Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 19fea%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f59d47f9f5a1 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 19fea";alert(1)//59d47f9f5a1 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ff292%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f0064ea15d33 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as ff292";alert(1)//0064ea15d33 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e4164%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f1a74d0f7646 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as e4164";alert(1)//1a74d0f7646 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 47a85%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f8a988fdc41c was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 47a85";alert(1)//8a988fdc41c in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 3f120%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f6f1ea5ebfd8 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 3f120";alert(1)//6f1ea5ebfd8 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 48917%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f856a1c192cc was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 48917";alert(1)//856a1c192cc in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a01d7%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f5239a336e5f was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as a01d7";alert(1)//5239a336e5f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 596f6%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f7b1d381910f was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 596f6";alert(1)//7b1d381910f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 572ac%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f4cc2ff36ba was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 572ac";alert(1)//4cc2ff36ba in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5538b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252ff41898ef8f was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 5538b";alert(1)//f41898ef8f in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7a2bf%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fa20a90febee was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 7a2bf";alert(1)//a20a90febee in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f11da%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fbfb51045d7 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as f11da";alert(1)//bfb51045d7 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload bf905%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fc979ed088f9 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as bf905";alert(1)//c979ed088f9 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload aac0a%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f28dad5a684 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as aac0a";alert(1)//28dad5a684 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload aad91%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f5c529586a56 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as aad91";alert(1)//5c529586a56 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload df8ad%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f78064835007 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as df8ad";alert(1)//78064835007 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 263fb%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fb9f4dd9dbce was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 263fb";alert(1)//b9f4dd9dbce in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload da712%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f5c626eb8514 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as da712";alert(1)//5c626eb8514 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6546f%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f3573798d42 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as 6546f";alert(1)//3573798d42 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /_assets6546f%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f3573798d42/swf/marquee/MarqueeRotator2.swf HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1; ASP.NET_SessionId=nfitblrcbop1mb4503th3045; sifrFetch=true; mbox=check#true#1302790957|session#1302790896490-398750#1302792757|PC#1302790896490-398750.17#1304000499; s_pers=%20s_evar18%3D%255B%255B'Direct%2520Load'%252C'1302790904672'%255D%255D%7C1460643704672%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20c_m%3DundefinedDirect%2520LoadDirect%2520Load%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 14:25:23 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: UrlRewriter.NET 2.0.0 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 84914
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 341bb%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252ff96397c168d was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as 341bb";alert(1)//f96397c168d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /_assets/swf341bb%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252ff96397c168d/marquee/MarqueeRotator2.swf HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1; ASP.NET_SessionId=nfitblrcbop1mb4503th3045; sifrFetch=true; mbox=check#true#1302790957|session#1302790896490-398750#1302792757|PC#1302790896490-398750.17#1304000499; s_pers=%20s_evar18%3D%255B%255B'Direct%2520Load'%252C'1302790904672'%255D%255D%7C1460643704672%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20c_m%3DundefinedDirect%2520LoadDirect%2520Load%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 14:25:26 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: UrlRewriter.NET 2.0.0 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 84916
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ada8b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f33e6cf59b97 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as ada8b";alert(1)//33e6cf59b97 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /_assets/swf/marqueeada8b%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f33e6cf59b97/MarqueeRotator2.swf HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1; ASP.NET_SessionId=nfitblrcbop1mb4503th3045; sifrFetch=true; mbox=check#true#1302790957|session#1302790896490-398750#1302792757|PC#1302790896490-398750.17#1304000499; s_pers=%20s_evar18%3D%255B%255B'Direct%2520Load'%252C'1302790904672'%255D%255D%7C1460643704672%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20c_m%3DundefinedDirect%2520LoadDirect%2520Load%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 14:25:29 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: UrlRewriter.NET 2.0.0 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 84916
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6391c%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f41ecf749792 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 6391c";alert(1)//41ecf749792 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /_assets/swf/marquee/MarqueeRotator2.swf6391c%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f41ecf749792 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1; ASP.NET_SessionId=nfitblrcbop1mb4503th3045; sifrFetch=true; mbox=check#true#1302790957|session#1302790896490-398750#1302792757|PC#1302790896490-398750.17#1304000499; s_pers=%20s_evar18%3D%255B%255B'Direct%2520Load'%252C'1302790904672'%255D%255D%7C1460643704672%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20c_m%3DundefinedDirect%2520LoadDirect%2520Load%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 14:25:32 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: UrlRewriter.NET 2.0.0 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 84916
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload e636a%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f431a86f0e36 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as e636a";alert(1)//431a86f0e36 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 2 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload c91a0%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252f7636ef56af7 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 2. This input was echoed as c91a0";alert(1)//7636ef56af7 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 2 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 3 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 5b7e4%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fe0dccbb4f7 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 3. This input was echoed as 5b7e4";alert(1)//e0dccbb4f7 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 3 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 71ad9%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252ffcef8333d72 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 71ad9";alert(1)//fcef8333d72 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
The value of REST URL parameter 1 is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a04ea%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fc2f34da51a6 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 1. This input was echoed as a04ea";alert(1)//c2f34da51a6 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 1 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.
Request
GET /favicon.icoa04ea%2522%253balert%25281%2529%252f%252fc2f34da51a6 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1; ASP.NET_SessionId=nfitblrcbop1mb4503th3045; sifrFetch=true; mbox=check#true#1302790957|session#1302790896490-398750#1302792757|PC#1302790896490-398750.17#1304000499; s_pers=%20s_evar18%3D%255B%255B'Direct%2520Load'%252C'1302790904672'%255D%255D%7C1460643704672%3B; s_sess=%20s_cc%3Dtrue%3B%20c_m%3DundefinedDirect%2520LoadDirect%2520Load%3B%20s_sq%3D%3B; s_vi=[CS]v1|26D38177851D3CD2-4000010440004BFD[CE]
Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defence and monitor the traffic passing through switches.
Issue remediation
The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.
Request
GET /usa/ResourceWriter.ashx?v=1.0&fileSet=JS_Functionality1&type=application/x-javascript HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Softwa ...[SNIP]... <div class="signInContent"><form><div class="signInErrors errors"> ...[SNIP]... <li class="row password"><input type="password" class="text signInPw" name="password" maxlength="14" /><input type="text" class="text defaultValue" value="' + passwordtextbox + '" /> ...[SNIP]...
The application publishes a Flash cross-domain policy which uses a wildcard to specify allowed domains, allows access from specific other domains, and allows access from specific subdomains.
Using a wildcard to specify allowed domains means that any domain matching the wildcard expression can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust every possible web site that may reside on a domain which matches the wildcard expression.
Allowing access from specific domains means that web sites on those domains can perform two-way interaction with this application. You should only use this policy if you fully trust the specific domains allowed by the policy.
Issue background
The Flash cross-domain policy controls whether Flash client components running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially gain full access to the application within the security context of the logged in user.
Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access.
Issue remediation
You should review the domains which are allowed by the Flash cross-domain policy and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to fully trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.
The application uses the GET method to submit passwords, which are transmitted within the query string of the requested URL. Sensitive information within URLs may be logged in various locations, including the user's browser, the web server, and any forward or reverse proxy servers between the two endpoints. URLs may also be displayed on-screen, bookmarked or emailed around by users. They may be disclosed to third parties via the Referer header when any off-site links are followed. Placing passords into the URL increases the risk that they will be captured by an attacker.
Issue remediation
All forms submitting passwords should use the POST method. To achieve this, you should specify the method attribute of the FORM tag as method="POST". It may also be necessary to modify the corresponding server-side form handler to ensure that submitted passwords are properly retrieved from the message body, rather than the URL.
Request
GET /usa/ResourceWriter.ashx?v=1.0&fileSet=JS_Functionality1&type=application/x-javascript HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Softwa ...[SNIP]... <div class="signInContent"><form><div class="signInErrors errors"> ...[SNIP]... <li class="row password"><input type="password" class="text signInPw" name="password" maxlength="14" /><input type="text" class="text defaultValue" value="' + passwordtextbox + '" /> ...[SNIP]...
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
password
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
Request
GET /usa/ResourceWriter.ashx?v=1.0&fileSet=JS_Functionality1&type=application/x-javascript HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Softwa ...[SNIP]... <div class="signInContent"><form><div class="signInErrors errors"> ...[SNIP]... <li class="row password"><input type="password" class="text signInPw" name="password" maxlength="14" /><input type="text" class="text defaultValue" value="' + passwordtextbox + '" /> ...[SNIP]...
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
id@Xs.tc
Issue background
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
Request
GET /usa/ResourceWriter.ashx?v=1.0&fileSet=JS_Functionality3&type=application/x-javascript HTTP/1.1 Host: www.avaya.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.avaya.com/usa/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.16 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/10.0.648.204 Safari/534.16 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQADSTQSQ=MHBFMCEDBJHDOBFGFNEKFDCB; DisplayedToolTip=Yes; ToolTipCount=1; ASP.NET_SessionId=nfitblrcbop1mb4503th3045; sifrFetch=true; mbox=check#true#1302790957|session#1302790896490-398750#1302792757
The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.
The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.
Issue remediation
The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honour the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorised access.
Request
GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0 Host: www.avaya.com
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: close Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 14:23:12 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: UrlRewriter.NET 2.0.0 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 2333 Vary: Accept-Encoding
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain XML.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.