Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data is copied from a request and echoed into the application's immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to construct a request which, if issued by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.
The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.
Users can be induced to issue the attacker's crafted request in various ways. For example, the attacker can send a victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or instant message. They can submit the link to popular web sites that allow content authoring, for example in blog comments. And they can create an innocuous looking web site which causes anyone viewing it to make arbitrary cross-domain requests to the vulnerable application (using either the GET or the POST method).
The security impact of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is dependent upon the nature of the vulnerable application, the kinds of data and functionality which it contains, and the other applications which belong to the same domain and organisation. If the application is used only to display non-sensitive public content, with no authentication or access control functionality, then a cross-site scripting flaw may be considered low risk. However, if the same application resides on a domain which can access cookies for other more security-critical applications, then the vulnerability could be used to attack those other applications, and so may be considered high risk. Similarly, if the organisation which owns the application is a likely target for phishing attacks, then the vulnerability could be leveraged to lend credibility to such attacks, by injecting Trojan functionality into the vulnerable application, and exploiting users' trust in the organisation in order to capture credentials for other applications which it owns. In many kinds of application, such as those providing online banking functionality, cross-site scripting should always be considered high risk.
Issue remediation
In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences:
Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised.
User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc).
In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task.
The value of the contact%5Bemail%5D request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 64730%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%20f433ec27faf484d61 was submitted in the contact%5Bemail%5D parameter. This input was echoed as 64730 style=x:expression(alert(1)) f433ec27faf484d61 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
Element.update("contactform", "For general information, queries and comments please use the the form below\n<form action=\"/contact\" method=\"post\" onsubmit=\"new Ajax.Request('/contact', {asynchron ...[SNIP]... <input id=\"contact_email\" name=\"contact[email]\" size=\"30\" type=\"text\" value=\"64730 style=x:expression(alert(1)) f433ec27faf484d61\" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the contact%5Bname%5D request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload 8ed73%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%2090aac5c669584716d was submitted in the contact%5Bname%5D parameter. This input was echoed as 8ed73 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 90aac5c669584716d in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
Element.update("contactform", "For general information, queries and comments please use the the form below\n<form action=\"/contact\" method=\"post\" onsubmit=\"new Ajax.Request('/contact', {asynchron ...[SNIP]... <input id=\"contact_name\" name=\"contact[name]\" size=\"30\" type=\"text\" value=\"8ed73 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 90aac5c669584716d\" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the contact%5Bsubject%5D request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is not encapsulated in any quotation marks. The payload a6ad1%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%20870f8b9852762ce05 was submitted in the contact%5Bsubject%5D parameter. This input was echoed as a6ad1 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 870f8b9852762ce05 in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
Element.update("contactform", "For general information, queries and comments please use the the form below\n<form action=\"/contact\" method=\"post\" onsubmit=\"new Ajax.Request('/contact', {asynchron ...[SNIP]... <input id=\"contact_subject\" name=\"contact[subject]\" size=\"30\" type=\"text\" value=\"a6ad1 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 870f8b9852762ce05\" /> ...[SNIP]...
The value of the contact%5Bsubject%5D request parameter is copied into the name of an HTML tag attribute. The payload 26d15%20style%3dx%3aexpression(alert(1))%207c016ea84c444acdb was submitted in the contact%5Bsubject%5D parameter. This input was echoed as 26d15 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 7c016ea84c444acdb in the application's response.
This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. The PoC attack demonstrated uses a dynamically evaluated expression with a style attribute to introduce arbitrary JavaScript into the document. Note that this technique is specific to Internet Explorer, and may not work on other browsers.
The original request used the POST method, however it was possible to convert the request to use the GET method, to enable easier demonstration and delivery of the attack.
Element.update("contactform", "For general information, queries and comments please use the the form below\n<form action=\"/contact\" method=\"post\" onsubmit=\"new Ajax.Request('/contact', {asynchron ...[SNIP]... <input id=\"contact_subject\" name=\"contact[subject]\" size=\"30\" type=\"text\" value=\"Inquiring about Card Recon26d15 style=x:expression(alert(1)) 7c016ea84c444acdb\" /> ...[SNIP]...
The following email address was disclosed in the response:
media@groundlabs.com
Issue background
The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.
However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organisation's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.
Issue remediation
You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).
The response contains the following Content-type statement:
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
The response states that it contains script. However, it actually appears to contain HTML.
Issue background
If a web response specifies an incorrect content type, then browsers may process the response in unexpected ways. If the specified content type is a renderable text-based format, then the browser will usually attempt to parse and render the response in that format. If the specified type is an image format, then the browser will usually detect the anomaly and will analyse the actual content and attempt to determine its MIME type. Either case can lead to unexpected results, and if the content contains any user-controllable data may lead to cross-site scripting or other client-side vulnerabilities.
In most cases, the presence of an incorrect content type statement does not constitute a security flaw, particularly if the response contains static content. You should review the contents of the response and the context in which it appears to determine whether any vulnerability exists.
Issue remediation
For every response containing a message body, the application should include a single Content-type header which correctly and unambiguously states the MIME type of the content in the response body.
Element.update("contactform", "For general information, queries and comments please use the the form below\n<form action=\"/contact\" method=\"post\" onsubmit=\"new Ajax.Request('/contact', {asynchron ...[SNIP]...
Report generated by XSS.CX at Fri Sep 16 13:55:51 CDT 2011.
