.facebook.com/2008/fbml"> <head> ...[SNIP]...
4. Password field with autocomplete enabledpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.necn.com
Path:
/
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL:
http://www.necn.com/
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
login_password
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=2a02820e026de694b113032169f8e7dd; path=/ Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 98185
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:fb="http://www.facebook.com/2008/fbml"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <table width='100%' cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 border=0 bgcolor=''> <form enctype="multipart/form-data" action="/" Name= "" ID = "" method="post"> <tr> ...[SNIP]... <td>pass:<input type=password name='login_password' class='-1'></td> ...[SNIP]...
5. Cross-domain script includepreviousnext There are 2 instances of this issue:
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=2a02820e026de694b113032169f8e7dd; path=/ Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 98185
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:fb="http://www.facebook.com/2008/fbml"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <META name="keywords" content = "Boston news weather sports business New England video politics"> <script language="javascript" src="http://wac.24C5.edgecastcdn.net/8024C5/platform/common/js/jquery-1.4.2.min.js" type="text/javascript" language="javascript1.2"></script> ...[SNIP]... ionmini6~component_morningshowsubmit~component_morningshowpromo~component_latest_news_right~component_right_generic~component_footer/g=style~tv_listing/cscc=csnnat" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /> <script language="javascript" src="http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php/en_US" type="text/javascript" language="javascript1.2"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=1;sz=728x90;ord=1299847688?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=2;sz=184x90;ord=1299847688?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=4;sz=300x250;ord=1299847690?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=5;sz=300x250;ord=1299847690?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=6;sz=300x250;ord=1299847690?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=7;sz=728x90;ord=1299847690?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... <!-- begin ad tag --> <script language="JavaScript" src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/necn/home;tile=3;sz=60x33;ord=1299847690?" type="text/javascript"></script> ...[SNIP]... </div> <script src="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> ...[SNIP]...
The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:
helpmebrian@necn.com
jakethevet@necn.com
tedalditreatment@necn.com
Issue background
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=2a02820e026de694b113032169f8e7dd; path=/ Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 98185
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:fb="http://www.facebook.com/2008/fbml"> <head> ...[SNIP]... <a href="mailto: helpmebrian@necn.com"> ...[SNIP]... <a href="mailto:jakethevet@necn.com"> ...[SNIP]... <a href=mailto:tedalditreatment@necn.com"> ...[SNIP]...
7. HTML does not specify charsetpreviousnext There are 4 instances of this issue:
If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.
In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.
GET /common/js/aggregate.js?s=main|thePlatform/util|thePlatform/swfobject|tv_listing&menz=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.necn.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5db8d585898b23752022541cd48c0bd8
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 90989
function bigShowHide(inputString,direction){ var pairs = inputString.split(","); var directions = direction.split(","); for (var i=0; i<pairs.length; i++){ if(directions[i]){ direction = direc ...[SNIP]...
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/html
The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain script.
Request
GET /common/js/aggregate.js?s=main|thePlatform/util|thePlatform/swfobject|tv_listing&menz=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.necn.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5db8d585898b23752022541cd48c0bd8
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Type: text/html Vary: Accept-Encoding Expires: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store Pragma: no-cache Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:50 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 90989
function bigShowHide(inputString,direction){ var pairs = inputString.split(","); var directions = direction.split(","); for (var i=0; i<pairs.length; i++){ if(directions[i]){ direction = direc ...[SNIP]...
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: image/jpeg
The response states that it contains a JPEG image. However, it actually appears to contain a GIF image.
Request
GET /template_images/main_main_1034_background.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.necn.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5db8d585898b23752022541cd48c0bd8; __qca=P0-1553828670-1299847997445
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Last-Modified: Wed, 05 May 2010 19:41:35 GMT ETag: "159fc095-1fb7-38319c0" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 8119 Content-Type: image/jpeg Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:53 GMT Connection: close
GIF89a........_..Z..l..]..v..X.....W..Z..X..U. q. n. x..Z..]. ]..^..i..V.._..h..W..f. U..t.....y..p..a..Q..V..h. b. Z. i..i. f.....|.....q..n. t..r.....f..J..`..W..U..R. X..n..n..f..\.._.....w..Z. P.. ...[SNIP]...
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: image/jpeg
The response states that it contains a JPEG image. However, it actually appears to contain a GIF image.
Request
GET /template_images/main_main_1872_background.1291914844.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: www.necn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.necn.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.127 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5db8d585898b23752022541cd48c0bd8; __qca=P0-1553828670-1299847997445
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Last-Modified: Thu, 09 Dec 2010 17:14:04 GMT ETag: "10fec21a-1fb7-5d5b4f00" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 8119 Content-Type: image/jpeg Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2011 12:51:54 GMT Connection: close
GIF89a........_..Z..l..]..v..X.....W..Z..X..U. q. n. x..Z..]. ]..^..i..V.._..h..W..f. U..t.....y..p..a..Q..V..h. b. Z. i..i. f.....|.....q..n. t..r.....f..J..`..W..U..R. X..n..n..f..\.._.....w..Z. P.. ...[SNIP]...