The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:
http://www.bullhorn.com/community/index.php
The form contains the following password field:
passwd
Issue background
Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defense and monitor the traffic passing through switches.
Issue remediation
The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.
Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Remediation background
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 8af49'%3balert(1)//6d3335eef3a was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 8af49';alert(1)//6d3335eef3a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.bullhorn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=8af49'%3balert(1)//6d3335eef3a
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:17:40 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 Cneonction: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 53188
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 90e35'%3balert(1)//8c67f55178d was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 90e35';alert(1)//8c67f55178d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 92a81'%3balert(1)//07373d60016 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 92a81';alert(1)//07373d60016 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload e2fdb'%3balert(1)//d1f759de768 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as e2fdb';alert(1)//d1f759de768 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 397da"><script>alert(1)</script>39745fe9168 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 39e5b'%3balert(1)//7057166aaeb was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 39e5b';alert(1)//7057166aaeb in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 33149'%3balert(1)//c7f47ecfc28 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 33149';alert(1)//c7f47ecfc28 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload d947e'%3balert(1)//e2e3d6af923 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as d947e';alert(1)//e2e3d6af923 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 9691a'%3balert(1)//6f0becaefe3 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 9691a';alert(1)//6f0becaefe3 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 8600a'%3balert(1)//25028d39779 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed as 8600a';alert(1)//25028d39779 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 8c87b'%3balert(1)//0ae15de6c21 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 8c87b';alert(1)//0ae15de6c21 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 21dec'%3balert(1)//6ff5492e2c7 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as 21dec';alert(1)//6ff5492e2c7 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c47c1'%3balert(1)//d5df4907eb2 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as c47c1';alert(1)//d5df4907eb2 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c5b94'%3balert(1)//0fed8766a96 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as c5b94';alert(1)//0fed8766a96 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 31e4a'%3balert(1)//70e6e522df6 was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as 31e4a';alert(1)//70e6e522df6 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 14af1'%3balert(1)//7d72bfc3a61 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 14af1';alert(1)//7d72bfc3a61 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 5ece3'%3balert(1)//bb8e6afb61d was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as 5ece3';alert(1)//bb8e6afb61d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload f6809'%3balert(1)//6f5a374834 was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as f6809';alert(1)//6f5a374834 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 79dae"><script>alert(1)</script>5085ad8268b was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 38c3f'%3balert(1)//ff26501d804 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 38c3f';alert(1)//ff26501d804 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 23e4e"><script>alert(1)</script>e54beebc302 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload fbdea'%3balert(1)//ea89d798264 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as fbdea';alert(1)//ea89d798264 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 5ca13'%3balert(1)//f9ab46ecbae was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as 5ca13';alert(1)//f9ab46ecbae in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload ddf3c"><script>alert(1)</script>968f1f62871 was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 96883'%3balert(1)//de5a200a6e5 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 96883';alert(1)//de5a200a6e5 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 18975'%3balert(1)//9a49f91fd15 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as 18975';alert(1)//9a49f91fd15 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload f26b9'%3balert(1)//97dc34d096a was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as f26b9';alert(1)//97dc34d096a in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 9cc5f'%3balert(1)//02d920cb1de was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 9cc5f';alert(1)//02d920cb1de in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 475c6'%3balert(1)//ed66ccc32d was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as 475c6';alert(1)//ed66ccc32d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 71ef5'%3balert(1)//faa3f0aaf84 was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as 71ef5';alert(1)//faa3f0aaf84 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 6dc1f'%3balert(1)//d4def1d8e15 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 6dc1f';alert(1)//d4def1d8e15 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 940cb'%3balert(1)//96c4a5eb7af was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as 940cb';alert(1)//96c4a5eb7af in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 872ef'%3balert(1)//385d61336ec was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as 872ef';alert(1)//385d61336ec in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 1f3de'%3balert(1)//29c8dd62584 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 1f3de';alert(1)//29c8dd62584 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload c84b5'%3balert(1)//9ade8292c9 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as c84b5';alert(1)//9ade8292c9 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload dbc8a'%3balert(1)//485b5af7f43 was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as dbc8a';alert(1)//485b5af7f43 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadkeyword cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload 372f6'%3balert(1)//6612f1b3495 was submitted in the myleadkeyword cookie. This input was echoed as 372f6';alert(1)//6612f1b3495 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadpromocode cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload b2286'%3balert(1)//93480001b46 was submitted in the myleadpromocode cookie. This input was echoed as b2286';alert(1)//93480001b46 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
The value of the myleadsource cookie is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in single quotation marks. The payload b7a1e'%3balert(1)//9ab0616af25 was submitted in the myleadsource cookie. This input was echoed as b7a1e';alert(1)//9ab0616af25 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Remediation detail
Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.
3. Password field submitted using GET methodpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.bullhorn.com
Path:
/community/index.php
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted using the GET method:
http://www.bullhorn.com/community/index.php
The form contains the following password field:
passwd
Issue background
The application uses the GET method to submit passwords, which are transmitted within the query string of the requested URL. Sensitive information within URLs may be logged in various locations, including the user's browser, the web server, and any forward or reverse proxy servers between the two endpoints. URLs may also be displayed on-screen, bookmarked or emailed around by users. They may be disclosed to third parties via the Referer header when any off-site links are followed. Placing passords into the URL increases the risk that they will be captured by an attacker.
Issue remediation
All forms submitting passwords should use the POST method. To achieve this, you should specify the method attribute of the FORM tag as method="POST". It may also be necessary to modify the corresponding server-side form handler to ensure that submitted passwords are properly retrieved from the message body, rather than the URL.
The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:
PHPSESSID=rq45hl4argq4ggdl293p76vr47; path=/
The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.
Issue background
If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.
Issue remediation
There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.
You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:37:28 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=rq45hl4argq4ggdl293p76vr47; path=/ Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache X-Pingback: http://www.bullhorn.com/blog/xmlrpc.php Status: 200 OK Cneonction: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 50939
<script type="text/javascript"> function SubmitPartner(dm){ if(dm.txtcomments.value==""){ alert("Message on box required"); dm.txtcomments.focus(); } else if(dm.cmbpartner.value=="-1"){ alert ...[SNIP]...
5. Password field with autocomplete enabledpreviousnext
Summary
Severity:
Low
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
http://www.bullhorn.com
Path:
/community/index.php
Issue detail
The page contains a form with the following action URL:
http://www.bullhorn.com/community/index.php
The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:
passwd
Issue background
Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.
The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks.
Issue remediation
To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute autocomplete="off" within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).
The POSTing of data between domains does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. You should review the contents of the information that is being transmitted between domains, and determine whether the originating application should be trusting the receiving domain with this information.
When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.
If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.
You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.
Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behaviour should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.
Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.
Issue remediation
The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:38:59 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache nnCoection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 34510
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Conten ...[SNIP]... </span> <a href="http://www.bullhornsoftware.co.uk/"><span style="vertical-align:middle;"> ...[SNIP]... </a> <a href="http://www.bullhornsoftware.co.uk/"><span style="font-size:10px;"> ...[SNIP]... <li class="ligreyarrow"><a href="http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K" target="_new" class="inleftlink">Do you Twitter?</a> ...[SNIP]... <p><a href="http://gw.vtrenz.net/?KTFSQAXD2J"><img src="/images/BUL-021-Banner-Ad-Opt-A.gif" border="0" /> ...[SNIP]... <td align="left" valign="top" class="txt10pxinner"><a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2011/01/31/job-postings-up-dramatically.html" target="_blank" class="txt10pxinnerlink"> Job postings up dramatically </a> ...[SNIP]... <td align="left" valign="top" class="txt10pxinner"><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/jobs/30search.html/" target="_blank" class="txt10pxinnerlink">A Sign of Hope for More Hiring </a> ...[SNIP]... who was inducted into the MITX Innovation Hall of Fame, as well as a panel forum on “What’s Next for the Device Web – Emerging User Experiences.” For a complete list of winners <a href="http://www.mitxawards.org/technologyawards/finalists_winners.aspx?year=2007">please visit here</a> ...[SNIP]... <br /> Website by <a href="http://www.exclusiveconcepts.com" target="_blank" class="ecicopylink">Exclusive Concepts</a> ...[SNIP]...
8. Cross-domain script includepreviousnext There are 3 instances of this issue:
When an application includes a script from an external domain, this script is executed by the browser within the security context of the invoking application. The script can therefore do anything that the application's own scripts can do, such as accessing application data and performing actions within the context of the current user.
If you include a script from an external domain, then you are trusting that domain with the data and functionality of your application, and you are trusting the domain's own security to prevent an attacker from modifying the script to perform malicious actions within your application.
Issue remediation
Scripts should not be included from untrusted domains. If you have a requirement which a third-party script appears to fulfil, then you should ideally copy the contents of that script onto your own domain and include it from there. If that is not possible (e.g. for licensing reasons) then you should consider reimplementing the script's functionality within your own code.
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 11:05:03 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Fedora) Last-Modified: Tue, 27 Jul 2010 17:21:04 GMT ETag: "2c295a-2345-48c61b9d06000" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 9029 Cache-Control: max-age=14400,public Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 15:05:03 GMT nnCoection: close Content-Type: text/javascript
// ColorBox v1.3.9 - a full featured, light-weight, customizable lightbox based on jQuery 1.3 // c) 2009 Jack Moore - www.colorpowered.com - jack@colorpowered.com // Licensed under the MIT license: http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php (function(b,gb){var v="none",t="click",N="LoadedContent",d=false,x="resize.",o="y",u="auto",f=true,M="nofollow", ...[SNIP]...
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:40:30 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache nnCoection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 28537
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Conten ...[SNIP]... <!-- /*Shishir "sisir48@yahoo.com" Functionality to track Google PPC as a lead source. Creating Cookie */ --> ...[SNIP]...
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
The response states that it contains HTML. However, it actually appears to contain plain text.
Request
GET /bullhorn_poll//script1.php?homepath=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebullhorn%2Ecom%2Fbullhorn%5Fpoll%2F&home%5Fpath=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebullhorn%2Ecom%2Fbullhorn%5Fpoll%2F&count%5Fno=0&ID=&question=&answer%5Fno=0&answer1=0&answer2=0&answer3=0&answer4=0&answer5=0&answer6=0&answer7=0&answer8=0&count1=23&count2=55&count3=90&count4=10&count5=0&count6=3&count7=0&count8=0&skin=0&sel%5Foption=%5Btype+Function%5D&prepare%5Fdata=%5Btype+Function%5D&marime=%5Btype+Function%5D&arrange=%5Btype+Function%5D&scr2%5Fadr=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebullhorn%2Ecom%2Fbullhorn%5Fpoll%2F%2Fscript2%2Ephp&scr1%5Fadr=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebullhorn%2Ecom%2Fbullhorn%5Fpoll%2F%2Fscript1%2Ephp HTTP/1.1 Host: www.bullhorn.com Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.bullhorn.com/bullhorn_poll/poll/poll.swf?homepath=http://www.bullhorn.com/bullhorn_poll/ Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 Cookie: myleadsource=Direct; myleadpromocode=IWContactUsform; myleadkeyword=; __utmz=11940647.1299550653.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utma=11940647.797081035.1299550653.1299550653.1299550653.1; __utmc=11940647; __utmb=11940647.1.10.1299550653
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:17:30 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 Cache-Control: max-age=14400,public Cneonction: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 342
&ID=71&question=Which topic is most relevant to your business today?&answer_no=5&answer1=Getting the most out of your software and systems&answer2=Using metrics to better manage your business &answer ...[SNIP]...